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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the dependability of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs). We propose an approach, inspired by the immune system, that al-
lows individual nodes to detect, diagnose and recover from different failures
by switching between different protocols using a multi-modal switching mech-
anism. A causal link between different failures in WSN is identified. Existing
fault tolerance in WSNs approaches are examined. From the survey, it is identi-
fied that various attempts have been made to improve the fault tolerance of the
communication protocol especially in the routing protocols. Although tests have
been performed to evaluate the communication protocols prior to deployment,
failures in WSNs are still being reported when deployed in real environments.
A Systematic Protocol Evaluation Technique (SPET) is proposed and applied to
evaluate the dependability of the proposed multi-modal protocol and reduce the
uncertainties in the experiment and to demonstrate the confidence in the mea-
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of a number of wireless sensor nodes
that are deployed across an area of interest to perform surveillance and moni-
toring tasks (Akyildiz and Vuran, 2010). They have become a popular area of
research in recent years due to their huge potential to be used in various ap-
plications. Ever since the first smart dust military project proposed by Kahn
et al. (1999) using small communication device, different application areas have
emerged including wildlife monitoring (Mainwaring et al., 2002; Anthony et al.,
2012), plantation monitoring (Langendoen et al., 2006), health-care (Malan et al.,
2004), fire detection systems (Liu et al., 2013), and military operation (Le´deczi
et al., 2005). With the adoption of WSNs in safety critical systems, it is not only
sufficient for WSNs to maintain operating for a long period of time with best ef-
fort delivery service. They must provide a reliable end-to-end communication for
the application to maintain operation. Despite various success stories of WSNs in
test environments, evidence from previous deployments have shown unaccept-
able levels of reliability (Shakshuki et al., 2009). With limited and irreplaceable
energy resources available in the node, nodes can fail due to battery depletion.
The energy consumption highly depends on the protocols operating on the node.
There is a need to improve the reliability and efficiency of the WSNs protocols in
order to operate in a dynamic and changing environment.
1
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Sensor nodes are originally designed to monitor and collect information from the
environment and send the information to a central location over a wired network.
These nodes usually rely on their on-board local power sources such as batteries
or energy harvesting device for data collection, processing and communication.
With the recent advancement in microchip and communication technology, the
wired communication module has been replaced with a tiny radio transmitter
that has the capability to transmit over the air (Chong and Kumar, 2003). Con-
sequently, each sensor node becomes an independent and autonomous unit that
has the ability to forward its data using the radio as a means of communication.
This provides an extra level of flexibility for the sensor nodes to be deployed any-
where, anytime without the needs for expensive wiring. As a result, WSNs can
be applied to various applications ranging from toys to household applications,
from hobbies to safety critical applications.
1.1.2 Dependable Wireless Sensor Networks
For the WSNs to be applicable to safety critical systems and acceptable to the
users, the individual nodes, including the hardware components and software
running on it, must be made dependable to provide the level of service required
for the application to function. According to Avizienis and Laprie (1986), a net-
work can only be dependable if ”reliance can justifiably be placed on the services it
delivers”. This definition highlights the need for a network to have confidence
and be trustworthy. A more measurable definition of dependability is stated by
Avizienis et al. (2004a) as:
”The ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe
than is acceptable to the user(s).”
There is a need to avoid failure that may lead to negative consequences on the
systems affecting their operations and dependability. Avizienis et al. (2004a) has
described dependability as an integrated concept that constitutes of the following
attributes namely availability, reliability, safety, integrity, and maintainability. In
this thesis, we focus mainly on the operation aspects of dependability namely Re-
liability and Availability. Based on these properties, a definition of dependable
WSNs for our research works is:
The ability for the networks to deliver the level of service, in term of packet




1.1.3 Effect of Radio Abnormality on the Dependability of Wire-
less Sensor Networks
With the use of wireless channels, the radio and the packet data can easily be
exposed and subjected to anomalies (Karlof and Wagner, 2003). According to
Chandola et al. (2009), anomalies are observations that do not correspond to a well
defined notion of normal behaviours. Anomalies in WSNs can be caused by errors,
malfunction and attacks. These anomalies may cause the network software to
function properly or even lead to network outage, affecting the dependability
of the WSNs. The fact that the nodes share the same radio frequency spectrum
used by other wireless devices cannot always guarantee a reliable communica-
tion, making them vulnerable to signal distortion, ambient noise and interference.
Studies by Boers et al. (2010) have shown that interferences created by these wire-
less devices can disrupt the normal routing operation of the sensor node leading
to significant packet losses and delays. As a reliable communication is an impor-
tant aspect in the safety critical systems, a dependable routing is required that is
resistant to the network anomalies related to radio interference.
1.1.4 Dependable Routing
To achieve sufficient level of dependability in WSNs, different fault prevention
and recovery solutions have been proposed in the WSN literature to tolerate fail-
ure either through the development of new protocols or enhancement of existing
protocols. Most of these works have focused on reactive routing due to its en-
ergy saving on-demand ability to discover a new route when communications
between two nodes are required.
Reactive routing protocols such as Adhoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
have the ability to discover the route when required (Perkins and Royer, 1999).
AODV uses the flooding mechanism to broadcast the route request to determine
for new route during failure and can be very expensive to perform. Hence, it must
be used sparingly. AODV does not distinguish failure. It relies on the link layer
feedback and the distance traverse by the packet to determine whether to broad-
cast for new route or drop the packet. As WSNs are prone to different failures
with different durations caused by neighbouring nodes, external radio devices,
moving object and operating environments, nodes can suffer from transient, in-
termittent and permanent failure. A combination of these failures can occur and
produce a complex unpredictable behaviour that cannot be addressed with a sin-
gle protocol. For example, transient failures may trigger the link layer to notify
failure to the AODV and result in route discovery. When the next-hop neighbour
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experiencing the transient failure recovers, it will respond to the request while
other nodes propagate the route request to all its local nodes. This will create a
ripple effect that may congest the network. It is necessary to provide a reliable
mechanism for the nodes to change their routing strategy according to the cur-
rent network topology in order to re-establish the network connection. This leads
to a motivation to investigate the potential of integrating different routing proto-
cols to switch between different protocols for different interferences in order to
answer the first research question below:
Research Question 1: Can we improve the dependability of WSNs by in-
tegrating and switching between different routing protocols using a multi
modal approach to function according to its operating environments?
1.1.5 Fault Tolerance Approach toward Dependability
In order to provide an appropriate routing strategy, the node must be able to
identify and diagnose the failure quickly and reliably. It is necessary to build
a fault tolerance network that has the ability to deliver the required service in
the presence of faults (Avizienis et al., 2004a). The first step toward tolerance is
detection.
Anomaly detection in WSNs has attracted significant attention over the last 10
years based on comparing the current network condition with a normal network
pattern (Xie et al., 2011). Any deviation from the normal pattern will be declared
as anomaly. To design an Anomaly Detection System (ADS) for WSNs is a chal-
lenging task due to the limited resources in the nodes. Most of the techniques in-
vestigated by Xie et al. (2011) are based on the assumption that the normal model
does not change during operational time and it is generated offline. This is not
practical in WSNs due to dynamic operating environments of the sensor nodes
triggering a change in the normal model. The inaccessibility of the nodes and the
limited network communication bandwidth can make the nodes difficult to be
updated. Hence, the nodes should be able to detect changes in their environment
online and update the normal model individually. Another problem with current
WSN’s ADS is that none of the fault tolerance detections has been implemented
as most existing WSNs ADS highlighted by Karlof and Wagner (2003) are tailored
toward malicious attacks.
Alternative fault tolerance approaches based on immune systems called Ar-
tificial Immune System (AIS) have been applied in a wide variety of application
areas to maintain the systems integrity and functionality (Hart and Timmis, 2008).
De Castro and Timmis (2002) define AIS as ”Adaptive systems, inspired by theoretical
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immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models, which are applied
to problem solving”. Over the years, many immune-inspired ADSs have been suc-
cessfully applied to WSNs to detect and recovery from anomalies (Davoudani
et al., 2007; Wallenta et al., 2010). This is partly motivated by the analogy be-
tween the characteristics of WSNs and the immune system such as distributed,
autonomous, self-organise, scalable and prone to failures. As WSNs nodes are
susceptible to interference from other radio emitting devices, there is a need to
investigate the immune theories to integrate detection, diagnostic and recovery
to rectify these failures and improve the response rate, energy efficiency and de-
pendability of the WSNs. This motivates the application of AIS to address the
second research question:
Research Question 2: Can an immune-inspired algorithm be applied to assist
the routing protocol to detect and classify the different characteristics of the
non-intentional interference in order to recover from network failures?
1.1.6 Establishing Dependability with Confidence
The task to demonstrate dependable WSNs does not only involve the develop-
ment of a reliable protocol, but also the evaluation process must provide a suf-
ficient level of confidence that the protocol is dependable. Due to the high cost
in deploying real sensor motes, researchers have used experimental tools such
as simulator (NS2, 2002) and pilot study (Szewczyk et al., 2004) to evaluate the
dependability of WSNs. Like any other software, the routing protocol must be
tested comprehensively using those tools before it is deployed to remove any er-
ror that may be introduced during design and testing. There is a need to assess
the confidence regarding the achievable dependability level of the routing proto-
cols.
Designing a good testing strategy based on the real world is not always easy
(Langendoen et al., 2006). WSN systems too often fail to provide expected re-
sults once deployed. It is complicated and complex to capture and model the real
environment in simulation. Real Deployment usually fails even though it has
been tested repeatedly. Langendoen et al. (2006) claim that the design and testing
of WSNs protocols are hardened by the lack of effective testing and evaluation
approach to produce a confident feedback on a critical figure of merit such as
packet delivery reliability and network availability, that is necessary when trying
to assess the network ability to perform within a persistent level of dependability
across different operating environments. There is a need to conduct a compre-
hensive evaluation to analyse the level of tolerance on uncertainty that presence
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in an experiment. Hence, statistical analysis is necessary to reduce the impact of
uncertainty in order to achieve a sufficient level of confidence that is a representa-
tive of the prognostic results. A combination of simulation and sensor hardwares
is used to evaluate the dependable routing protocol of WSNs to investigate the
third research question:
Research Question 3: Can the dependability of network protocol be demon-
strated by reducing the experimental uncertainty using state of the art sta-
tistical techniques?
1.2 Statement of Hypothesis
Based on the motivations and research questions highlighted in the previous sec-
tion, the hypothesis of this thesis is formalised as follows:
Dynamically switching routing protocols can improve a Wireless Sensor Network’s
performance based on immune-inspired monitoring, however understanding its
performance requires a systematic statistical evaluation.
1.3 Contributions
In Chapter 2, a survey on the existing literature has revealed that the components
of the WSNs are unreliable and prone to failure. The issues of dependability
have been widely ignored. Failures can occur in different parts of the WSNs. A
causal link between the failures is identified. In order to satisfy the dependability
of the emerging sensor network application, the key design properties required
for a dependable WSN are proposed namely: fault tolerance, energy efficiency,
scalability and adaptability. To evaluate the fault tolerance approaches applied in
WSNs, a comprehensive survey is conducted. The results from the analysis have
shown that there are still some gaps in the existing fault tolerance techniques
applied in the WSNs protocols such as the ability to adapt to different failures,
integrated fault tolerance to repair the network, and dynamic detection model.
It is necessary to construct an experimental testbed and evaluate the depend-
ability of the WSNs protocols to identify the limitation highlighted in Chapter 2.
A dependability assessment of existing protocols in WSNs is presented in Chap-
ter 3. The methodology employed to evaluate the performance of the WSNs is
described. An interference model based on the ON/OFF model to simulate the
failures generated by radio emitting devices is proposed. The results from the
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simulation on different routing protocols have demonstrated that a routing pro-
tocol does not always give the same performance when different failures are in-
troduced. One protocol may outperform the other in condition X, but the oppo-
site in Condition Y where X and Y represent different failure conditions. There is
a need to adapt the routing protocol according to the failures.
The main contribution of the work is presented in Chapter 4 to address the
single modal issue highlighted in Chapter 3. A multimodal technique to switch
between different operating modes is proposed in order to adapt the changing
environment. This approach is implemented in the network layers using the re-
active routing protocol as a case study. A Multi-modal Routing Protocol (MRP)
is presented and evaluated on a simulator to measure its reliability and perfor-
mance. The simulated results have shown that the multimodal approach has a
higher dependability compared to a single mode.
The second main contribution in Chapter 5 applies the immune-inspired algo-
rithms to assist the MRP to provide a co-ordinated automated recovery. An AIS
algorithm, the Receptor Density Algorithms (RDA) proposed by Owens et al.
(2012), is extended to identify the failures and interact with MRP to provide a
response in order to rectify the failure. The Interference Detection and Recovery
Systems (IDRS) is proposed and evaluated in real hardware and simulation. The
IDRS has improved the response provided by the routing protocol.
Chapter 6 presents a systematic evaluation approach to demonstrate the de-
pendability of the protocol using non-parametric statistical techniques. A Sys-
tematic Protocol Evaluation Technique (SPET) is proposed to reduce the uncer-
tainties in the experiment and to assess the confidence of the measurements taken
from the experiments. The Conceptual Statistical Test Framework (CSTF) is pro-
posed to cross-validate the results obtained from both hardware and simulations
in SPET. By using SPET, the dependability of the protocol can be evaluated and
the confidence level on the dependability can be measured.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
• Chapter 2 introduces the WSNs and the importance of dependability in WSNs.
It presents the threats in WSNs that can affect the dependability of the network
and investigates some of the fault tolerant approaches applied to WSNs. A
survey of existing routing protocols and the current state of the art approaches
to evaluate the performance of the routing protocols is presented.
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• Chapter 3 provides some of the existing methods to evaluate the performance
of the WSNs. A comparison between four commonly used reactive routing
protocols is evaluated by simulation to assess the ability to rectify anomalies in
a dynamic environment.
• Chapter 4 proposes the Multi-Modal approaches to improve the fault tolerance
of the routing protocol in a dynamic changing environment. It re-uses and
integrates existing reactive routing protocols presented in Chapter 3 to switch
between different operating modes to handle different failure conditions. The
robustness and scalability of the routing protocol are analysed and evaluated
using a simulator.
• It is necessary to determine the cause of the failure online in order to provide
a quick and effective response. Chapter 5 introduces an immune-inspired al-
gorithm called the Receptor Density Algorithms (RDA) to classify the current
radio patterns collected by the nodes to improve the recovery. The RDA is
integrated with MRP to provide an automated self-healing system to detect,
diagnose and respond based on the current state of the networks. The relia-
bility and the overhead generated by IDRS are evaluated against MRP in both
real hardwares and simulation.
• In order to demonstrate the dependability of the proposed MRP, we propose
a statistical approach to evaluate the WSNs in Chapter 6. It applies the con-
cept of Correctness, Consistency, Completeness, and Cost-effectiveness (4Cs)
to measure the effectiveness of the different evaluation strategy. A systematic
protocol Evaluation Technique (SPET) is proposed in order to establish confi-
dence in both the simulation and the real world WSNs deployment. The MRP
is used as a case study to evaluate the benefit of SPET.
• In Chapter 7, the thesis is concluded with a discussion of the main contribu-




Towards a Dependable Wireless
Sensor Networks
In order to understand the issues of dependability in WSNs, it is essential to in-
troduce the fundamental components in Section 2.1, and present the properties
of the WSNs in Section 2.2. We highlight the needs of a dependable WSNs in
Section 2.3. The concept of failure in WSNs is formalised in Section 2.4 before
different failures in WSNs are investigated in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 highlights
some of the existing fault tolerance approaches to detect, diagnose and recover
from these faults and identifies some of the limitations of existing approaches.
In order to investigate the potential of the application of immune-inspired solu-
tion to address the limitations, an introduction of the immunological theory and
a review of existing algorithms applied in a fault tolerance system are presented
in Section 2.7. As the routing protocol plays an important role in ensuring the
operation of the WSNs, different reactive routing protocols are introduced and
compared in Section 2.8. In order to evaluate the dependability of these routing
protocols. existing state of the art experimental approaches is presented in Sec-
tion 2.9. This chapter concludes with a summary of the key challenges in Section
2.10.
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
WSNs consist of spatially distributed autonomous wireless sensing devices that
interact with the environment to capture and send the data to the user through
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a computer system (Akyildiz and Vuran, 2010). It may range from tens to thou-
sands of sensor nodes distributed across a wide area. The nodes are usually de-
ployed in a predefined location to provide complete coverage (Zou and Chakrabarty,
2007). During operation, a source serves as an interface to the real world to mon-
itor and collect environmental information. This information is processed into
data packets before they are transmitted to the sink or base station via a single-
hop or multihop network depending on the distance between the source and the
sink as shown in Figure 2.1. Single-hop network provides a better data delivery
reliability than multihop network as each transmitted packet can immediately
be acknowledged by the sink upon receiving the data packet (Brownfield et al.,
2006). However, the source may its transmission range if the destination is out-
side the boundary of the transmission range of the source, requiring more energy
resources that may reduce the network life (Raghunathan et al., 2002). In con-
trast, a node in a multihop network can communicate with other nodes at a lower
transmission power as long as the two nodes are within their radio transmission
range. This reduces the energy consumption in the node. Hence, the multihop







Processing and Monitoring Station
Figure 2.1: WSNs deployment showing the single-hop (left) and multihop net-
work (right). In a multihop network, a routing protocol is required.
As shown in Figure 2.2(a), each mote can be divided into two units: the core
unit and the optional unit. The core unit hosts the main components required
for the mote to function. The optional unit may consist of sensors board, charg-
ing module, position locator and response module (Akyildiz et al., 2002). The
microprocessor of a typical node shown in Figure 2.2(b) usually has a limited
processing power to run the systems software and process the sensed data. The
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memory module is usually small in size of around 10K bytes of RAM and 100K
bytes of flash RAM for data, configurations and application storage. The commu-
nication module consists of a radio transceiver and is used to transmit or receive
packets. The mote can either be powered directly from an energy source such
as a computer or from a battery source (Sohraby et al., 2007). The lifespan of
a battery powered node highly depends on the energy utilisation consumed by
the operations of the individual node. Energy harvesting techniques such as so-
lar and vibration have been proposed as an alternative energy source. However,
Anthony et al. (2012) have shown that sensor motes cannot always benefit from
these technologies as these energy sources are not always available for charging.





























(a) The components of a mote (b) A Typical commercial node (TelosB mote)
Figure 2.2: An example of WSNs Hardware
For a node to perform the task assigned, specialised system software are in-
stalled and run on the mote to regulate its operation. Due to the limited resources
in the node, these software are usually designed with careful consideration on the
resource availability with minimal complexity.
Communication Stack
WSNs build on the IEEE 802.15.4 multi-layered standard for low-rate wireless
personal area networks (WPAN) to provide the physical and link layer frame-
work for low data rate communications systems and low power consumption
application (Howitt and Gutierrez, 2003). Additional network and the transport
layers are defined by the WSN industrial standards. The functionalities of each
layer are described below.
• Physical layer (PHY) acts as an interface to radio channel and controls the
functions related to the radio frequency (RF) transceiver such as the trans-
mission and reception of the packets, the clear channel assessment (CCA),
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and RF energy detection (ED). Simple data modulation, transmitting and
receiving techniques have been used to reduce complexity and energy re-
quirements of the WSN. CCA detects the channel occupancy by perform-
ing ED or Carrier Sense (CS). Commercial sensor node shares the same RF
with other wireless devices and operates at 2.4 GHz, using the 16 channels
available under the IEEE 802.15.4, each labelled sequentially from 11 to 26
(IEEE, 2006a). As illustrated in Figure 2.3, some of these channels overlap
with other home devices like Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) and
can interfere with the radio and the operation of the nodes. Although in-
dustrial standards such as WirelessHART (Song et al., 2008) and ISA100.11a
(ISA100, 2009) address the issue of interference by employing Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) where the channel used for data trans-
mission will alternate in random sequence at packet level, an agreement on
the frequency to use is necessary. It does not overcome the interference from
other devices using similar approaches such as Bluetooth. Hence, it is criti-
cal to identify and overcome these interferences in order to reduce failures.
The frequency hopping mechanism can be applied for recovery.
2.405  2.410  2.415  2.420  2.425  2.430  2.435  2.440  2.445  2.450  2.455  2.460  2.465  2.470  2.475  2.480
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Ch 1   Ch 2     Ch 3 Ch 4   Ch 5    Ch 6 Ch 7    Ch 8    Ch 9 Ch 10  Ch 11  Ch 12 Ch 13  Ch 14  Ch 15  Ch 16
Ch 1 Ch 6 Ch 11
802.14.5
Networks
802.11 b,g and n
Networks
Figure 2.3: Frequency Allocation for WSNs starts from channel 11 to 26. Channel
26 is usually used in WSN experiment as it is not utilised by WLAN (802.11).
• Data link layer provides functions such as Medium Access Control (MAC),
error detection and control. It is responsible for the establishment of a re-
liable link between the nodes. The MAC protocol plays an important role
in deciding the network protocol to be implemented in the layer above in
order for the communication stack to function correctly. The topology of
the network is also dictated by the MAC protocols used in which protocols
12
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
such as the Time division multiple access (TDMA) usually has hierarchi-
cal topology while Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) is mostly flat-based. The IEEE 802.15.4 uses the CSMA/CA as
the default MAC protocol. It is flexible and does not require any time syn-
chronisation (IEEE, 2006a). Assigning an effective time schedule in TDMA
can be very difficult and expensive to perform in WSNs especially in a large
network. Hence, the CSMA/CA protocol is used in this thesis.
• Network layer hosts the routing function including the network addressing,
packet forwarding and the error recovery. It is dependent on the applica-
tion requirement and network architecture. The routing function usually
relies on the link layer to detect failures. It maintains the quality of service
required by the transport and application layers. Although conventional
data distribution approaches like flooding and gossiping can be applied
to send the data across the network, it can create unnecessary wastage in
the communication bandwidth and energy by sending redundant informa-
tion across the networks (Zhang et al., 2009). Hence, a routing protocol is
necessary to forward the data packet across the multihop network, control
network flow and reduce communication overhead.
• Transport layer maintains the reliability and quality of data flow between
nodes. It provides packet-loss recovery and congestion control mechanism
caused by network congestion, packet collision, buffer overflow and node
failure. Currently, the two approaches applied are based on the node-to-
node or end-to-end reliability. In the node-to-node reliability, intermediate
nodes in the networks store the forwarding packet in their buffer (Wan et al.,
2005). The end-to-end reliability uses an end-to-end transmission in which
the source will keep all the transmitted packets until an acknowledgement
is received (Iyer et al., 2005). Both protocols require communications be-
tween the sender and receiver to update the delivery status. Due to the lim-
ited memory space to buffer the forwarding packets, industrial standards
such as like ZigBee and Specknet have omitted the transport layer (Arvind
and Wong, 2004). They attempt to provide the reliability function at the
lower layer of the communication stack to reduce the processing and com-
munication overhead between layers.
Applications layer
The application layer hosts the software that is responsible for presenting the
information to the users, provides interface to the environment and accepts re-
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quests from the layer below. Langendoen (2008) classifies the types of WSNs
applications into periodic-based and event-based. In periodic-based application,
data is captured and sent to the end users periodically, for instance every 30 sec-
onds for a pulse oximetry application (Chipara et al., 2010). In event-based appli-
cation, the source only detects and sends critical information to the users when
an unusual event is detected by the sensor (Liu et al., 2010). In a static network,
the periodic-based application usually discovers the path to the sink when it is
first set up and is only updated when there is a communication failure along the
route. In contrast, the routing information for an event-based application may
need to be checked or updated more frequently to ensure that the path to the sink
is still exist and the routers are alive. Both types of applications generally require
to operate over a period time in order to provide the services required.
2.2 Design Challenges in WSNs
In recent years, a large body of research in WSNs has evolved in improving
the communication protocol in order to prolong the operation of the networks
(Hatler, 2012). Only a limited number focuses on improving the reliability and
robustness of the WSNs. During the development of any WSNs protocol, it is
essential to address and incorporate the following properties of the WSNs in the
design:
P1: The resources availability such as memory and processing, communication
bandwidth and the radio capability on the nodes. The nodes are usually
resource constraints.
P2: The high density of the sensor nodes.
P3: The uncontrollable operation of the wireless medium due to interference, fad-
ing and contention making the network prone to failure,
P4: The dynamic topology of the network that is distributed and autonomous with-
out a centralised controller.
P5: The realisation of the reliable operation during real deployment network.
In order to satisfy the dependability of the emerging sensor network appli-
cation, the design of the WSNs hardware and system software must exhibit the
following properties including fault tolerant, energy efficiency, scalability and
adaptability.
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2.2.1 Tolerate failure
In a fault-tolerant network, the nodes must have the ability to deal with nodes or
links failure to maintain reliability and provide continuous operation of the net-
works. Explicit fault tolerant can be provided if there are a sufficient number of
redundant nodes available to provide the coverage required for sensing or com-
munication (Luo et al., 2006). However, to determine the minimum number of
the nodes without the nodes interfering with each other can be a challenge. As
a result, implicit detection and recovery are necessary to improve the reliability
and robustness of the nodes to failure. One technique to achieve reliability is by
retransmission (Balakrishnan et al., 1997). Zheng et al. (2011) highlight that re-
transmission in WSNs can improve the packet delivery when wireless channel is
in a mild or bad condition. However, maximising the reliability through retrans-
mission may increase the network energy consumption substantially and increase
packet delay that may affect the timeliness of the packet received (Fonseca et al.,
2006). Depending on the type of applications, timing delay may dictate the per-
formance and stability of a control system (Moyne and Tilbury, 2007). Hence, the
network designers need to consider the trade-off between reliability and energy
consumption as higher reliability may result in higher communication overhead
and hence energy consumptions (Zheng et al., 2011).
2.2.2 Efficiency
As the nodes have limited processing power, small memory storage, shared trans-
mission bandwidth and are usually battery powered, each node must manage
and utilise these resources effectively. Consequently, protocols used in WSNs
have to be lightweight and energy-efficient to prolong the availability of the node
to provide the services required by the application. As the requirement attributes
for the safety critical application such as high reliability and low latency may re-
quire significant energy, these attributes must be prescribed accordingly to meet
the level of assurance required for the application to meet its target. These ap-
plications can usually tolerate up to a certain degree of packet losses (10-20%)
and delays (Schenato et al., 2007; Moyne and Tilbury, 2007). Hence, maximising
packet delivery while minimising the delay to the optimum level is not always
necessary since these strategies can significantly reduce the network lifetime. As
the radio communication is a major energy consumer in WSNs, it needs to be op-
timised. Most existing literature has focused on energy-efficient networking pro-
tocols for WSNs. According to Sohraby et al. (2007), energy efficiency in WSNs
can be achieved in three ways:
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• Duty cycling with periodic switching between the node’s operation modes
in order to conserve energy and increase the life time of the network.
• Local processing to reduce the energy required by radio transmission.
• The use of multihop network to minimise the long-range transmission range.
However, Tate and Bate (2010) highlight that multihop generates more mes-
sages that may cause more collision and hence higher energy consumption.
2.2.3 Scalability
Scalability is another challenge due to the large-scale and dense deployments.
WSNs can be deployed indoor or outdoor in large scale in the order of hundreds
or thousands. The variation of the number of nodes in the network highly de-
pends on the application running on it. The nodes are usually deployed in close
proximity to each other to achieve a higher sensing coverage and redundancy
(Chipara et al., 2010). Hence, the protocols should be able to adapt to variation in
the network size and avoid inter-nodes interference.
2.2.4 Adaptability
Adaptability is the other challenge due to the lack of infrastructure and network
dynamics. WSNs do not have a fixed infrastructure as the network logical topol-
ogy can change due to the unreliable communication links or nodes that fluctuate
between connecting nodes. Every node requires to self-organise and operate in-
dependently in order to be flexible to the continuously changing environment.
The system software in the node need to respond to both internal stimuli gener-
ated within the node and external stimuli generated from the environment. The
internal stimuli may be generated due to the changes in application’s require-
ment or an error in the system software, while the external stimuli is produced
due to the time varying wireless channels, the dynamic variations of the network
or the occurrence of events. Hence, each node must possess self-adaptive and
self-healing capabilities to cope and adapt to spatial and temporal changes of the
operating environment.
2.2.5 Discussion
As a result of these properties, the design of the WSNs systems components has
to take into accounts a number of development factors such as the correct im-
plementation, operation and fault tolerance of the system to provide dependable
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service. As the communication protocol forms a major part of the WSNs, it is
critical to design and evaluate the effectiveness of the communication protocol
that satisfies the application requirements and optimises the energy efficiency of
the systems. Safety Critical Systems (SCS) such as the fire detection and rescue
and the health monitoring usually consist of a set of measurable service attributes
imposed by the applications in terms of reliability, availability, delay, and energy
consumption. These attributes can be applied to assess the dependability of the
WSNs by ensuring that these requirements have been met at a sufficient level.
2.3 Dependable WSN
To allow for the application of WSNs into SCS domain, a high degree of depend-
ability is necessary. These safety critical applications demand not only energy ef-
ficient operation to prolong operation, but also strict data delivery performance.
In particular, data must be transported to a sink in a timely and reliable fash-
ion. Based on the definition of dependability given in Section 1.1.2 of Chapter 1,
it can be comprehended as the ability for the networks to provide the packet re-
liability and network availability specified by the application at a desirable level
of confidence despite of the occurrence of faults in the networks. The results
from previous studies have shown that there is growing evidence where the de-
ployment of WSNs in real world is unreliable. Some of the failures highlighted
include packets loss, communication failures induced by the operating environ-
ments, and short term availability caused by power exhaustion (Tolle et al., 2005;
Huo et al., 2009). Despite the existing success stories of achieving dependability
for the traditional SCS, the solutions proposed are not easily transferable to the re-
source constraint WSNs. The classical approaches often require complex software
that cannot be performed online in WSNs. As a result, alternative dependability
enhancing techniques such as fault detection, identification and recovery are es-
sential to maintain or increase the acceptable level of dependability in WSNs.
2.4 Failures in WSNs
Before fault tolerance techniques can be applied in WSN, it is necessary to under-
stand the failure characteristics of WSNs. The WSNs are found to be unreliable in
existing literature (Langendoen et al., 2006; Tolle et al., 2005). The application and
communication protocols running are primarily designed to be energy efficient
using non-complex algorithms in order to reduce the energy consumption and
computational cost (Langendoen et al., 2006). The hardware may be deployed to
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operate in an unattended manner for a long period of time and exposed to differ-
ent environmental condition that may deteriorate the node’s hardware compo-
nents (Tolle et al., 2005). For these reasons, WSNs are prone to failure.
2.4.1 Fault, Error and Failure
According to Avizienis and Laprie (1986), a fault is a defect or incorrect state of
the hardware or software that can occur in any part of the system. This fault
is usually untraceable until an error has occurred. An error corresponds to an
incorrect and unknown state of the system that can lead to failure. A failure
may occur if the error is not detected and rectified (Laprie, 1985). When a failure
occurs, the system may deviate from its specification and unable to deliver its
intended functionality. An unattended failure may later lead to further faults
and errors of the system forming a chain reaction as depicted in Figure 2.4. An
error is the manifestation of a fault in the system, and a failure is the result of such











Figure 2.4: Formation and manifestation mechanisms of faults, errors, and fail-
ures: The arrows show the relationship between the three states and the fields in
the brackets show the location where the abnormalities are experienced.
For example in Figure 2.5, an application running on node 1 is required to
send sensor readings periodically to node 4 via node 2 and 3. As node 2 is about
to forward a data packet, the node’s radio channel in node 3 may experience a
radio communication fault induced by external interference (fault state). Since
node 2 does not detect the presence of interference in node 3, node 2 will attempt
to send the packet that may result in irregular packet loss (error state) due to the
stochasticity of the interference. As a result, the application running on node 4
will not be able to receive the data packet and an irregular network outage (failure
state) is experience by the users. This erroneous condition may lead to further
application fault if the degrading network condition is not detected and rectified.
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Therefore, it is critical to detect these irregular patterns and recover from the fault
at the earlier stage to prevent application failure.
1 32 4
Figure 2.5: Examples of manifestation of faults caused by communication fault
in WSNs: Node 1 is periodically sending packet to node 4 via node 2 and 3.
Node 3 experiences radio fault that lead to packet forwarding error in node 2 and
eventually fail network and application if the error is not rectified.
2.4.2 Fault Characteristics
Siewiorek (1990) classifies faults into three types:
• Permanent: Fault, usually in hardware, that is continuous to appear until the
faulty component is replaced. It is considerably easier to detect.
• Intermittent: Fault that occurs occasionally due to an unstable system state.
• Transient: Fault that occurs temporarily due to environmental condition.
Based on the given definitions of faults, it is difficult to distinguish the tempo-
ral characteristics of the intermittent and transient faults and provide a prognosis
of these faults. The ability to detect a transient fault that can lead to reduced per-
formance and eventual failure of the network is vital as the response required to
rectify the fault can be made before it fails the network. Siewiorek (1990) makes
the distinction based on the ability to detect the fault. An intermittent fault is
usually detectable as it exhibits a repeatable failure pattern but a transient failure
is more difficult to detect and recover. For example, the intermittent fault can be
discriminated by evaluating the rate of fault occurring which is relatively high
(Bondavalli et al., 2000). In contrast, transient failure is usually related to tem-
porary environmental factor that is usually rectified by the system software or
when the source of error disappeared. However, due to the design of the system
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software, this error may trigger inappropriate response that may aggravate the
networks (Tseng et al., 2002). For example, the self-reactive nature of the rout-
ing protocol to cope with transient error (obstruction) has resulted in congestion
and network outage (Szewczyk et al., 2004). It can be very difficult to detect and
predict the outcome of the transient fault as it adverse effects are usually irregu-
lar and may disappear rapidly (Bondavalli et al., 2000). However, the reaction of
events generated by the fault on the network is conspicuous. For instance, faulty
radio communication might not be directly observable but the unusual low num-
ber of packet errors in the forwarding node of the WSNs (i.e. the data delivery)
can be observed. Bondavalli et al. (2000) highlight that the detecting a fault may
require repetitive testing at the discrete time interval. By analysing the changes in
data flow within a time window, it is possible to detect that an error has occurred.
Due to the complex and dynamic characteristics of WSNs, it is important to
detect and determine the irregular transient fault at run-time to prevent network
failure. It is crucial to understand the type of faults that can occur in WSNs to
ensure that the right technique can be apply to tolerate them. These faults, also
known as anomalies, are discussed in the next section.
2.5 Type of Anomalies
WSNs are commonly deployed in a harsh environment where each node can be
subject to anomalies. These anomalies in WSNs can occur in the hardware as well
as in any of the communication protocols. Physical hardware faults are usually
induced internally that may affect its components and system software due to un-
reliable hardware and limited resources (Langendoen et al., 2006). The interaction
faults are errors that are generated externally affecting the communication pro-
tocols, for instance, radio interference in the channel affecting the links. In order
to address the research questions in Chapter 1, it is crucial to understand these
anomalies in the WSNs domains to identify the failures that may degrade the
WSNs protocol. From literature survey conducted on the previous deployments
of WSNs, anomalies can present in the hardware, software, network, communi-
cation, or data. The following subsections investigate the four types of anomalies
that have occurred in the real deployment of WSNs as a result of the faults.
2.5.1 Data anomalies
Data anomalies are errors that occurred in the information received in the sink.
Inconsistency in measurement is usually considered as anomaly and needs to
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be detected and eliminated. Data anomalies can be caused by processing faults
(Elnahrawy and Nath, 2003), hardware fault (Ni et al., 2009) or malicious attack
(Wang et al., 2006). Elnahrawy and Nath (2003) have classified the sources of data
errors as systematic and random errors. Systematic errors are caused by changes
in the operating conditions and calibration errors of the sensor node. Random er-
rors are usually introduced by external noise such as environmental interference
and inaccuracy to measurement and computational techniques. These errors can
affect the accuracy of the sensor reading. For example, Tolle et al. (2005) reported
that the data obtained from the sensors were out of normal range and did not
correlate with the each other when the voltage of the battery fell below 2.4 volts.
Systematic errors may be generated by long operation of the nodes that may af-
fect the component or applications running on the nodes, such as the calibration
of the sensors or timing drift in synchronisation (Ni et al., 2009). Data anomalies
that are produced intentionally can occur when an attacker injects false packet
or retransmits packets into the network after gaining access to the sensor node
(Wang et al., 2006). This attack can deplete the battery of the node and cause
network congestion (Raymond and Midkiff, 2008). However, intentional data
anomalies in real have not been reported and are only performed in test lab or
simulation to show the ability of WSN to avoid threat against malicious attacks.
2.5.2 Node anomalies
Node anomalies occur when the node is unable to perform the tasks it is assigned
to. Node anomalies can be caused by hardware (Szewczyk et al., 2004) or software
faults (Werner-Allen et al., 2006). The node is usually manufactured at low cost
and can be easily damaged due to impact or extreme weather condition. During
deployment, sensors may be dropped from high altitudes damaging the outer
protective enclosure and exposing the internal components of the sensor nodes
(Kahn et al., 1999). Sensors may be damaged or disconnected from the node due
to ground impact causing intermittent or continuous false alarms or misses. For
instance, node failure due to short circuit has been reported by Szewczyk et al.
(2004) when the circuit board of the sensor node was exposed to direct contact
with water. The low quality hardware and appropriate antenna design are also
reported by Langendoen et al. (2006) as the contributing factors to the node fail-
ure for a large scale deployment of potato cultivation where no useful data were
captured. Some nodes may run out of power due to the limited on-board energy
resources (Tolle et al., 2005). The limited computational and storage resources
available on a node may restrict the amount of processing that can be performed
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at the node. If this limit is exceeded, the tasks may not complete causing non-
deterministic behaviour and segmentation fault in the software. As the nodes
usually operate in an inaccessible location, maintenance steps, software updates
and bugs fixing are difficult and not usually performed.
2.5.3 Network anomalies
Network anomalies can be caused by node failure, gateway failure, unavailabil-
ity of transmission radio, or malicious attacks. Most network anomalies found in
the literature are attack-related as existing routing protocols and isolated deploy-
ment of the nodes can be easily exploited (Karlof and Wagner, 2003). Routing is
one of the essential building blocks for a multi-hop WSNs. The broadcast nature
of the routing protocol can result in packet losses from collisions when two nodes
within range of each other transmit simultaneously. Collided packets can be lost
at a receiver due to the hidden terminal effect (Woo and Culler, 2001). This must
be detected by the sender for retransmission and to ensure that the data packet
is forwarded and send to the sink. In multi-hop WSNs, the radio communica-
tions and the network connection is highly volatile and cannot always guaran-
tee the same packet delivery rate in real deployment as in the test lab (Szewczyk
et al., 2004). Ingelrest et al. (2010) have highlighted that the unstable link between
nodes can cause constant changes in the routing table. Constant routing table up-
date may require additional radio communication, occupying the shared radio
channel and consuming additional energy resource in the nodes. Hence, an intel-
ligent method to determine the cause of the unstable link is necessary to ensure
that route update is only performed when necessary, for example when the link
degradation has a significant effect on the reliability or the failure is permanent.
2.5.4 Signal anomalies
Wireless medium can be greatly affected by noisy environments causing the sig-
nal to attenuate or loss. Radio irregularity and channel interference are common
phenomena in wireless transmission that may affect the radio operation of the
node. Zhou et al. (2004) highlight that messages may be lost as a result of fading
during propagation over the wireless medium. These irregularity and interfer-
ences are created by the non-isotropic characteristics of the propagation media
and the heterogeneous properties of the nodes that may differ according to the
radio module. The communication can also be interrupted by physical phenom-
ena, metallic object, other radio emitting devices and hardware calibration error
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such as antenna gain, and fluctuation of the radio transmission range due to bat-
teries depletion (Tolle et al., 2005). An object that is larger than the wavelength of
the signal, such as a building or tree, can reflect the signal propagating through
the wireless medium causing interference in the network. Such fault is always
transient in nature as these interference are non deterministic as their presences
fluctuate (Chipara et al., 2010). In a potato field, the radio transmission range
between two node can be obstructed by the plants as each plant grows, affecting
the link quality as observed by Thelen et al. (2005). Equipment and machinery
operating at the same frequency with the WSNs node can generate noise in the
network causing transient faults (Gungor and Hancke, 2009). WSNs also operate
in unprotected wireless communication channel that is shared by other wireless
devices such as microwave and wireless network, making the node vulnerable
to interference. These interferences can lead to packet collision and increase the
packet error rate (Gungor and Hancke, 2009; Huo et al., 2009). These interferences
must be detected and avoided to ensure reliable communication.
2.5.5 Discussion
From the reviews, anomalies can occur in any part of the WSNs including the ap-
plication’s functionality and data, the node, the networks and transmission chan-
nel. There is some causality between these anomalies where the occurrence of
these faults may have a knock-on effect on each other. Using the communication
stack model described in Section 2.1, the causality link between the anomalies
can be shown based on the layered approach as exhibited in Figure 2.6. The top
layer anomalies may occur as a consequence of the faults generated by the lower
layer. For example, due to the anomalies produced in the radio communication
signal, the routing protocol in the network may not be able to function correctly.
As a result, the node cannot forward the message to the sink causing the appli-
cation unable to detect and response to the event detected by the sensor. Hence,
it is important to identify and recovery from these errors at the lower layer of the
communication stack.
2.6 Achieving Dependable Network using Fault Tol-
erant Approaches
In a distributed system such as WSN, failure in one component may trigger a
partial failure within the systems (Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 2002). This partial
failure may or may not affect the operations of the other components depending
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Figure 2.6: The causal link between the anomalies: The occurrence of the anoma-
lies in the inner layer may cause anomalies to occur in the outer layer.
on the nature of the faults (Avizienis et al., 2004a). Tanenbaum and Van Steen
(2002) state that it is critical to construct a system that can automatically detect
and recover from partial failures without affecting the overall performance. For
instance in WSNs, the application running on the node should continue to func-
tion in an acceptable level while the networks are being repaired. Each node
should have the ability to tolerate failures and can continue to operate in a reli-
able manner even in the presence of faults. Hence, the reliability and availability
of services provided by WSNs highly rely on the fault-tolerant ability of the node
as it cannot be assumed that all sources of error can be eliminated after thor-
ough engineering and intensive evaluation process. Each node must determine
and remove the error by using error processing technique in order to provide a
continuous and reliability service, (Laprie, 1985). The error processing technique
consists of a set of actions namely:
• Error detection: the ability to detect the fault,
• Error diagnosis: the ability to identify the fault,
• Error recovery: the ability to rectify the fault.
These three actions are part of the fault tolerance approaches proposed by
Laprie (1985) to achieve dependability. According to Avizienis et al. (2004a), the
fault tolerance approaches can prevent network outages in the presence of faults.
It attempts to address the issue of delivering a reliable and trustworthy service
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during operation at a degraded level acceptable to the users. We describe some
of the fault tolerance approaches applied in the WSNs context in the next few
subsections.
2.6.1 Fault tolerant architecture
There are three architectures for deploying an agent to perform the fault tolerance
namely centralised, distributed and hybrid architecture.
• Centralised approach: In centralised architectures, the anomaly detection is
performed at the sink. WSNs collect information from the sensor nodes and
send this information to the sink to be processed and analysed. Gupta et al.
(2007) utilise this information to generate the global view of the network
to detect and identify the anomalies. The sink usually has more resource
available to perform complex detection algorithms to improve the detec-
tion accuracy. The sink also has the capacity to store historical data that can
assist in detecting the anomalies. However, high volumes of data transfers
are required to send these data (Ngai et al., 2006). A node cannot afford to
periodically send its state and data as the radio communication usually con-
sumes more energy than local processing (Raghunathan et al., 2002). The
centralised approach also suffers from a single point of failure. The nodes
within a region will fail quicker due to a higher concentration of data and
management traffics. Rajasegarar et al. (2008) address this issue by aggre-
gating the data within a local network to reduce the communication over-
head. Although data aggregation can reduce the packet size and the num-
ber of the packets in the networks, it may remove critical information nec-
essary to determine the causes of anomalies. The centralised approach may
also increase the detection time and the Mean-Time-To-Recovery (MTTR) if
the sink is far away from the anomalous node. MTTR represents the av-
erage time required to repair a failure which can be critical in bringing the
network back to operation. This approach becomes inefficient and commu-
nication expensive as the network size increases.
• Distributed approach: In distributed architectures, the detection agent is
installed in every node and promotes the concept of local decision-making.
A node can monitor and obtain the local state of the neighbouring nodes
within its transmission range to detect any abnormal activities. It allows a
local node to make recovery decision. This decision making and recovery
process is usually transparent to the sink. The communication between the
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sink is only needed if the error cannot be resolved locally and a global recov-
ery is required (Rajendran et al., 2004). This approach can reduce the com-
munication overhead and improve the energy efficiency. To perform real
time anomaly detection, da Silva et al. (2005) apply a distributed rule-based
detection model to perform data anomalies detection. Each node generates
the normal data pattern using its own data and the data collected from its
neighbouring nodes. During operation, the current data pattern is analysed
to detect any deviation from the normal pattern. Once anomalies have been
detected, an alarm is sends to the sink or neighbours for consensus. This
method is also applied to detect anomalous network behaviours (da Silva
et al., 2005; Onat and Miri, 2005a,b). The distributed approaches can pro-
vide online detection but may require the node to store historical informa-
tion to perform the anomaly detection. The amount of data to be stored
highly depends on the algorithm applied and is restricted to the storage
space available. Multiple alerts may be triggered during detection result-
ing in a sudden burst of traffics and packets collision. Additional energy
consumption may be needed to listen to the network to collect the data pe-
riodically or continuously. As a node has limited resources to perform these
tasks, a lightweight algorithm is usually applied.
• Hybrid approach: In hybrid architectures, the detection is performed locally
and the recovery action is triggered by the sink or Cluster Head (CH). The
WSNs can be grouped into smaller networks where a node within a group
is assigned as detection agent. Hai et al. (2007) cluster the nearby nodes in
the networks into subgroup. The sink randomly selects a node to become
the CH. The CH monitors the nodes within its cluster and sends an alert
to the sink when an anomalous behaviour is detected. Upon receiving the
alert, the CH or sink can response to the failure. This approach can reduce
the communication overhead but create additional processing overhead in
the CH to carry out detection. Load balancing approaches such as round
robin are usually applied to share the role of CH and distribute the process-
ing evenly (Nam and Min, 2007). Hai et al. (2010) have shown a significant
reduction in energy consumption in the node compared to a distributed ap-
proach when all the nodes are periodically activated as the detection agent
based on the coverage area. However, this architecture suffers from a single
point of failure as the detection is performed centrally in a localised dis-
tributed manner by the CH.
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Discussion
The comparison between the three different architectures is provided in Table 2.1.
Distributed approach is more efficient compared to centralised approach as less
communication is required. It is important to minimise the communication over-
head between nodes to extend the life of the network. To minimise these over-
heads, a distributed approach with load balancing is usually taken by ADS as the
processing overhead requires to perform the anomaly detection can be shared be-
tween the nodes. However, communication is still required to communicate with
the other nodes to reach to consensus. It is necessary for each node to be able to
detect and recovery from failures independently while achieving the high recov-
ery rate without incurring additional overheads. Although centralised approach
may be easier to implement and can provide a higher accuracy, the nodes need to
send information required for detection over the network. This can significantly
increase the energy consumption and recovery time. Both centralised and hybrid
approach can suffer from a single point of failure.
Table 2.1: Comparison between different fault tolerant architectures
Architecture Centralised Distributed Hybrid
Agent Sink Node Node (Detector)
Installation Sink (Responder)
Response Increases as size of Real Time Immediate
Time network increases detection only
Communication High Minimal Moderate
Overhead (Data) (Alert) (Alert)
Processing Minimal High Medium
Overhead in node (Detection) (Load sharing)
2.6.2 Error Detection
Before any failure can be rectified, the error must first to be detected and the
fault needs to be identified before recovery can be performed. Many error detec-
tions algorithms have been proposed in the literature to detect any anomalous
behaviour in WSNs. Some of the proposed solutions integrate the detection with
diagnostic or recovery as one system. Others treat them as an isolated problem,
implement and test the error detection separately in different layer of the com-
munication stacks. They assume that diagnostic and recovery will be provided
by other system. Some of the key detection approaches to construct the normal
model and detect the anomalies in the WSNs are discussed in this section.
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Type of Detections
Error detection can be categorised into two type namely signature-based and anomaly-
based error detection (Chandola et al., 2009).
Signature-based detection is based on a pre-configured set of known error pat-
terns that need to be updated when a new error pattern is found. It can only
detect error based on the signature installed in the system. It cannot detect any
new emerging fault. A new signature has to be created and deployed each time
a new error emerges. Hence, signature-based error detection is less popular in
WSNs domain due to the limited resources available in the nodes for communi-
cation and storage.
Anomaly-based detection, also known as Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS)
is based on a normal model to detect any abnormal behaviour by monitoring
any observation that significantly differs from the normal model. ADS initially
constructs a model of the normal characteristics from an observed system. Using
the normal model constructed, it can detect anomalies by observing any change
in the current system behaviour. A system can be flagged as abnormal if the
current model deviates from the previous normal model based on an acceptable
threshold value.
ADS is suitable for the resource-constrained properties of the WSNs as it does
not need to maintain and share the signatures for different errors. Each node
can detect any observed activities that deviate from the normal behaviour dur-
ing operation. However, the accuracy of the ADS depends on the precision on
the capturing of the normal model, the anomaly threshold and the techniques
used to distinguish between the norms from the abnormal. One major challenge
in ADS is that it can be difficult to capture and establish the norms and define
the acceptable threshold value especially with the dynamic normal pattern that
changes with operating environment. This detection technique can be subject to a
high false negative rate if the detection system is unable to observe and construct
the normal pattern or model of the monitored system during initialisation or op-
erational period for update. An ideal ADS in WSNs is a system that can achieve
a high detection with no false detections with minimal resource consumption in
a distributed streaming data.
Establishing the norms
Models representing the normal and abnormal characteristics of WSNs need to
be established and built using machine learning technique before anomaly detec-
tion can be carried. Chandola et al. (2009) classify the techniques to establish the
model into supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised learning approaches.
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Supervised learning assumes the availability of labelled data sets to train the
classifier (Go¨rnitz et al., 2013). A supervised algorithm analyses the training data
and constructs the normal and abnormal models using the labelled input data.
A data point can be determined as normal and abnormal solely depending on
which models the data point fits in. Many supervised learning techniques have
been used in WSNs. Wang and Zhang (2007) have used statistical approaches to
construct the node profile using the normal and abnormal traffic pattern. Hodge
and Austin (2004) highlight that this approach requires both normal and abnor-
mal data to be available. These pre-labelled data are usually not available and
time consuming to obtain. The normal data in WSNs usually changes during
operation. The available data might not be extensive enough to cover new and
occasional events. It may require retraining if the normal and abnormal models
change.
Semi-supervised learning combines a large number of unlabelled data with a
few labelled data to improve classifiers (Go¨rnitz et al., 2013). It declares any new
data points that do not fit into the normal model as anomalies. When labelled
data are limited, semi-supervised learning can be used to improve supervised
learning using the readily available unlabelled data (Zhu and Goldberg, 2009).
However, it is not easy to get a complete trained data set in the real world. Defin-
ing the boundary of normal can be difficult.
In unsupervised learning, all the data available to construct the classifier are
unlabelled. It is used to construct the classifier online. It can detect the anomalies
by applying various statistical methods and distribution functions to build the
normal model based on the observed behaviour of the systems. It is common
to assume that (i) the occurrence and the population of normal data is higher than
the anomalous data as anomalies do not occur very frequently and (ii) anomalies are
distinguishable from the norms. It requires a certain measurable criteria or threshold
to identify the anomalies.
In summary, an unsupervised learning approach is applied in this thesis to
monitor the time varying characteristics of the radio pattern experienced by the
motes. The environmental normal radio pattern may change dynamically and
is usually unknown prior to deployment. With the use of the unsupervised ap-
proach, the classification model can be built online according to the current tem-
poral condition or when there is a change in the operating environment.
Error Detection Algorithms
Most of the ADS proposed in WSN in the literature detect anomalies based on
periodic-based application using sensor measurement, RSSI, and network traffic
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pattern as the input data. Chandola et al. (2009) have suggested that different
detection algorithms proposed in the literature can be generally classified into
five approaches namely Statistical-Based (SB), Classification-Based (CB), Nearest
neighbour-Based (NB) and Cluster-Based (CLB). Table 2.2 summarises some of
the existing ADS proposed in WSNs.
Table 2.2: Comparison of various anomaly detection algorithms
DS Anomalies Arc Algorithm Model Signature
Type Attribute Learning Training Update
SB1 Data Single DS Statistical Type-3 Online Static
(Mean/SD)
NB Data Single CS KNN Type-3 Online Dynamic
CB1 Data Single CS ANN Type-1 Offline Static
CB2 Data Single DS SVM Type-3 Online Dynamic
CB3 Signal Single DS BBN Type-3 Offline Static
CB4 Network N/A DS Rule-
Based
N/A Online Static
CLB Network N/A DS Clustering Type-3 Online Static
Keywords
Detection Systems
SB1 = (Hida et al., 2004) CB2 = (Rajasegarar et al., 2007)
NB = (Rajasegarar et al., 2008) CB3 = (Lee et al., 2007a)
CLB = (Loo et al., 2006) CB4 = (da Silva et al., 2005)
CB1 = (Kulakov and Davcev, 2005)
Learning Model Others
Type-1 = Supervised ANN = Artificial Neural Network
Type-2 = Semi-supervised KNN = K-Nearest Neighbour
Type-3 = Unsupervised SVM = Support Vector Machine
Arc = Architecture BBN = Bayesian Belief Network
CS = Centralised System SD = Standard Deviation
DS = Distributed System N/A = Not applicable
The majority of the ADS listed in Table 2.2 have the following key properties:
• Abrupt vs. Subtle: Most of the ADS have focused on malicious attacks and
have not taken into account anomalies that occur within the operating en-
vironment, such as human-induced interference and wireless communica-
tion. The ADS proposed by Loo et al. (2006) and Hida et al. (2004) can detect
abrupt attack but have not been tested on subtle and irregular changes that
are more difficult to detect.
30
2.6 Achieving Dependable Network using Fault Tolerant Approaches
• Distributed vs. Centralised: In order to conserve energy, distributed approach
has been taken to extend the lifespan of the network. It usually does not
have a centralised controller and must work with localised data. All the
nodes in the network can detect local anomalies but have not taken into
consideration the temporal characteristics of the network (Loo et al., 2006).
A weakness shared by the distributed approaches is that the ADS can only
detect the anomalies based on the localised data. The local nodes may fail to
detect the failure if when a large area of the local network is affected by the
anomalies leading to similar behaviour being observed by the local nodes
(da Silva et al., 2005). Although some centralised approaches are proposed
to provide a global view, the data are usually compressed to reduce the com-
munication overhead (Rajasegarar et al., 2006). As a result, data required to
identify the anomalous nodes might be removed during data aggregation.
• Static vs. Dynamic Threshold: Proposed ADS requires a pre-defined threshold
to detect the anomalies which can be very difficult to define prior to deploy-
ment (da Silva et al., 2005). It can be very difficult to determine an appropri-
ate threshold value in the time variant WSNs and may need to be updated
when the normal model changes. The boundary between normal and out-
lying behaviour is often not very clear (Rajasegarar et al., 2007). Therefore,
defining a representative normal region is challenging. However, due to the
limited constraint in the node, the building of the normal spatial and tem-
poral model can be performed on-demand. This is usually triggered when a
change in the operating environment is detected. Different anomaly metrics
can be used to detect anomalies.
• Online vs. Offline: It may be necessary to generate the normal model online
as the availability of labelled data for training/validation can be difficult
to obtain prior to deployment in WSNs. These training data are usually
available during or after deployment or with preliminary site survey. Cap-
turing of the normal condition has to be performed online as the operating
environment keeps on evolving. The data collected may contain noises that
need to be manipulated in order to obtain the normal model of the data.
Hence, techniques that required offline training may not be appropriate in
WSNs. Due to the limited resource in the nodes, the online detection al-
gorithm must not incur a high computational complexity. Techniques such
as ANN (Kulakov and Davcev, 2005) and SVM (Rajasegarar et al., 2007)
usually have a high complexity during the model generation making them
unsuitable to be performed in the nodes.
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In summary, the distributed detection should be performed near to the source
of the anomalies to reduce communication overhead and recovery time. The al-
gorithm used to detect the anomalous events online must be energy efficient due
to the limited resource in the nodes. The detection model must be able to detect
different types of anomalies and can adapt to the dynamic environment. Differ-
ent anomaly metrics can be applied using different data attributes to improve the
detection rate and identification of the anomalies.
2.6.3 Error Consensus
In WSNs, sensor nodes may be compromised or not functioning properly. Con-
flicting information generated due to these faulty nodes can be misleading and
may cause the network to response incorrectly. This problem is commonly known
as the Byzantine General problem and is a common problem in both distributed
and hybrid architectures (Lamport et al., 1982). For example, the sink or CH de-
pends on the alerts or data received from the sensor nodes to determine whether
a node is malicious. If the information received is not inaccurate, the sink or CH
will not be able to make decision or may take the wrong action that may aggra-
vate the anomalous condition (Atakli et al., 2008). Currently, there are two meth-
ods to declare whether a node is compromised (Ioannis et al., 2007; Atakli et al.,
2008). The first method proposed by Ioannis et al. (2007) is based on cooperative
decision making where all the nodes will take the responsibility to perform the
anomaly detection and send the alerts. A consensus on whether the node is com-
promised can only be made after all the alerts are received from the neighbouring
nodes within the transmission range (Ioannis et al., 2007; Roman et al., 2006). A
node is confirmed anomalous based on the majority votes from the neighbouring
nodes. An alternative method is based on a trusted value assigned to an indi-
vidual node where only nodes with a trusted value above a certain threshold is
certified to send the alert to the base station to affirm the anomalies (Atakli et al.,
2008). These trusted nodes are assigned by the base station based on a certain
reliability condition of the data received from the trusted nodes. All consensuses
require some exchange of messages between the nodes. Although these messages
can piggyback on existing communication to reduce overhead, the messages can
be easily be compromised or loss. Hence, a distributed self detection without
relying on error consensus is necessary in WSNs.
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2.6.4 Error Diagnosis
When an error is detected by the ADS, it is necessary to identify the location and
the cause of the fault in order to isolate or recover the fault. This technique to
assess the failures caused by the detected error is known as error diagnosis. An
error diagnosis system needs to assess the effectiveness of the detection-recovery
agent to rectify from the faults using a feedback mechanism. This feedback mech-
anism consists of information about the health status of the node or network after
repair. With the availability of such system, the success rate of the recovery can
be increased.
As discussed in Section 2.6.1, error diagnosis can be executed in the cen-
tralised and distributed manner. A centralised error diagnosis is performed in
the sink or cluster head while distributed diagnosis is performed in the localised
node. With the ability of the node to diagnose the fault, each node can decide
and confirm independently on the state of the network without performing any
consensus. You et al. (2011) classify the error diagnosis into proactive and passive
diagnosis. In proactive approach, the diagnostic agent is embedded in the node
to monitor the node’s ability to perform its tasks such as routing and reporting
the result to the sink periodically. Debugging software such as Sympathy con-
stantly monitors the network to collect traffic statistics that is generated by each
communicating node (Ramanathan et al., 2005). It uses a decision tree to locate
and determine the cause of the failure based on the connectivity metrics obtained
from the routing table, packet flow metrics and node status metrics. A fault is
detected when the traffic from a node is not sensed for a certain period of time.
This approach requires additional energy consumption for continuous monitor-
ing and introduces a large communication overhead in the network due to con-
stant reporting from individual node. The time window required to diagnose the
network has to be set according to the metrics to ensure that the statistics collected
can be used to locate and determine the cause of the failure. To minimise these
overhead, Staddon et al. (2002) apply a centralised fault tracing approach to de-
termine whether the cause of the network error is due to a single router failure or
a group of nodes within an area. The sink broadcasts a route update to determine
the status of the inactive nodes. Each node receiving the route update message
will piggyback its neighbours IDs along with its reading to the sink. The sink can
then process this information to learn about the topology of the normal network
during training or learning mode. This normal network topology is then used to
detect and trace the fault node during each routing update. Although the cen-
tralised approaches taken by Ramanathan et al. (2005) and Staddon et al. (2002)
can provide a global view of the network and produce a higher accuracy, it is not
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advocated for a large scale network as the information needs to parse through
the network before reaching the diagnosis agent. It is very expensive to collect
the information from every node and identify them in a centralised manner. A
sufficient amount of network statistics has to be collected within a time window
before a decision can be make on the fault nodes that may increase the mean time
to detection. The centralised approach may also drain the energy level of the
nodes closer to the sink and lead to a hot spot problem and network partitioning
(Perillo et al., 2005). Hence, an autonomous distributed error diagnosis approach
is required to address these problems.
2.6.5 Error Recovery
As the networks components play an important role in WSNs, it is critical to
ensure that the network is always available for service and has the capability to
tolerate failure. In order to prevent failure or bring the network back to its original
state and maintain operational, it is necessary to rectify the erroneous condition
immediately after an error is detected. In section 2.6.2, error detection can be
detected in a distributed, centralised manner and hybrid manner. Error recovery
can also exhibit the same architectures. If the error is identified and detected in
the sink, the recovery request can be activated and instructed by the sink in a
centralised manner. However, it takes a longer time to recover from the failed
network as the information needs to be sent, processed and acted upon by the
sink which can be distance away from the erroneous node. Individual loss packet
may occur in noisy environments affecting the recovery process. These recovery
requests may be loss along the route. As a result, the distributed recovery is
more attractive in WSNs as errors can be recuperated by the nodes autonomously.
Immediate response can be provided to rectify the failure immediately.
Different error recovery techniques have been proposed in different layers of
the WSNs protocol stack such as congestion control in the transport layer, path
recovery in the network layer and collision recovery in the MAC layer. The fol-
lowing subsections discuss each of the approaches.
Congestion Control
Wan et al. (2003) propose local congestion detection in the transport layer of the
node. Each node broadcasts a message back to the sources node to reduce the
congestion rate in the local network when congestion is detected. The node de-
tects congestion by sensing the channel. Each node receiving the message will
adjust it sending rate according to the local congestion policy to overcome the
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congestion. As a node will continue broadcasting the messages as long as con-
gestion persists, this may aggravate the congested network as the broadcast mes-
sages propagate toward to the source node. To reduce the communication over-
head, Sankarasubramaniam and Akan (2003) propose the Event-to-Sink Reliable
Transport (ESRT) to manage the congestion by adjusting the reporting rate at a
sufficient level required for the sink to reliability to detect the event. A desired
reliability has to be defined and the observed reliability must be within a toler-
ance range. If the reliability is below the predefined range, the sensing rate will
increase. ESRT can minimise the communication overhead and control the traf-
fic flow provided if the network is free from other interference sources. ESRT
can suffer from high latency and packet loss in a multihop network as it relies
on end-to-end feedback between the sink and the source. To address this long
traversal of feedback messages, a hop-to-hop reliable transport protocol such as
Pump-Slowly, Fetch-Quickly (PSFQ) can be applied (Wan et al., 2005). However,
PSFQ does not perform any congestion control.
A hybrid approach is proposed by Rajendran et al. (2004) that use the local
queue in the nodes to determine the network congestion. Each node maintains a
neighbourhood congestion table to keep track on the cause of the packet dropped.
Reliable Adaptive Congestion-controlled Transport protocol (ReACT) combines
source-based congestion and error control with receiver-initiated localised re-
covery to notify the downstream nodes the occurrence of congestion. A local
or global recovery is then activated depending on the congestion status of the
neighbouring nodes. The local recovery attempts to recover localised losses such
as transmission errors while the global recovery is trigger for errors that could
not be rectified locally. ReACT has the ability to distinguish between local and
network losses using the MAC layer information and can quickly correct errors
and path loss with lower overheads when compared to an end-to-end protocol.
Path Recovery
There are two basic approaches used to redirect traffic during path failure namely
table-driven or on-demand rerouting. Both of these rerouting approaches can
be performed globally or locally. The recovery decision on the route taken can
be made based on the resource or link availability. When the decision made is
based on a particular network element such as node battery level, it is a resource-
oriented decision. Whenever the recovery mechanism is focused on a particular
path based on the link quality, it is considered to be path-oriented.
Most routing protocols use the cumulative link statistics between nodes to de-
tect failures. If a sensor node cannot receive packets from a neighbouring node,
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the node is classified as a failed node and removed from the neighbour table. The
next best node can be selected from the table as the next-hop node. This type
of route recovery is known as table-driven rerouting. In table-driven rerouting,
multiple routes are established in the node during initial route discovery in order
to provide the alternative route during failure. Marina and Das (2002) apply a
multiple paths approach to forward the packet to tolerate a next hop failure. A
backup rerouting can provide an alternative route with minimum delay. How-
ever, the process to manage and maintain the list of the backup nodes may require
additional overhead. The backup nodes can also be subject to fault. As a result,
an on-demand route discovery is more suitable to determine an alternative route
during network error. Local recovery is attempted by the upstream node to pro-
tect against a link or node failure (Perkins and Royer, 1999). If the local node
is unable to recover a failed path due to unavailable of redundant node or un-
successful attempt, a failure message may be send to the source where a global
recovery is triggered to determine a new route. Global recovery is usually slower
than local recovery and is usually applied when a local network has failed.
Collision recovery
Collision is a common phenomenon in networking, in particular in a shared wire-
less channel. WSNs protocols such as flooding and data aggregation are espe-
cially prone to collisions. Most of the collision recovery approaches in WSNs are
based on collision avoidance and prevention approaches. Duty cycling has been
applied to reduce the occurrence of collision (van Hoesel and Havinga, 2004). Dif-
ferent radio channels are used by different clusters of nodes to reduce the inter-
ference (Heinzelman et al., 2000). However, such approaches usually rely on the
topological structure of the sensor network and apply in a hierarchical structure.
They also require redundant nodes or the ability of the node to adjust or syn-
chronise its radio to perform the duty cycling. In channel or frequency switching
(Song et al., 2008), a consensus is required to decide on the channel reservation
between different clusters that may generate additional overheads.
Collision detection is important in WSNs before collision avoidance schemes
such as RTS/CTS can be applied. Collision detection is performed by channel
sensing (Ye et al., 2002). Whitehouse et al. (2005) exploit the capture effect to
detect and deter from packet collision caused by flooding. The capture effect is
defined as the ability for a receiver to sense and receive a signal from one trans-
mitter despite the interference from another transmitter, even if the relative signal
strengths of the two signals are nearly the same (Leentvaar and Flint, 1976). A
node listens for any packet preamble during packet reception to detect for colli-
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sion. If the signal strength of the second packet is stronger than the current packet
the node is receiving, the node can stop receiving the first packet and resynchro-
nise in order to recover the second packet. The capture effect can differentiate be-
tween a high collision rate and low link quality. It can decide whether to change
its transmission schedule or to find a route. If successive retransmission is un-
successful, an adaptive power transmission algorithm is applied to overcome the
interfering signal (Lin et al., 2006). The capture effect can only detect and recover
from collision created by a second packet with stronger transmission strength.
The accuracy of the detection may decrease if the time difference between trans-
missions decreases as the second packet is received during or at the same time as
the first packet. One approach to recover from collision is to apply a transmission
control to change the transmission schedule or perform a back-off to change its
next transmission phase (Woo and Culler, 2001). For example, the CSMA/CA in
TinyOS uses retransmission and exponential back-off algorithms to recover from
packet collision (Gutierrez et al., 2001).
2.6.6 Limitation of Existing Fault Tolerant Approaches
Many fault tolerance algorithms have been proposed that differ accordingly to
the information used for analysis and the techniques applied to detect deviations
from normal behaviour. Unfortunately, little work has been done with respect
to anomalies with subtle and irregular change caused by environmental effects,
with majority of the solutions focus on sudden change caused by faulty or mali-
cious nodes. Most proposed algorithms have the following limitations:
• Adaptability: The network detection model or signature is usually gener-
ated during initialisation period where the network is assumed to be free
from anomalies. This model remains static during testing and does not
change as the networks evolve. The behaviour of WSNs usually changes
as the system operates due to buffer overflow, route expiry, and a change in
the operating environment. The detection model should adapt to the time-
varying wireless channels and the variations of the network topology. For
instance, the communication protocol must adapt its responses according
to the current state of the networks.
• Limited recovery mechanism: Most proposed solutions have treated recov-
ery as a separate issue and tested separately not as a whole system (Schaust
and Szczerbicka, 2011). Some of the typical recovery strategies involve re-
booting, node replacement, adaptive transmission range, or using mobile
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node to cover the transmission range temporarily. These solutions may in-
cur temporary network outage while the faulty node is being repaired. To
separate recovery from detection and diagnostic would be impractical in the
resource constraint WSNs where each process has to be executed separately.
• Cross layer design: Cross-layer interactions have been used to obtain the
state of the node and to optimise the protocol. Existing network recovery
approaches such as congestion control and error recovery are implemented
in the transport layer and rely on the information provided by the network
or MAC layer. For example, ESRT requires the link quality information to
detect the congestion or collision from the MAC layer to perform the con-
gestion control. Routing recovery also relies on this information to detect
route failure before any recovery approach can be initiated. This informa-
tion are passed between layers and processed in the layer to perform the
recovery. This will require additional resources for processing, storage and
communication which are limited. It is necessary that the fault tolerance to
be performed in the same layer to minimise the cross layer interactions and
avoid additional resources consumption.
In summary, it is crucial that the fault tolerance for the WSNs is distributed
and lightweight to reduce energy consumption. Unsupervised learning approaches
are usually used to generate the normal model as data are usually not available
prior to deployment. Dynamic detection model are required to capture the spatial
and temporal variants of WSNs. In the next section, we explores the application
of immune-inspired approaches to provide fault tolerance.
2.7 The Application of Immune-Inspired Approaches
toward Fault Tolerance
In Section 2.6.6, we have highlighted that the current statistical approaches are
not sufficient to address the non-linearity behaviours of the WSNs and an adap-
tive approach is required. As a result, researchers have explored on the immune-
inspired approaches for anomaly detections (Wallenta et al., 2010; Drozda et al.,
2011). The immune system is a unique complex defence system that protects the
body from different types of foreign micro-organisms present in the environment
(Goldsby et al., 2003). It can identify and eliminate specific micro-organisms in-
vading the body. These micro-organisms, also known as pathogens, can be harm-
ful and trigger an immune response when expose to the immune cells. According
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to Wallenta et al. (2010), the immune systems are applicable to the WSNs as they
exhibit similar properties as WSNs (summarised in italic) listed in Section 2.2 such
as:
P1: Resource Constraints
– The WSNs consist of sensor nodes that have limited resources.
– The immune system is made up of specialised cells that have limited
processing and storage and communication capacity. Each cell can
bind and communicate with a restricted number of neighbour cells.
P2: High density
– The WSN’s nodes are usually deployed in large number.
– The immune cells exist in large number.
P3: Uncontrollable operation
– The nodes prone to failure as their radio are subject to interference, fading and
contention.
– Each cell is prone to failure as it operates in an environment that is
continuously exposed to attack.
P4: Distributed autonomous
– Each node is usually configured to perform multiple tasks in a distributed and
autonomous manner without a centralised controller.
– Each cell performs different tasks in a distributed autonomous and
self-organising manner without predetermined global control.
2.7.1 The Immune System
To defend and protect the body from harmful pathogen, the immune system uses
a multi-layer approaches that is partitioned to four layers namely the outer bar-
rier, biochemical barrier, innate immune system and adaptive immune system
(Goldsby et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2012). The outer barrier, such as the skin,
provides the first layer of protection to prevent harmful pathogen from entering
the body. The biochemical barrier consists of destructive enzymes that inhibit the
growth of micro-organisms and eliminate them. The innate immune system re-
acts to pathogens that managed to break through these barriers. It can recognise
common and frequently encountered pathogen that are not specific to any type
39
2.7 The Application of Immune-Inspired Approaches toward Fault Tolerance
of pathogen. The adaptive immune system can detect and learn new and spe-
cific pathogen. The activation of each immune system depends upon the activity
between the immune cells and the pathogens. To select an appropriate immune
function for self-healing, it is necessary to understand the functions of the im-
mune systems in more details.
Innate immune system
The innate immune system provides the initial protection from infections. It has
the ability to recognise and response immediately to a foreign cell entering the
body. It consists of different specialised white blood cells, such as macrophages
and dendritic cells that can engulf and destroy the foreign cells. These cells also
generate molecular signals to attract and interact with other immune cells and
molecules. These molecules play a major role in fighting infections and removing
dead cells to regenerate healthy tissues. They also interact and initiate the adap-
tive immune response using the specialised cells called the antigen presenting
cells (APCs) (Murphy et al., 2012). The APCs process the antigens and present
them to T-cells that may result in a secondary immune response.
Adaptive immune system
The adaptive immune system is a natural defence mechanism that is only present
in vertebrate mammals. It has the ability to identify and remove foreign cells
that are not recognised by the innate immune system. The lymphocytes are a
group of white blood cells in the adaptive immune system that have the ability to
change their molecular structure dynamically. These cells are initiated and regu-
lated when the antigens on the surface of the APCs are presented by the innate
immune system (Goldsby et al., 2003). The lymphocytes are produced in the bone
marrow through the differentiation of stem cells. These stem cells can differen-
tiate into specific and non-specific lymphocytes. Specific lymphocytes learn and
recognise specific antigen using various receptors (protein molecules) on their
surface and attach these receptors to the receptors of the antigen. There are two
types of antigen specific lymphocytes produced in the bone marrow namely B
Lymphocytes (B-Cells) and T Lymphocytes (T-Cells) (Janeway Jr, 1992). The B-
cells mature in the bone marrow while T-Cells are released from the bone mar-
row and transported to the Thymus for maturation. Both cells express unique
antigen-binding receptors on their surface known as the B-Cell Receptor (BCR)
and T-Cell Receptor (TCR) that has the ability to bind to antigens and activate the
cells (Novak et al., 2006). The activation of B-Cells produces antibodies that can
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recognise antigens and responsible for effector function. The activated T-Cells
regulate the response actions undertaken by other immune cells to destroy the
infectious cells.
2.7.2 Immunological Theory
In order to prevent the immune system from attacking its own cells, it is criti-
cal for these immune cells to be able to distinguish between its own cell (self)
from foreign cells (non-self) and attack only non-self cells. There have been many
immunological theories that describe the discrimination process of the immune
system.
The self/non-self discrimination produces cells that are capable of detecting
non-self cells in the body through the process of positive and negative selections
(Janeway Jr, 1992). The positive selection selects the lymphocytes with the recep-
tors that can recognise and react with antigens while the negative selection elim-
inates all the lymphocytes that react with self antigens. For example, immature
T-Cells recognising a self-antigen after positive selection process will undergo
negative selection. Any T-Cells match a self-antigen will be removed leaving
cells that can only be activated by a non-self antigen.
In contrast, the clonal selection principle (CSP) describes how the lympho-
cytes can evolve into effector cells when exposed to antigens (Burnet, 1959). When
a B-Cell is exposed to a non-self antigen together with a co-stimulatory signal
from the T-Cells, the B-cell is activated and reproduced. In order to diversify
the cells colony and increase the probability of recognising more antigens, each
newly generated B-Cell undergoes somatic mutation to become memory cells
and plasma cells that can secrete antibodies with a higher binding strength. The
plasma cells also undergo negative selection to ensure only cells reactive to non-
self antigen are released into the blood stream. However, negative selection is
not a perfect process as it cannot recognise every antigen with sufficient certainty
(Burgess, 1998). As a result, self-reactive T-Cells and B-Cells can be released to
the blood stream to attack the body.
In Jerne (1974) immune network theory, the immune cells are capable of in-
teracting and stimulating each other without the presence of on antigen and are
always in a state of dynamic equilibrium. Jerne (1974) proposes that the antibod-
ies is capable of recognising other antibodies and can bind to the surfaces of other
antibodies forming a network of antibody-antibody interactions. These interac-
tions can generate positive and negative response. A positive response causes
B-cell activation, proliferation and generation of antibodies. A negative response
leads to cell tolerance and suppression to prevent autoimmune response.
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Due to the non-reactive feature of immune cell to good bacteria and autoim-
mune disease cannot be explained simply by self and non-self discrimination,
Matzinger (1994) suggests that the immune system can detect and respond to
anything that is dangerous. This immunological principle is known as Danger
Theory (Matzinger, 1994). In Danger Theory, specialised APCs called Dendritic
cells (DCs) are released to the body to initiate the immune response. They collect
antigens from foreign and host cells in tissues, and present these antigens to naive
T-cells. The DCs operate in three states namely: immature, semi-mature and ma-
ture. During normal operation, immature DCs will differentiate into semi-mature
state when they receive signals generated by T-Cells due to natural cell death.
Semi-mature DCs will suppress the matching T-Cells. However, if the T-cells are
injured, stressed or induced death, danger signals are released requesting for an
immune response. Upon detecting the danger signals, immature DCs differenti-
ate into mature DCs. These mature DCs release a number of protein molecules to
stimulate and activate the T-cells for an immune response.
Immunological principle proposed by Grossman and Paul (2001) postulate
that the lymphocytes have the ability to tune and update their responses accord-
ing to its current environment. The immune system can recognise and classify
different patterns of signal received and trigger selective responses based on the
current on-going activities with other cells. The activation of the T-Cell does not
depend only on the type and density of the foreign bodies, but also on the signals
received from other cells. For a T-cell to be activated, the TCRs must be stimu-
lated by an APC until the excitation level exceeds an activation threshold. Recent
work by Owens et al. (2010) show that the activation of the T cell to discriminate
between the self and non-self antigens depends on the stimulation received from
all the antigens and the internal signalling of the T-Cell. The internal component
of the TCR undergoes a process known as kinetic proofreading that has the ability
to adapt the activation of the receptors (Owens et al., 2010).
In Summary, the immune system is an immensely rich and complex natural
defence system that has the capabilities to learn new disease, recognise previ-
ously encountered micro-organisms and adapt the system to the new environ-
ment. The properties of the immune system to trigger an immune response in an
autonomous and distributed manner have provided the inspirations for the de-
velopment of immune-inspired algorithms to solve real world complex problem
especially in anomaly detection. Although there are many conflicting theories on
the activation of the immune response, various AIS algorithms have been pro-
posed and tested based on these theories. Some of them have been successfully
implemented for error detection in swarm systems such as WSNs and robotics
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and have produced promising results (Lau et al., 2011). The next section intro-
duces the AIS algorithms and investigates some of the proposed AIS applied in
fault tolerant system and WSNs domain.
2.7.3 Artificial Immune System
De Castro and Timmis (2002) define AIS as “the adaptive computational systems, in-
spired by the theoretical principles and processes of immune function, used for problem
solving”. AIS exploits the immune system’s adaptability, learning and remem-
bering capability making them appropriate to appropriate to solve the complex
problem in WSNs and apply the computational and mathematical approaches of
immunity to solve complex problems. It attempts to algorithmically mimic the
behaviour of natural immune system. Over the years, different AIS algorithms
have been proposed and applied in WSNs due to its ability to self-organise and
adapt to the environment. The properties of the WSNs made the WSNs a suit-
able metaphor for the tissue of the human body (Wallenta et al., 2010). We will
describe the algorithms proposed in the following subsections.
Negative selection algorithm
Negative selection algorithm (NSA) is an algorithm inspired by the maturation of
the T-Cells in the thymus where each cell undergoes a selection process to form a
set of mature T-Cells that can only bind to non-self antigen. Forrest et al. (1994)
apply NSA to detect any infected file in a computer system. A set of signatures is
produced by removing the data that matches a set of self strings during training.
Any incoming data instance that matches any detector will be declared as anoma-
lous during testing. Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000) later extend the NSA to detect
network intrusion in a wired network. They classify the network connections
into binary string of self and non-self and introduce a permutation mask to re-
duce the number of holes and the false negative rate. These holes occur because
the matching techniques and strings used cannot cover all the non-self detec-
tors (D’haeseleer, 1996). Le Boudec and Sarafijanovic (2004) implement the NSA
in mobile wireless network to detect abnormal nodes using the routing traces
collected from neighbouring nodes that is later implemented in WSNs to detect
anomalies (Drozda et al., 2007). The NSA algorithm suffers from severe scaling
and coverage problem. The time taken to generate an appropriate number of de-
tectors can be very long as the search space increases. Kim and Bentley (2001a)
estimate that it may take thousands of years to produce detectors set that can
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only product 80% detection rate. The NSA is not suitable for generating com-
petent detectors but is good for removing invalid detectors. Stibor et al. (2006)
show that the performance of NSA is not better than the kernel density and SVM
for detecting anomalies and can suffer from the curse of dimensionality where
the number of samples required for classification increases exponentially with
the data dimension. Elberfeld and Textor (2011) resolved this issue by proposing
the string-based negative selection algorithms to reduce the worst-case execution
time complexity from exponential to polynomial with the use of data compres-
sion techniques.
Clonal selection algorithm
Clonal selection algorithm (CSA) is based on the proliferation and mutation pro-
cess of the B-Cells as outline in section 2.7.2. The first CSA, CLONALG is used to
perform pattern recognition and optimisation function (de Castro and Von Zuben,
2002). de Castro and Von Zuben (2002) demonstrate that CSA can select, repro-
duce and mutate a set of artificial B-cells from a set of input patterns. Kim and
Bentley (2001b) apply the CSA to generate a set of detectors to detect network
traffic anomalies. The input data are classified into self and non-self and com-
pared against a randomly generated detector. If a detector can match a number
of non-self antigens, it will undergo clonal selection to reproduce a population
of detectors using crossover and mutations process. To ensure the validity of
the detectors, the detectors undergo negative selection to remove self detectors.
The algorithm was tested using breast cancer data and the results have shown a
high false positive rate as the size of detectors increases. Kim and Bentley (2002)
further extend the CSA to dynamically administer the population of the three
detectors into immature, mature and memory detector. An additional external
co-stimulation signal, based an acknowledgement from system operators, is in-
troduced to verify the anomalies. Their results have shown a significant reduc-
tion in false positive when the normal remains unchanged. However, the false
positive rate increases when the algorithm is applied in a dynamic environment
where the self changes with time.
Immune network model
de Castro and von Zuben (2000) have proposed the Artificial immune Network
(AiNet) which is a modification of the CLONALG algorithms with an additional
feature to suppress the antibodies interaction. Fang and Lin (2005) have proposed
an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm based on AiNet on detect network
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data anomalies. It is based on a network of antibody components to adjust and
match a number of inputs. The algorithm uses AiNet to reduce the population of
the input data by applying a hierarchy clustering algorithm to generate clusters
of normal data. A cluster is normal if the number of data points in a cluster is
more than 10% of the training data. A new data point is considered as anomalous
if the distance from data point to a cluster is more than a predefined threshold.
They highlight that detection rate of 85% can be achieved if an appropriate affin-
ity threshold is used. However, the algorithm is not able to detect anomalies if
the anomalies are not qualitatively different from the normal instances. There
are many tunable parameters used in the algorithm and the sensitivity of these
parameters on the detection rate has to be tuned to reduce false positive rate.
Danger model
Aickelin et al. (2003) proposed the first comprehensive application of danger the-
ory in computer systems where a computational model of danger theory is pre-
sented and a novel ADS algorithm is proposed. The ADS system collects signals
from the network and correlates the signals with intrusion alerts. Once a number
of successful attacks are detected, a danger signal will be generated. The system
requires an accurate classification of good and bad alerts which can be difficult
to determine. Greensmith et al. (2005) extend the danger theory and propose
the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). The DCA is based on the ability of the DCs
to activate the T-cells for an immune response by evaluating the concentrations
of both internal and external signals received (Mosmann and Livingstone, 2004).
The external signals known as pathogen associated molecular patterns (PAMPs)
are only produced by foreign micro-organisms. The immune responses mediated
by the T-cells depend on the level of internal signals emitted by the tissue cells
of the body. These tissue cells secrete chemical messengers known as cytokines
to communicate with each other. By differentiating the cytokines generated from
the tissues, pathogenic cell can be detected Aickelin et al. (2003).
Tunable Activation Threshold Model
Recently, a new AIS algorithm inspired by the Grossman and Paul (2001) T-cell
signalling processes in TAT has been developed by Owens et al. (2012). Gross-
man and Paul (2001) postulate that the activation of a T-Cell depends not only
on the excitation and suppression signals experience by the T-cell, but the exci-
tations (exposure to the APC) must be stronger than the suppression to exceed
the activation threshold. A T-cell that receives continuous interactions with the
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same antigens will have a higher activation threshold. As a result, more excita-
tions are required to exceed the threshold. The T-cells that interact regularly with
self-antigens will also have a higher activation threshold (Grossman and Paul,
2001). This immunological theory has provided inspirations for development of
anomaly detection algorithms. One such algorithms is the Receptor Density Al-
gorithm (RDA) developed through the extraction of features of the generalised
T-cell receptor, and mapped onto the kernel density estimation (Owens et al.,
2012). The RDA is specifically designed for anomaly detection problems and has
been applied in chemical and fault detection. Hilder et al. (2012) have shown that
the RDA can successfully detect and distinguish different chemical substances
in a dynamic environment and have been tested in real sniffing robot. RDA has
also been tested on a swarm of robots to detect faulty components (Lau et al.,
2011). Their results have shown RDA can achieve a higher detection rate with
low positive rate compared to conventional statistical approaches.
2.7.4 Application of AIS in WSNs
Over the years, many immune-inspired ADS have been applied to different appli-
cation areas of WSNs such as data classification, anomaly detection and coverage
problem. This is partly motivated by the analogy between the characteristics of
WSNs and the immune system. Davoudani et al. (2007) have provided a map-
ping between the Cohen’s Cognitive Immune System (CIS) and the WSNs and
have highlighted that the functionality challenges faced by WSNs are similar to
those faced by immune systems where each node (cell in immune system) needs
to maintain and regulate its operation as long as possible to meet the applica-
tion requirements. The ability of the immune system to self-heal and adapt to
changes in the environment have attracted the application of AIS in the area of
anomaly detection. The earliest work is carried out by Ishida (1997) where they
have used immune network theory as metaphor to detect sensor fault. Their solu-
tion is based on the B-Cells interaction to create a dynamic sensor network where
distributed individual nodes can interact with one another to detect any incon-
sistent change. Wallenta et al. (2010) evaluate the DCA using TOSSIM and J-Sim
simulator with 10 and 7 nodes respectively and have shown that DCA can only
detect 65% fake interest packets. The detection relies on the PAMP signal usually
generated by the sink to confirm the presence of the anomalies. This centralised
approach is not practical in WSNs as the size of WSNs can scale up to thousand
of nodes and may incur high communication cost. In real application scenario,
the sink can be several hops away. The delivery of PAMP signal can be very ex-
pensive, or dropped due to congestion and collision. As a result, DCA is subject
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to single point of failure if the sink is unable to validate the attack. The DCA
solution also assumes the WSNs logical topology does not change.
Similar to the technique proposed by Le Boudec and Sarafijanovic (2004),
Drozda et al. (2007) apply the NSA to detect abnormal packet drop in WSNs on
individual node. During training, randomly generated antigens (based on vari-
ous network traffics) that do not match a set of self strings will become the set of
mature detectors and use in the anomaly detection by the node. The simulated
results collected from GlomoSim simulator have only shown 70% to 85% detec-
tion rate as inadequate number of detectors were generated during training. To
improve the detection rate, Drozda et al. (2011) apply the interaction between in-
nate and adaptive immunity to classify the errors that can lead to degradation
in packet delivery rate. Co-stimulation signals between the innate and adaptive
immunity are used to reach to a consensus on the presence of the fault. Schaust
and Szczerbicka (2011) propose an automated response system based on the CIS
in order to ensure that the networks are always available for service. Detection
without effective diagnosis is not sufficient to determine the underlying cause of
the problem, and confirm the presence of the fault for an appropriate remedial
action to be taken. These three actions have to be integrated and operate as one
component. In addition, for all these studies, the proposed solutions mainly fo-
cused on failure caused by malicious attacks. The proposed AIS algorithm by
Davoudani et al. (2007) has limited adaptivity and the hybrid approach may re-
quire additional communication for interaction which can be expensive in WSNs.
They are not suitable for the complex and dynamic environment of the WSNs as
they does not provide online unsupervised learning and adaptivity required to
detect changes in the radio environment. These attacks usually have unique fea-
tures that are easier to detect and does not change dynamically.
2.7.5 AIS for Interference Recognition in WSNs
One of challenges in detecting anomalies due to interference is that the duration
and occurrence for these types of anomalies are unpredictable and changes with
time (Liu et al., 2010). According to (Boers et al., 2010), it can be expensive and dif-
ficult to detect and classify the presence of interference using existing AIS or other
statistical approaches such as computing the means and median discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6.2. Detecting anomalies using such traditional statistical approaches may
only detect anomalies that have a high variability. The results from Boers et al.
(2010) has shown that the statistical techniques by taking the mean and skewness
of the RSSI values cannot be used to distinguish between different interferences.
The duration and occurrence of these interferences are usually dependent on the
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type of radio devices or applications, and their usage pattern. Due to the limita-
tion of current statistical approaches and the non-adaptive of existing AIS algo-
rithm to changes in the environment, this thesis will investigate the application
of an AIS algorithm based on the signalling of the T-Cell receptors to support the
nodes adaptivity to the dynamic radio environment. As discussed in Section 2.7,
the T-Cells have the ability to adapt the activation of their receptors according to
the recurrent signals received on each receptor. The stimulation of the cell’s re-
ceptor must exceed the activation threshold in order to be activated. The abilities
for the cell to act and detect independently from other cells without incurring ad-
ditional communications and adapt the activation of its receptors according to its
current environment have motivated the application of the RDA in WSNs node
to detect the presence of the irregular radio interference in the WSN’s environ-
ments. Based on the numbers of activated receptors, the radio interference can
be determined as the receptors will be activated according to the strength and
frequency of the interference captured. With these information, an appropriate
response can be taken.
2.8 Fault Tolerance in WSNs Routing Protocols
The routing protocol plays an important role in order to achieve dependability as
data packets are often routed across the WSNs according to the routing algorithm
to reach the final destination. The routing protocol must be resilient and can re-
act to topology changes stemming from unreliable links or faulty nodes to ensure
the stability of the network infrastructure under varying network dynamics. The
ability to detect and recover from changes or failures is necessary. The routing
protocol can be administered proactively, reactively or both. Al-Karaki and Ka-
mal (2004) highlight that it is preferable to have proactive routing protocols rather
than reactive protocols when the node is static. However, WSNs have dynamic
topologies that may change according to its operating environment even if the
nodes are static. Reactive routing is known to be fault tolerance to topological
change as it allows the nodes to react quickly to failures (Al-Karaki and Kamal,
2004). Hence, in this section, we focus only on the reactive routing protocols to
identify the detection and recovery approaches to overcome failures.
2.8.1 Reactive Routing in WSNs
The two reactive protocols widely researched in WSNs are the Adhoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV) proposed by Perkins and Royer (1999) and Dynamic
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Source Routing (DSR) proposed by Johnson and Maltz (1996). Both AODV and
DSR initiate a RD to establish the route to the sink using two main routing man-
agement packets namely: Route Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP). When
a source node has data to send to the sink, the source node broadcasts a RREQ
packet. Each RREQ packet contains an unique sequence number, the source ad-
dress, the destination address, the route path and the time to live (TTL) counter.
When an intermediate node receives a RREQ packet, it checks the sequence num-
ber and inspects the TTL counter in the packet to prevent re-broadcasting and
mitigate loop formation that may lead to broadcast storm (Tseng et al., 2002).
Broadcast storm can severely affect network performance and disrupt the net-
work communication. When the RREQ packet is received by the sink or a rout-
ing node that has a route to the sink, a RREP packet is sent to the requesting node
via the reverse path the taken by RREQ packet. Once the source has received the
RREP packet, the source node can begin to send the data packets to the sink.
Abolhasan et al. (2004) highlight the two differences between AODV and DSR.
Firstly, AODV uses a routing table to forward the packet to the next hop neigh-
bour. Each node relies on the destination address and the next hop address in the
packet’s header to forward the packet. The next hop is determined using the rout-
ing table computed during RD (Perkins and Royer, 1999). As for DSR, the data
packet carries the routing information on its packet header that contains a list of
forwarding nodes (Johnson and Maltz, 1996). Each routing node will inspect the
forwarding list and forward the packet accordingly. This list can become very
long if the distance between the sink and source is far away. As a result, the rout-
ing overhead in DSR is higher than AODV due to a larger header size. Secondly,
DSR does not support local route repair in an event when one of the routers fails
(Youn et al., 2006). The route is repaired based on the routing information that
is cached in the source node. The route information is updated when an up-
stream node detects a failure and notifies the source by sending a route error
(RERR) packet. In contrast, AODV repairs its route locally and is more adapt-
able to highly dynamic environment compared to DSR. As a result, DSR is less
tolerant to failure in a large network and is not analysed in our work.
2.8.2 Mixed Routing
Alternative hybrid routing that combines the proactive and reactive routing pro-
tocols has been proposed in various literature to reduce packet delay and im-
prove packet reliability and energy efficiency. The Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)
proposed by Haas and Pearlman (2001) is the first hybrid routing protocol to be
implemented in WSNs to reduce the routing traffic. Proactive routing is applied
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within a cluster of nodes to manage the local route and reactive routing is per-
formed between clusters. Although the ZRP can utilise the wireless spectrum
effectively, it is unable to adapt to the dynamic topological changes and therefore
it requires the cluster to be restructured. A policy-based approach has been pro-
posed to adapt to the dynamic topology of WSNs (Figueredo et al., 2005; Yazir
et al., 2010). Figueredo et al. (2005) proposed a policy-based adaptive routing in
WSNs where a set of nodes can switch between reactive and proactive routing
protocols depending on the forwarding policy. These policy-based approaches
use a centralised routing decision determined by the destination node using the
network delivery rate observed and a threshold level. However, the centralised
approach is subject to single point of failure and can incur additional commu-
nication overhead to forward the policy. Yazir et al. (2010) propose a multiple
criteria analysis method for a decentralised decision making where a distributed
routing decision is made locally based on aggregated voting between a group of
local nodes. As a result, additional delay and overhead are required for the dis-
tribution mechanism to reach for a consensus on the routing decision and for the
network to stabilise. Due to the difference in reactive and proactive protocols,
the routing switching module may cause service discontinuity when individual
node switches between the reactive and proactive routing (Figueredo et al., 2005;
Yazir et al., 2010). The nodes need to reset and reconfigure their routing service
and allow the same routing protocol to run in all the nodes. In order to reduce
the switching downtime. the spectrum of routing protocols applied must exhibit
route management and recovery strategies, for instance, a combination of dif-
ferent variants of reactive routing protocol. In these thesis, we will investigate
the applicability of integrating different variants of AODV to provide different
recovery strategies.
2.8.3 Research Attempts to Enhance and Augment AODV
AODV presents several problems that are related to high packet error rate and
high routing overheads created by lossy radio link (Pirzada and Portmann, 2007;
Alshanyour and Baroudi, 2008). These problems can cause packet losses, packet
collisions, and high end-to-end delay. Fault-tolerant AODV has been proposed
to address these problems through redundancy. Researchers have extended and
modified the AODV routing protocol to improve its performances in term of reli-
ability and energy efficiency and the ability to provide an alternative better route
(Marina and Das, 2002; Carbajo et al., 2008). This section surveys some of pro-
posed enhancements to improve the AODV routing protocols in the literature.
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• AODV: AODV is one of the commonly used reactive routing protocols in
WSNs originally proposed by Perkins and Royer (1999) for Mobile Adhoc
Network (MANET). As discussed in 2.8.1, it uses RREP, RREP and RERR
to construct and repair the route from the source to the destination by ini-
tiating a RD. Although hello packet is proposed in AODV to maintain the
link, MAC layer Link Layer Notification (LLN) is usually applied to reduce
the communication overhead. When the AODV fails to receive a LLN, the
route is repaired locally. If the route cannot be repaired locally, the packet is
dropped and a RERR packet is transmitted back to the source. When RERR
packet is received, the source will initiate a global RD to determine the route
to the destination. Packets transmitted during RD usually have a higher
latency as the networks are usually more congested than usual while the
route is being established. In WSNs, spurious link failures or packet drops
are common. This can be mistaken as failure and RD may be executed. Fre-
quent RD can consume significant amount of resources and can reduce the
lifetime of the network. It can also aggravate the congested network.
• TinyAODV: TinyAODV (Carbajo et al., 2008) is a minimalist adaptation of
AODV used in WSNs node, such as telos motes, running TinyOS. It is devel-
oped based on pessimistic approach to recover from route failure without
local repair and expiration period in the routing table. The routes are kept
in the nodes when they are constructed during RD. When a packet cannot
be sent over an active path, RERR is generated. The routing table is updated
and the undelivered packet is dropped. It assumes that the route is unre-
coverable and a global RD is required to determine the new route. It also
assumes a static WSNs topology with minimum link failure.
• AOMDV: In Adhoc On-Demand Multipath Vector Routing protocol (Ma-
rina and Das, 2002), a multiple link-disjoint path is obtained and calculated
from source to destination during global RD. Each node in the network will
keep a list of alternative hops that is established during global RD. This
list of alternative next-hop is ranked according to the hop-count. During a
link failure, an immediate node will select the next available next-hop in its
routing table to forward the packet. However, the list of backup route is not
updated to reflect any changes in the network. As a result, this may lead to
outdated or stale route. If all paths to the destination fail or no alternative
path is available, RD will be initiated. This protocol can handle any route
failure if the failure size is small. However, additional memory overheads
are required to store multiple routes information. The use of hello packet is
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needed to maintain the connectivity to all the neighbours, generating addi-
tional communication overheads.
• NST-AODV: Not-So-Tiny-AODV (NST) (Gomez et al., 2006) is an enhanced
AODV that maintains all of the features available in AODV. It uses an opti-
mistic recovery approach where the route failure is temporary and can re-
cover by retransmission. In order to minimise the routing packets generated
during by local repair, it performs an additional network layer retransmis-
sion to overcome sporadic failure caused by bad radio connection. Gomez
et al. (2006) have reduced the network latency and the number of routing
packet transmitted.
Route recovery approach
From the survey conducted, it can be concluded that these protocols are designed
to handle specific network conditions. Table 2.3 highlights the operating envi-
ronment that is suitable for each routing protocol. Different WSNs protocols
may behave differently when applied to different network conditions. A spe-
cific routing protocol may perform better in one network scenario but can aggra-
vate the network when applied in different scenarios. For example, the proposed
AOMDV may fail to forward the packet using the backup route if all the neigh-
bouring nodes are spatially interfered by a strong radio signal. The use of RD and
hello packet may congest the network making normal communication unfeasible.
When a link failure is detected, the node detecting the failure will attempt to re-
store the connectivity locally. This process is transparent to the source or sink. It
is employed by most of the routing protocols discussed above except TinyAODV,
where a pessimistic approach is taken where no local route is assumed to be avail-
able and a new route needs to be discovered globally. This pessimistic approach
may not be able to tolerate anomalies in large network where frequent intermit-
tent link failures can cause uncontrollable amount of routing packets being gen-
erated from the source. In an attempt to reduce the amount of control packet,
AODV and AOMDV and NST use layer 2 LLN to detect link failure and attempt
to fix the fault locally using less pessimistic strategies. The difference between
NST, AODV and AOMDV is that the NST uses an optimistic recovery where no
repair is required and the failure can be rectified by retransmitting the packet
again. AOMDV is less optimistic than NST where the next-hop is declared as
faulty and an alternative back-up route is used before the route is re-established
locally. If the local RD is unsuccessful, the packet is dropped and a RERR packet
is returned to the source. All variants of AODV use global RD as the last attempt
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to rediscover a new route.
Table 2.3: Route detection and recovery mechanisms in different AODV routing














































Routing metrics are used by the routing algorithm to decide which neighbouring
node to become the next-hop node. Perkins and Royer (1999) propose the use
of the number of hops as the metric to decide on the next node to forward the
packet as the default metric in AODV. This metric is commonly used in most
AODV routing protocol as it provides the shortest path to the sink. Boughanmi
and Song (2008) have shown that the hop count metric can minimise the packet
latency and the total number of transmissions required between the source and
the sink. However, it does not take into account other operating factors such as
the node’s energy availability, the network utilisation and the radio signal quality.
Alternative metrics have been proposed to improve the transmission rate. For
instance, Chen et al. (2006) propose the use of LQI to determine the link quality
and avoid lossy radio link and transient failure and Younis et al. (2002) propose
energy awareness metric computed from the nodes to avoid node failure due to
energy depletion. Although the proposed metrics may help to avoid a bad link, it
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does not play a role in providing any assistance during the maintenance or repair
of the route. For WSNs to respond an unexpected hardware or software failure,
the node requires an online route management technique to detect and recover
from failure.
Route Failure Detection
The route maintenance procedure is usually triggered locally when a node detects
a link failure between itself and the next hop node. Link failure can be detected
by: (i) the use of periodic Hello messages received from a neighbour (ii) the use
of feedback known as Link Layer Notification (LLN) received from the link layer.
In the former approach, Hello messages are broadcast by a local node periodically
to inform the neighbouring nodes of its state. This process may congest the local
network making it inaccessible. In contrast, LLN is provided by the link layer
after a numbers of unsuccessful retransmissions (3 retransmissions). It does not
congest the networks compared to the Hello messages. According to Chakeres
and Belding-Royer (2005), the LLN is suitable for dynamic topologies.
2.9 Current Evaluation methodology
In a review conducted by Kurkowski et al. (2005) on 151 network research pa-
pers published in ACM Mobihoc from 2000-2005, 75.5% of the works have used
network simulator to test their protocols. Only 60% has stated the number of it-
erations performed. 12.5% has shown statistical confidence in their results, with
none of them addressed the randomness of the experiments. This can dramati-
cally affect the confidence in the results obtained.
In this section, we have performed similar survey on 50 WSNs papers pub-
lished in Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS) conference from 2010 to
2012, to investigate and update whether any attempt has been made to improve
the confidence of the published work and satisfying the experimental proper-
ties in the area of WSNs, 5 years after the publication of the previous survey
(Kurkowski et al., 2005). MASS is a leading conference in the WSNs community
and 50 of the articles reviewed are related to experimental methods and results.
Based on our survey, most of the findings in Kurkowski et al. (2005) still hold. We
have found out that 80% of the published results are still based on simulation,
12% are hardware and 8% are mixed or hybrid approaches. However, 12 out of
the 40 simulation papers did not state the type of simulation tools and 10 pa-
pers developed their own simulator but none of them provide their source code
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making it difficult to reproduce their results. 60% have described their experi-
mental setup and the use of pseudo-random generators to produce input data
has increased significantly. However, there is still a lack of confidence on the
simulation results published and the use of statistical analysis on the output re-
sults was found to be limited (Pawlikowski et al., 2002). Based on our current
survey, only 17.5% have shown error bars in their graphical results with only 8%
have stated the confidence interval (CI). None of the papers has performed any
significance tests on their results and the issue of aleatory uncertainty was not
addressed appropriately. Although 60% have repeated the experiment n times,
how n is obtained statistically was not described. This can make it very difficult
to ensure that the sufficiency of data to minimise uncertainty and their results are
both statistical and scientific significant. Any significant results observed in an
experiment, whether from simulation or hardware, must be at a specific statis-
tical confidence level, repeatable and textitunbiased as any improper data analysis
can often lead to incorrect or misleading results, threatening the credibility of the
published work. The lack of scientific analysis and evaluation can affect the va-
lidity properties of the dependable system (Avizienis et al., 2004b). Contradictory
result observed by Stetsko et al. (2011), in an experiment to evaluate the uncer-
tainty between four different simulators, calibrated using data collected from real
hardware experiments, has reiterated the need of achieving confidence in exper-
iments using a more scientific approach. The summaries of the survey, based on
the three criteria stated, is shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Survey from 50 papers published in IEEE MASS Conference 2010-2012
have shown that there is insufficient evidence to support and evaluate the de-
pendability claims made in Kurkowski et al. (2005) due to lack of repeatability.
Evaluation Percentage Comments
Criteria
Statistical 17.5% Shows error bar on plot
Valid 8% States the confidence interval (CI)
0% Performs significance tests
Empirically 66.7% States the tools used
Valid 60% Provides simulation parameters
0% Provides source code
Uncertainty 60% Uses seeded inputs
Analysis 60% Performs repeated runs
Another issue that can affect the credibility is the lack of various real world
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scenario used in the experiments (Andel and Yasinsac, 2006). For example, pro-
tocol A may outperform B in environment X, but the opposite in environment
Y. As shown in Chapter 3, The NST did not perform better than AODV when
the failure duration increases from 0.5 to 20 seconds. NST was initially tested on
real hardware by Gomez et al. (2006) to evaluate the energy efficiency and route
change latency, but performance evaluation of NST was not conducted rigorously
against other test scenario and no comparative performance is performed against
other routing protocol. Hence, it is difficult to verify the reliability of NST.
2.9.1 The hybrid approaches
The survey in Section 2.9 has shown that 84.5% of the papers reviewed still rely
on simulation tools to test and evaluate their new protocol as they allow signifi-
cant levels of testing to be performed at reasonable cost. The simulation is usually
repeatable and controllable. Unfortunately, the performance observed in simula-
tion often differs considerably and does not perform as predicted during deploy-
ment (Langendoen et al., 2006). There is a reality gap between the simulation and
real hardware experiment due to the simplified models, such as the radio and
communication models, built in the simulator (Pham et al., 2007). Langendoen
et al. (2006) has suggested the use of exhaustive testing to reduce errors between
simulations and real deployment. It is not sufficient to use simulation alone as
a validation tool. Instead, a mixed approach between simulation and hardware
is more appropriate as simulated result can be cross-validated using small scale
experiment on real hardware in a controlled environment.
2.9.2 Reality Gap in the Current Evaluation Approaches
There is still some mismatches between physical hardware and simulation re-
sults. Pham et al. (2007) attempt to validate the wireless channel model of Castalia
by comparing the performance of MAC protocol. Although the simulator was
calibrated using the connectivity maps obtained from the real experiment, there
are discrepancies in Packet Reception Ratio (PRR) between simulation and the
real hardware. WSN simulations usually use unrealistic assumptions, such as
circular radio transmission area, and no fading or shadowing phenomena. These
assumptions can lead to simulation results that differ significantly from experi-
mental results. Shakshuki et al. (2009) implement the energy model taken from
real sensor node to their java-based simulator and NS-2, in order to make the
results between simulator and real world deployment closer. Their studies have
shown that the results from a custom-made simulator did not perform better than
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NS-2 because the overhearing and packet collision effect were not implemented
in their simulator. They suggested that it is necessary to develop or use an exist-
ing network simulator that provides a complete protocols stack, such as NS-2, as
their results have shown similar patterns to real. Bergamini et al. (2010) evaluate
the performance of two routing protocols (NETSET and Gossip) using two dif-
ferent simulators (Castalia and NS-2) and validated the simulated results against
the results obtained from 34 TMote Sky sensor nodes. They suggested that a sim-
ple parameter tuning may significantly increase the accuracy in the simulators.
By tuning the simulator using the data captured from ZigBit-A2 nodes and ap-
plied them to Castalia, Gama et al. (2011) have shown that the simulated results
obtained match satisfactory to those obtained in real conditions. However, from
their results, it is not possible to show whether their results are both statistically
and scientifically significantly better without performing any statistical hypothe-
sis test.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of dependability is discussed and the factors that
can affect the dependability of WSNs are highlighted. Fault tolerance techniques
have been investigated that looked into various detection, diagnosis and recovery
approaches. Many algorithms have been proposed to assist in providing a fault-
tolerant WSNs. However, some of the techniques may incur additional overheads
and is based on specific static failure model that does not change during oper-
ation. With the complex and dynamic characteristics of WSNs, an alternative
anomaly identification and recovery approach that can address these issues as
well as adapt to the environmental changes is required. Having reviewed some
of the existing detection, diagnosis and recovery in WSNs, it is crucial that the
fault tolerance for WSNs is distributed, autonomous and lightweight in order to
reduce energy consumption. This thesis will attempt to provide an optimal de-
sign for fault-tolerant WSNs based on the following key characteristics:
• Distributed architecture: Detection should be done in a distributed manner
to reduce communication overhead.
• Stateless: Individual nodes should identify and recovery from the fault au-
tonomously and independently in the local environment. There should not




• Lightweight: The algorithm must have a low computational complexity. It
should also be integrated to reduce the processing overhead and recovery
time.
• Unsupervised learning: Unsupervised, non-parametric learning is prefer-
able as it is not easy to determine and obtain the normal predefined data.
• Adaptive: It should be able to learn and dynamically adapt the detection
and recovery model online. An adaptive model generated using a com-
bination of different data vectors are required to capture the spatial and
temporal variants of WSNs
• Self-healing: As the inaccessible nodes are difficult to maintain, the network
should exhibit the self-healing properties to adapt to the dynamic network
topology and to maintain the operation of the WSNs. One approach is to
apply the bio-inspired algorithm to assist in network recovery using the




Evaluating the Fault Tolerance of the
WSNs Routing Protocols
To investigate the hypothesis formulated in Section 1.2, this chapter presents an
experiment to analyse the fault tolerance of the multihop network communica-
tion in WSNs using the current state of the art approaches applied in WSNs. The
aim of the chapter is to produce an experimental framework that will be used
throughout this thesis to evaluate the dependability of different WSNs routing
protocols exposed with different failure characteristics. Based on the survey con-
ducted in Section 2.9, Section 3.1 formulates the research methodology using the
current state of the art approach in WSNs to evaluate the performance of the
routing protocols. A systematic evaluation to investigate the fault tolerance of
the routing protocols introduced in Section 2.8.1 is presented Section 3.2. We
summarise the results observed from the experiments in Section 3.3.
3.1 Materials and Methods
In this section, we formalise the materials and methods that are exercised in this
thesis based on the literature reviewed in Section 2.9 to evaluate the performance
of the routing protocols. To ensure that the experiments performed in our works
follow a systematic evaluation based on the current practises taken by WSNs re-
search community, an experimental framework is formulated in Figure 3.1 that
will be used to evaluate the routing protocol reliability in WSNs. The first step
in any experiment usually involves the formulation of the objectives and any
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assumptions made. This is followed by the description of the design of experi-
ments. It is necessary to reduce the uncertainty introduced into the experiment
by repeating the experiment sufficiently before the results are analysed visually
and mathematically. The following subsections elaborate the activities involved
in each of the stage.
(A) Defining the Scope
- Formalise the objectives
- State any assumption
(B) Design of Experiment
- Real Scenario (Applications)
- Large Test Cases (Failures)
- Tools and Configuration
(Simulators and Hardware)
(C) Error Reduction
- Arbritary number of
Repeatable Run
(D) Graphical Analysis
- Compilation of Results
- Error bar plot 
(E) Statistical Analysis
- Statistical Significance Test






















Figure 3.1: An Experimental Framework based on the existing State of the Art
experimental techniques in WSNs
3.1.1 Application Environment and Topology
According to Akyildiz et al. (2002), WSNs can be deployed in a predefined loca-
tion or random placed across an area of interest. Random deployment is usually
applied when the area to be monitored is not accessible. A large number of nodes
is usually deployed to ensure sufficient nodes are available to cover the sensing
area and communication range. However, random deployment of WSNs in the
real world, if any, is limited in the literature because it can be very expensive
and difficult to determine the number of nodes required for sufficient coverage
(Zou and Chakrabarty, 2007). The position of the nodes is usually pre-determined
and placed carefully to ensure that the nodes are within their transmission range.
Fixed deployment can be deployed outdoor or indoor. In outdoor deployments,
a grid topology is usually used to optimise the node’s placement. A number of
nodes ranged from 16 to 900 nodes are placed in parallel (n by n) (Hatler, 2012).
In an indoor application, two or more nodes are usually placed in the room and
along the corridors to provide redundancy (Chipara et al., 2010). Node redun-
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dancy plays an important role to provide fault tolerance. In our studies, we fol-
low the node redundancy approach in a grid-based topology similar to a vineyard
monitoring proposed by Beckwith et al. (2004) to mimic a realistic deployment.
A n by n predefined grid network with N static nodes is proposed as shown in
Figure 3.2 (n=7 and N = 49). The values of n and N can be different in real world
deployment depending on the sensing area and the application area.
Figure 3.2: A 7 by 7 grid topology based on multipoint to point network to model
an outdoor deployment where node 0, 2, 4, 14, and 28 (in blue) are evenly dis-
tributed to send periodic packets to sink (node 48, in red).
Traffic Flow
WSNs are usually used for sense and send applications. The flow of data packets
in WSNs depends on the requirements of the application running. It can be cat-
egorised into point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, multipoint-to-multipoint and
multipoint-to-point (Akkaya and Younis, 2005). Point-to-point provides direct
communication between the sender and receiver that can be triggered in two
methods. Firstly, a source may send the measurement to the destination periodi-
cally or when an event occurs. Secondly, a destination node may prompt for mea-
surements from a specific node. Point-to-multipoint traffic is usually generated
by a broadcast or flooding algorithm (Zhang et al., 2012). A typical WSNs applica-
tion is usually modelled by multipoint-to-point where information are generated
from many nodes and forwarded to the sink or cluster head (Langendoen et al.,
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2006; Liu et al., 2010). A multipoint-to-point becomes a multipoint-to-multipoint
when there are more than one sinks. In our simulation, we simulate a multipoint-
to-point network traffic flow as it is common for the sensed data to be collected
in one location across multiple hops (Chipara et al., 2010). For example in Figure
3.2, nodes 0, 2, 4, 14, 18 are assigned to send data packets to the sink (node 48).
Traffic Pattern
Demirkol et al. (2006) categorise the WSNs traffic pattern into event-driven and
periodic data-driven. In event driven, data packets are usually send to the user
when an interesting phenomenon is detected by the sensor nodes. This traffic pat-
tern is usually used for applications such as target detection and tracking (Le´deczi
et al., 2005). For a monitoring application, a periodic data driven traffic model are
usually applied. A constant bit rate (CBR) is often used where the data are usually
transmitted by a node at a predefined interval (Cui et al., 2005). This CBR can be
used to represent the sensed data from an environmental monitoring application
or the node’s health check information for event-based application. For example,
safety critical applications such as fire detection and intruder detection usually
perform maintenance check on the network to ensure that the nodes are always
ready to sense and forward data to the sink when fire occurs (Wang and Kuo,
2003; Wu et al., 2010a). The nodes usually transmit periodical heartbeat packets
regularly across the network to check the sink is still reachable. Hence, we ap-
ply the CBR traffic to flow from the sources (node 0, 2, 4, 14, 18) every t seconds
starting at different time intervals i to reduce the probability of packet collisions.
A set of baseline simulations using different t and i is run to determine the val-
ues of t and i to ensure that the routing protocols can produce significant results
when failures are introduced. Setting a low t value may not affect the routing be-
haviours and the results. From the baseline simulation, t is set to 0.5s to allow the
failing node to disrupt the sending of the packet. i is set to 0.1s to reduce failures
due to collision.
3.1.2 Failure Model
Errors on the radio communication can occur in WSNs as the open access radio
channel is shared by other devices. The interference in operating environment
can affect the routing protocol operating in the node. Different failure models
have been proposed and applied in WSNs. Most of these works concentrate on
fault models to detect intentional error. Unintentional error is common in the
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communication between the two nodes and may degrade the network perfor-
mance. As the 2.4-GHz ISM band occupied by WSNs is shared by other home
devices such as Wireless Network, microwave oven (MO) and cordless phones,
the communication between the nodes can be disrupted when the signal strength
emitted by these devices are higher than the transmitting node’s signal strength
(Reis et al., 2006; Mahanti et al., 2010). Mahanti et al. (2010) report that some in-
terferences are relatively short, but some have a long duration. For example, the
average active period (in min:sec) for microwave ovens (2:12), and digital cord-
less phones (7:32). Hence, it is important to be able to recognise and distinguish
the interference patterns in order to construct appropriate test cases into any eval-
uation.
3GPP2 (2009) and Zhuang et al. (2008) highlight that a typical wireless ap-
plication session can be observed as a sequence of distinct ON and OFF period
as shown in Figure 3.3. This ON and OFF patterns have been used in software-
based traffic generators to generate WLAN traffics (Botta et al., 2010). Hence,
in our research work, we apply the ON/OFF model to capture the interference
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arated.
Figure 3.3: A typical WLAN traffic patterns for web browsing (http) and File
Transfer (FTP)
In our ON/OFF interference model, the ON period will represent the failure
duration (fd(t)) (The interfering devices is ON). The OFF period will represent the
interval (fi(t)) between the occurrences of interferences (The interfering device
is OFF). The ON period can be classified into transient failure and permanent
failure. In permanent failure, the node is unable to communicate with any node
permanently (fd(t) =∞). It is usually created by obstacles such as metallic objects
that reduce the radio range of the sensor node. Hence, the interference is always
ON when it occurs. For transient failure, it has an irregular and unpredictable
duration that differs between activities. These failures may gradually reduce or
generate irregular packet delivery rate.
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To investigate the effect of interference on the packet delivery rate, we per-
form an experiment to capture the number of packets successfully received dur-
ing radio interference using a TelosB mote (Polastre et al., 2005). A sensor node
is configured to transmit a continuous fast stream of packets (250ms per packet)
without CCA and acknowledgement. Due to the limitation of the clock in TelosB,
the maximum transmission rate is equal 250ms. The number of packets send
successfully during WLAN interference is collected to observe the effect of inter-
ference on the transmission. We expose the WSNs to two different WLAN traffics
(FTP and HTTP traffics) each with different pattern as shown in Figure 3.3. From
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(b) Packet received during ftp interfer-
ence
Figure 3.4: The patterns showing the number of successful packets received by a
node during interference. The maximum duration for FTP traffic is 3.5s while the
minimum duration for www traffic is 0.25s (1 packet).
The failing pattern observed in Figure 3.4 is similar to Figure 3.3. Using that
pattern, it is possible to produce a model of the failure pattern using with the ON
and OFF model. Using the results observed, the interference model is classified
into short, medium and long duration. and fd(t) and fi(t) can be set accordingly
as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: The values of ON/OFF periods representing short, medium and long
interferences.
Interference ON period OFF period
Short fd(t) < 0.25s fi(t) < 0.25s
Medium 0.25s < fd(t) < 4s fi(t) < 0.25s
Long fd(t) > 4s fi(t) < 0.25s
To simulate the interference failure in our simulations, an active node along
the route is shut down during the ON period (fd(t)) and turn on during OFF
period (fi(t)). Although fd(t) and fi(t) may be context dependent and the ex-
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act channel usage of the WLAN devices in the real world may differ from that
of the particular applications studied in our controlled experiments, the general
characteristics observed should be similar.
3.1.3 Experimental Tools
To avoid any failures during operation, a newly design network protocol needs to
be tested thoroughly before any deployment in order to eliminate any errors in-
duced during design or implementation. The three commonly used techniques to
test and analyse the operation and performance of wired and wireless networks
can be categorised into analytical, computer simulation, and physical deploy-
ment. Due to the complexity of WSNs, such as dynamic deployment environ-
ment, unpredictable behaviour, and limited energy utilisation, it is complicated
and unfeasible to model and analyse the complex WSNs using traditional net-
work analytical methods (Hawrylak et al., 2009). The use of oversimplified as-
sumptions can produce results with limited confidence. Real physical hardware
deployment is usually expensive and time consuming. It requires a huge effort to
deploy especially in a large scale WSNs. Therefore, simulation is usually prefer-
able to evaluate the WSNs as large amounts of simulated data can be collected
cheaply and quickly for analysis.
Simulation Software
Different WSNs simulation tools have been developed. Dwivedi and Vyas (2011)
list fourteen WSNs simulators commonly used in WSNs experiments to evaluate
different aspects of WSNs such as the application, the network algorithm, and the
node behaviours. The number of simulators keeps on increasing as a new simula-
tor is proposed to tailor for different applications and scenarios. NS-2 is the most
widely used simulator to evaluate and analysed the network behaviour in WSNs
prior to deployment (Dwivedi and Vyas, 2011). It is initially developed in 1989
as a traditional network simulator. Since then, NS2 has gained popularity among
the WSNs community compared to other simulators. Various enhancements have
been implemented in NS2 including adding the IEEE (2006a) 802.15.4 MAC and
PHY layer to improve the validity of the simulation (Zheng and Lee, 2006). NS-2
contains a large numbers of external protocols and modules required including
routing protocol, battery models, and scenario generation tools. Each simulation
can be automated and repeated until a sufficient level of confidence in the results
has been achieved. The simulations are run at the packet level that can generate
detailed logs required for our studies.
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In this research work, we will be using the NS-2.34 simulator to evaluate the
routing protocols in our research work as it is an open-source event-driven sim-
ulator commonly used in the WSNs community (NS2, 2002). It can be extended
to support new protocols and can integrate with external script to support new
function. Although the large amount of logs generated by NS2 can be difficult
to analyse, we address this issue by post-processing the logs using automated
scripts written in Perl and shell scripts 1 that allowed us to compute the perfor-
mance metrics required for the analysis.
3.1.4 Simulation Methodology
In order to get a good estimate for the steady-state packet drop rate, the simula-
tion has to be run for a period of time. Furthermore, the transient phase Tr(t) at
the start of the simulation has to be removed and Tr(t) depends on the size of the
network. A preliminary baseline simulation on the network size of N=49 nodes
(7 by 7) shows that a simulation time of 120 seconds and a Tr(t) = 10s are needed
to initialise the network. To reduce the errors in the simulation, we repeat the
experiments n times and arbitrary set n=50. We will later show in Chapter 6 that
how the number of runs to reach a level of confidence in the results generated can
be determined systematically.
There are three radio propagation models available in NS-2.34 namely free
space model, two-ray ground reflection model and the shadowing model (NS2,
2002). The two-ray ground reflection model is commonly applied in the NS-
2.34 simulation. Although the log-normal shadowing path loss model provides
a more realistic propagation to model fading effect in the noisy environment, the
two parameters, namely, the path loss exponent and the log-normal shadow vari-
ance have to be measured and configured accordingly (Zamalloa and Krishna-
machari, 2007). The nodes near to the boundary of the transmission range can
only probabilistically communicate when simulating using shadowing model.
As a result, random packets are dropped. This can affect the observed results
between simulations. With a two-ray ground model, the communication failure
can be managed and controlled. Hence, the two-ray ground propagation model
with CSMA/CA protocol are used in our simulation. The IEEE 802.15.4 physical
and MAC protocols implemented by Zheng and Lee (2006) in NS-2.34 are also
enforced to ensure that our simulation follows the 802.15.4 standard.
In summary, the parameters to be used in our work are provided in Table 3.2.
1Downloadable at http://rtslab.wikispaces.com/file/view/ns2script.tar
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Table 3.2: Generic NS-2 Parameters used in simulations
Parameters Values
Simulation area: 200x200m
Number of nodes 49 nodes
Transmission interval: 0.5 s
Propagation model: Two-Ray Ground
MAC: 802.15.4 (CSMA/CA)
Routing Protocol: AODV, NST, AOMDV, TINYAODV
3.1.5 Evaluation Metrics
Reliability and latency are the two of the most important metrics in safety critical
system. They must therefore be considered during network design. Furthermore,
energy consumption remains a primary design concern in WSNs as a reasonably
long network lifetime is still necessary. According to Suriyachai et al. (2012), the
performance of a WSNs protocol can be measured based on the time domain or
reliability domain. The performance in the time domain relies on when data is re-
ceived at the destination and its ability to meet a specific deadline. Time domain
performance can be represented by packet delay. In terms of reliability domain, it
relies on how much data is received at the destination. Delivery ratio and packet
loss rate are measurements often used to represent this reliability performance.
To compare the performance between each routing protocol required for the stud-
ies, the following performance metrics are employed to test the objective defined
in Section 2.8:
• Packet Delivery Rate: Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) is the ratio of total num-
ber of data packets received, Pr to total number of data packets sent Ps. PDR
is commonly used to measure the reliability of the network. It allows us to
compare and measure how many packets have been successfully delivered






• Average Energy Consumption: The average energy consumption (Econsumed)
calculates the average amount of energy being utilised in the node to achieve
the PDR. It allows us to evaluate the amount of energy required for routing.
The lower the Eave, the better the routing algorithm is as it has increased the
lifespan of the network. Hence, routing protocol, that has the lowest Eave,
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where N = Total number of nodes
Ei(t0) = Initial Energy in the node
Ei(tx) = Energy Remains in the node
• End to End Delay: End to end delay (Delayave) is the sum of the delays
of each packet received over N, the total number of packets received. It
indicates the effectiveness and availability of the protocol and compares the






where N = Total number of packet received
t(prec) = Time Packet Sent at source
t(psent) = Time Packet Received at sink
• Normalised Routing Overhead: Routing overhead is calculated as the nor-
malised ratio of total routing packet transmitted to the total data packet
received. It is an important metric used to analyse the routing protocols
performance as it measures the routing overhead generated to deliver a data
packet. A low normalised routing overhead value is desirable as it indicates




Total Data Packet Received
3.1.6 Statistical tools
Data generated from multiple measurements can be subject to error. It is neces-
sary to reduce and understand the error by applying statistical analysis to sum-
marise those observations and quantifies the uncertainty in the measured vari-
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able. In our work, we will use the R statistical tool 2 to explore data sets, anal-
yse the statistics and plot the graphical representation of data results (Ihaka and
Gentleman, 1996). The use of statistical tools to analyse results collected from
WSNs experiments are limited. It is necessary to analyse the significance and
confidence of the results obtained to show that the performance improvement
observed is significant and different. Statistical tests allow us to analyse the prob-
ability that the results are different and whether the difference is significant. Two
non-parametric statistical tools can be applied to test the difference namely statis-
tical and scientifically significance test. Statistical significance test estimates the
probability that result if the results obtained have come from the same distribu-
tion. However, the test does not show how much the difference was. By per-
forming scientific significance test, the differences between the two distributions
can be estimated. Although non-parametric tests are weaker and are less likely to
reject the null hypothesis when it is false, this problem can be addressed by using
a large sample size to perform the test. According to Conover (1999), a nonpara-
metric test will require a slightly larger sample size to have the same power as
the parametric test. Hence, we repeat the experiments n times to generate a large
sample. We will later show in Chapter 6 how to determine n systematically.
Statistical significance test
Statistical significance test can be used to determine whether the difference in
performance observed in the results is likely to have occurred due to random
chance with the samples available, i.e. whether protocol X is really better than Y
or whether the results are so close than differences are purely random. In order
to determine and compare the relationship between the two samples collected
from the experiments, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, also known as rank-sum
test, is applied to compute the p-value (Wilcoxon, 1945). This non-parametric test
is used as it does not make any particular assumptions about the distribution of
the result, avoiding the need to verify the data conform to the test assumption.
Although a normality or other similar distribution test can be performed to de-
termine whether the data set exhibit a specific distribution, various reports have
shown that the data generated by the WSNs cannot be modelled by a known dis-
tribution. To show that our results generated from the WSNs simulation are not
normal, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test is applied to perform the hypothesis test
to reject null hypothesis (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965). The null hypothesis states that
the results are normally distributed. The test results for samples collected from
2The scripts downloadable at http://rtslab.wikispaces.com/file/view/plotgraph.tar
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one of the simulated scenario have rejected the null hypothesis as the p-values
<< 0.05 (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Results from Shapiro-Wilk Test show that the distribution of the results
generated from a WSN simulation does not follow a normal distribution (p-values
<< 0.05).
ENG PDR RT DLY
0.4936 1.47E-09 9.41E-11 6.07E-13
0.5996 3.71E-10 3.19E-08 4.49E-12
0.0271 5.21E-08 1.31E-07 4.24E-09
0.7244 3.91E-07 0.0018 1.64E-11
0.0022 9.33E-07 0.0017 1.58E-10
0.1651 5.31E-06 1.14E-02 8.24E-09
0.0478 6.39E-06 9.31E-09 3.23E-08
0.0120 1.29E-06 2.14E-07 6.96E-08
0.0006 1.93E-06 4.34E-08 1.99E-07
0.0027 6.74E-06 3.24E-08 9.90E-08
0.0018 2.75E-05 4.32E-07 1.70E-08
0.0297 4.82E-05 1.55E-05 1.94E-07
0.0023 0.0030 0.0002 8.68E-07
0.0018 0.0031 6.74E-06 2.68E-06
0.0089 0.0018 0.0004 6.43E-07
0.0014 0.0046 0.0005 7.09E-08
0.0007 0.0033 0.0014 4.68E-07
0.0023 0.0423 0.0012 4.02E-06
Another benefit of using the rank-sum test is the statistics generated from this
test can be used to perform scientific significance test. Based on a pre-determined
confidence level of X%, the results are shown to be statistically significant if the
p-value <= α. An α value of 0.05 is typically used, corresponding to 95% confi-
dence levels (Wilcoxon, 1945).
A two-tailed test is applied in our analysis as the directional prediction of
our data sample is unknown, that is whether the median of protocol A is better
than protocol B is unknown. We are only interested in determining the different
between the samples for this test. A two-tailed test is more rigorous and de-
mands more evidence to reject the hypothesis. The use of one-tailed test alone to
demonstrate significance is not sufficient (Gravetter, 2012). Hence, we will use a
two-tailed test and apply the scientific significance test to help us to deduce the
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direction of the relationship of the data (if any) by computing the effect size.
Scientific significance test
It is possible for the observed performance improvement between the protocols
to be statistically significant due to the large amounts of sample used to test the
protocol but the differences are small. It is important to examine the scientific sig-
nificance of results to measure the difference in the data distribution or the effect
size between the protocols. Another non-parametric test known as the Vargha-
Delaney A-statistic is used to measure the effect size (Vargha and Delaney, 2000).
A-value in the range [0, 1] is obtained using the parameters collected from the
previous rank-sum test. Using the guidelines proposed by Vargha and Delaney
(2000), the range of A-values representing different effect sizes are presented in
Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: The range of A-values proposed by Vargha and Delaney (2000) to rep-
resent different effect sizes.
Large Effect Size Medium Effect Size Small Effect Size
A-value <= 0.27 0.27 < A-value <= 0.36 0.36 < A-value < 0.44
A-value >= 0.73 0.64 < A-value <= 0.73 0.56 < A-value < 0.64
3.2 Performance Analysis of Routing Protocols
In order to analyse the competency of a routing protocol to tolerate failures, a set
of objectives is defined as:
• To investigate the ability of a routing protocol to tolerate failures with dif-
ferent duration and density.
• To compare the performance of the AODV, NST, AOMDV and TinyAODV
routing protocols injected with different failures.
• To identify the properties of a routing protocol used to rectify failures.
The results collected from the experiments are presented to investigate and
evaluate the performance of the routing protocol operating in the nodes.
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3.2.1 Observations
Figure 3.5 shows the PDR generated by each of the routing protocols under dif-
ferent number of failing nodes with transient (0.1s) and long (10s) failure dura-
tion. During the error-free condition (No fault is injected), NST (95%) can deliver
more packets than AODV (92.4%), AOMDV (94%) and TinyAODV (92.5%). As
the number of nodes injected with 0.1s failure duration increases, the number
of packets delivered for all the routing protocols decrease gradually. In order to
validate the results, a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test is applied to check if the ob-
served differences are statistically significant (Wilcoxon, 1945). Table 3.5 and 3.7
show that NST has a significantly higher PDR than AODV (Rank-Sum p-values<
0.09 , Vargha-Delaney A-value<0.662 (Medium Effect Size)).
When a longer error of 10s is injected, the PDR observed in AOMDV lower
than AODV, NST and TinyAODV. When more than 14 failing nodes, the PDR for
AOMDV has dropped by half as shown in Figure 3.5(b). Although the means
of the PDR of NST taken from 50 runs in Figure 3.5(b) is showing higher means
than NST and Tiny-AODV, the statistical tests have revealed than the differences
in PDR does not produce scientific values. For instance, the Vargha-Delaney test
in Table 3.7 have shown that the differences are always not significant when there
are more than 11 nodes failing with A-value < 0.65.
Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of energy consumption required for each of
the routing protocols with increasing number of failures. Figure 3.6(a) shows that
no significant difference in energy consumption between the AODV, NST and
Tiny-AODV when more than two nodes are failed at the same time at random
interval. When a 0.1s failure duration is introduced to one node in the network,
the energy consumption in NST is 0.25% lower than AODV (rank-sum test, p-
value = 0.044) and TinyAODV (rank-sum test, p-value = 0.022) as depicted in
Figure 3.6(a). Although the p-values at 0.1s (1 failure node) are < 0.05, the dif-
ferences between NST and AODV (A-value = 0.619), and TinyAODV (A-value =
0.634) exhibit small effects size. Hence, the differences is not significant between
the three protocols. The energy consumption slowly increases as more failures
occur as shown in Figure 3.6(a). AOMDV exhibits the highest energy consump-
tion (> 10%) compare to AODV, NST and TinyAODV (< 6%). We believe this
additional energy consumption is due to the Hello packets in the MAC layers.
Further assessment of the simulation log reveals that the total number of MAC
packets transmitted and received in AOMDV is 42% more than NST-AODV as
shown in Table 3.13. Hence, the use of Hello packets is not suitable for WSNs as
it consumes more energy than LLN in AODV, NST and TinyAODV.
When the failure duration is increased to 10s, the energy consumed by AODV
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(b) Packet Delivery Rate for failure duration 10s
Figure 3.5: The means computed from 50 runs have shown that the PDR of NST
is higher than AODV, AOMDV and TinyAODV as the number of failing nodes
increases.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 2.46E-006 0.0008 3.02E-006 0.0578 0.8902 0.0290
1 6.14E-005 0.0036 0.0003 0.0566 0.6030 0.1580
2 0.0093 0.0527 0.0290 0.1774 0.7615 0.4946
3 0.0051 0.0282 0.0749 0.2761 0.3552 0.8146
4 0.0027 0.0112 0.0299 0.5216 0.5227 0.6341
5 0.0008 0.0026 0.0205 0.7079 0.3572 0.3106
6 0.0010 0.0033 0.0168 0.9860 0.4724 0.2609
7 0.0023 0.0029 0.0118 0.5217 0.7072 0.1418
8 0.0019 0.0054 0.0394 0.7341 0.3460 0.0607
9 0.0016 0.0050 0.0349 0.7447 0.3441 0.0810
10 0.0032 0.0105 0.0314 0.6265 0.5134 0.1036
11 0.0037 0.0063 0.0304 0.3682 0.5087 0.0626
12 0.0010 0.0020 0.0100 0.3050 0.4972 0.0835
13 0.0070 0.0088 0.0494 0.2380 0.4835 0.0552
14 0.0031 0.0033 0.0527 0.2762 0.3260 0.0298
15 0.0066 0.0079 0.0498 0.1988 0.5087 0.0379
16 0.0028 0.0044 0.0297 0.2463 0.4188 0.0479
17 0.0077 0.0049 0.0326 0.1482 0.6005 0.0597
18 0.0039 0.0036 0.0353 0.2139 0.4483 0.0283
Table 3.5: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different PDR with 0.1s
failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and T=TinyAODV. The
value in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 6.52e-05 0.00778 9.59e-05 0.03421 0.69726 0.03218
1 2.68e-05 1.05e-06 4.47e-06 0.77037 0.83922 0.94692
2 0.09241 2.73e-05 0.11763 0.00293 0.80650 0.00013
3 0.18466 0.00242 0.70181 0.16846 0.40207 0.00309
4 0.21535 2.96e-05 0.81759 0.02139 0.48603 0.00396
5 0.02606 2.05e-05 0.28597 0.04111 0.03284 0.00071
6 0.04898 2.03e-06 0.62116 0.00017 0.11596 1.58e-05
7 0.01576 4.31e-08 0.91198 4.09e-06 0.10750 2.91e-07
8 0.00154 2.06e-10 0.16926 1.36e-06 0.15937 1.22e-08
9 0.00506 5.31e-13 0.03707 3.03e-08 0.49497 5.75e-11
10 0.00908 5.66e-13 0.04204 8.22e-10 0.46859 1.82e-12
11 0.00306 2.38e-13 0.01489 1.15e-10 0.61126 2.75e-13
12 0.03982 1.79e-13 0.33008 6.55e-12 0.25869 2.76e-15
13 0.00862 7.53e-14 0.09067 1.83e-12 0.21234 2.46e-15
14 0.08949 8.09e-14 0.17687 5.26e-13 0.57226 1.56e-16
15 0.00930 7.00e-14 0.43058 4.39e-14 0.12612 7.28e-17
16 0.03519 3.13e-14 0.98433 3.13e-14 0.06155 5.41e-17
17 0.03463 2.91e-14 0.67853 4.15e-14 0.13104 4.81e-17
18 0.11469 1.77e-14 0.78412 2.19e-14 0.17685 3.16e-17
Table 3.6: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different PDR with 10s
failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and T=TinyAODV. The
value in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.768 0.688 0.766 0.390 0.508 0.626
1 0.734 0.666 0.709 0.389 0.469 0.582
2 0.662 0.612 0.627 0.421 0.482 0.540
3 0.664 0.627 0.604 0.436 0.445 0.486
4 0.675 0.646 0.626 0.462 0.462 0.472
5 0.696 0.674 0.635 0.478 0.446 0.441
6 0.692 0.670 0.639 0.501 0.457 0.435
7 0.678 0.672 0.647 0.538 0.478 0.415
8 0.682 0.661 0.620 0.520 0.444 0.391
9 0.685 0.662 0.623 0.519 0.444 0.399
10 0.673 0.648 0.625 0.529 0.461 0.405
11 0.670 0.662 0.626 0.553 0.461 0.392
12 0.692 0.678 0.650 0.560 0.460 0.399
13 0.662 0.662 0.614 0.569 0.459 0.389
14 0.674 0.669 0.613 0.564 0.442 0.374
15 0.662 0.662 0.614 0.575 0.461 0.379
16 0.676 0.664 0.627 0.568 0.452 0.384
17 0.662 0.662 0.624 0.585 0.469 0.391
18 0.669 0.668 0.623 0.573 0.455 0.373
Table 3.7: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different PDR with
0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and T=TinyAODV.
The value in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows medium effect size.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.773 0.667 0.746 0.365 0.475 0.624
1 0.786 0.807 0.791 0.519 0.513 0.496
2 0.618 0.768 0.601 0.691 0.484 0.276
3 0.593 0.694 0.525 0.589 0.445 0.327
4 0.588 0.769 0.515 0.648 0.454 0.332
5 0.660 0.777 0.430 0.633 0.360 0.302
6 0.639 0.806 0.468 0.742 0.397 0.248
7 0.672 0.856 0.492 0.796 0.395 0.201
8 0.725 0.913 0.591 0.811 0.408 0.167
9 0.698 0.964 0.636 0.856 0.455 0.118
10 0.686 0.968 0.634 0.895 0.453 0.089
11 0.714 0.985 0.663 0.915 0.467 0.074
12 0.649 0.987 0.566 0.942 0.426 0.039
13 0.690 0.995 0.614 0.953 0.419 0.038
14 0.625 0.994 0.591 0.973 0.462 0.018
15 0.688 0.996 0.553 0.986 0.400 0.013
16 0.652 0.998 0.498 0.993 0.377 0.011
17 0.653 0.998 0.528 0.990 0.400 0.008
18 0.613 0.998 0.518 0.996 0.411 0.007
Table 3.8: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different PDR with
10s failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and T=TinyAODV.
The value in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows medium effect size.
77























0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18























0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
(b) Energy Consumption for failure duration 10s
Figure 3.6: Lower energy consumption (4.75% with 5% confidence level) due to
retransmission is observed in NST-AODV when 1 node fails for 0.1s duration.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.691 4.70E-018 0.676 9.31E-018 0.989 9.87E-018
1 0.044 7.17E-018 0.022 1.44E-017 0.891 8.59E-018
2 0.350 8.27E-018 0.370 1.73E-017 0.820 1.09E-017
3 0.699 1.04E-017 0.374 1.73E-017 0.662 2.23E-017
4 0.244 1.04E-017 0.370 2.34E-017 0.735 2.36E-017
5 0.584 1.40E-017 0.748 2.34E-017 0.789 7.23E-017
6 0.688 1.17E-017 0.900 2.20E-017 0.792 5.39E-017
7 0.639 1.17E-017 0.823 2.34E-017 0.756 1.36E-016
8 0.859 1.49E-017 0.872 4.02E-017 0.983 3.24E-016
9 0.782 1.67E-017 0.916 3.16E-017 0.820 4.56E-016
10 0.773 1.49E-017 0.928 2.98E-017 0.621 7.66E-017
11 0.205 1.40E-017 0.566 2.81E-017 0.464 1.53E-016
12 0.462 1.67E-017 0.961 3.16E-017 0.383 1.82E-016
13 0.562 1.58E-017 0.861 4.81E-017 0.655 1.45E-016
14 0.873 1.99E-017 0.806 2.98E-017 0.613 5.11E-016
15 0.806 1.99E-017 0.933 2.81E-017 0.691 6.06E-016
16 0.831 1.99E-017 0.915 4.53E-017 0.650 1.86E-015
17 0.790 1.99E-017 0.983 3.16E-017 0.670 1.26E-015
18 0.672 1.77E-017 0.823 2.98E-017 0.789 1.96E-015
Table 3.9: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different energy utili-
sation with 0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The value in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.35155 3.47E-015 0.38615 8.36E-015 0.76823 1.04E-017
1 0.50916 5.13E-015 0.27048 8.83E-015 0.71706 1.13E-017
2 0.07070 6.33E-015 0.31002 7.66E-015 0.45642 1.06E-017
3 0.43419 4.46E-015 0.95978 1.01E-014 0.60331 1.06E-017
4 0.41713 7.60E-014 0.57104 9.99E-014 0.24658 5.96E-016
5 0.35821 4.11E-012 0.92008 3.17E-012 0.54371 1.81E-014
6 0.92719 1.08E-010 0.20339 1.84E-010 0.48528 2.47E-012
7 0.98509 5.30E-010 0.19726 4.93E-010 0.26229 6.98E-012
8 0.87626 7.22E-008 0.07608 4.33E-008 0.08079 3.11E-008
9 0.57075 1.78E-006 0.13633 7.88E-007 0.11971 2.33E-006
10 0.04101 7.19E-006 0.11420 3.24E-007 0.00322 3.05E-005
11 0.00722 0.00037 0.19129 0.00001 8.42E-005 0.00153
12 0.00722 0.00412 0.45671 0.00001 0.00067 0.00929
13 0.00850 0.01963 0.60015 7.43E-006 0.00064 0.03024
14 0.04493 0.03068 0.35514 0.00014 0.00312 0.12263
15 0.30474 0.01726 0.19129 0.00048 0.00293 0.16889
16 0.66233 0.00336 0.03054 0.00059 0.00167 0.35722
17 0.72980 0.00570 0.01212 0.00179 0.00200 0.56461
18 0.75980 0.00568 0.00385 0.00215 0.00136 0.76604
Table 3.10: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different energy util-
isation with 10s failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The value in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.523 0.998 0.524 0.996 0.501 0.005
1 0.619 1.000 0.634 0.998 0.492 0.001
2 0.555 0.996 0.552 0.997 0.486 0.003
3 0.523 0.995 0.552 0.997 0.526 0.008
4 0.569 0.995 0.552 0.995 0.480 0.008
5 0.532 0.993 0.519 0.995 0.484 0.016
6 0.524 0.994 0.508 0.995 0.484 0.014
7 0.528 0.994 0.513 0.995 0.482 0.020
8 0.511 0.993 0.510 0.991 0.499 0.026
9 0.516 0.992 0.506 0.993 0.486 0.028
10 0.517 0.993 0.494 0.993 0.471 0.016
11 0.575 0.993 0.534 0.993 0.457 0.021
12 0.543 0.992 0.497 0.993 0.448 0.022
13 0.534 0.992 0.510 0.990 0.473 0.020
14 0.510 0.991 0.486 0.993 0.470 0.029
15 0.515 0.991 0.495 0.993 0.476 0.030
16 0.513 0.991 0.494 0.993 0.473 0.036
17 0.516 0.991 0.499 0.993 0.475 0.036
18 0.525 0.991 0.513 0.993 0.484 0.039
Table 3.11: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different energy
utilisation with 0.1s failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The value in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows
medium effect size.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.565 0.998 0.555 0.995 0.481 0.005
1 0.453 0.999 0.429 0.999 0.476 0.000
2 0.373 0.997 0.434 1.000 0.549 0.000
3 0.445 1.000 0.496 0.998 0.534 0.000
4 0.442 0.981 0.537 0.979 0.576 0.028
5 0.433 0.950 0.493 0.952 0.540 0.053
6 0.507 0.915 0.583 0.910 0.546 0.091
7 0.498 0.903 0.585 0.900 0.574 0.100
8 0.488 0.850 0.617 0.852 0.614 0.177
9 0.459 0.807 0.597 0.818 0.602 0.224
10 0.355 0.791 0.604 0.829 0.690 0.257
11 0.307 0.736 0.588 0.834 0.750 0.315
12 0.307 0.690 0.550 0.799 0.718 0.348
13 0.311 0.655 0.536 0.788 0.719 0.373
14 0.353 0.643 0.563 0.749 0.694 0.410
15 0.425 0.658 0.588 0.725 0.692 0.420
16 0.468 0.692 0.643 0.723 0.704 0.446
17 0.474 0.681 0.666 0.703 0.701 0.466
18 0.478 0.680 0.688 0.699 0.708 0.482
Table 3.12: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different energy
utilisation with 10s failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The value in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows
medium effect size.
Table 3.13: The total number of MAC packets transmitted and received are higher
in AOMDV compared to AODV, NST and TinyAODV even when no error is in-
troduced.
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(5% to 7.6%), NST (4.8% to 6.8%) and Tiny-AODV (5% to 7.4%) increases with
the number of failures. In contrast, the energy consumption for AOMDV de-
creases from 10% to 8% as more nodes are failed. The A-value tabulated in Table
3.12 shows that the energy consumed by NST is significantly less than AODV,
TinyAODV and AOMDV when more than 16 nodes are failed.
Figure 3.7 shows the routing overhead generated by each of the routing proto-
cols increases as the number of failures increases. In 3.7(a), the routing overhead
generated by NST is half the number of routing overhead generated by AODV
and TinyAODV with p-value << 0.0005 and A-value < 0.27 (NST and AODV)
and < 0.29 (NST and TinyAODV) in Table 3.16. NST has a lower routing packet
due to its ability to retransmit during failure. Although the mean values shown
in Figure 3.8(a) indicate the routing overhead for AODV is slightly lower than
TinyAODV when 12 or more nodes are failed, the difference between AODV and
TinyAODV indicated by the Rank-sum and Vargha-Delaney Test have shown that
differences are not significant.
When the failure duration is increased to 10s, the number routing packet gen-
erated by AODV and TinyAODV increases faster than NST as a steeper gradient
is observed in Figure 3.7(b). The routing overhead in NST is significantly lower
than AODV and TinyAODV. This shows that the ability to retransmit the packet
during failure in NST can reduce the routing overhead. The results in Figure
3.7(b) also show that the routing overhead generated by AODV and TinyAODV
fluctuate between each other. When the number of failure is less than 2, the mean
of the routing overhead is the same. Between 3 to 10 nodes, TinyAODV has a
lower routing overhead than AODV. When more than 11 nodes have failed, the
mean routing overhead is less than TinyAODV.
Further analysis of the simulation logs reveals that Local Discovery (LD) in
AODV can generate more routing overhead than tinyAODV when no local node
is available to forward the packets as shown in Figure 3.7(b) at 5 failure nodes.
Additional 100 routing packets are sent and received by AODV when compared
to TinyAODV (rank-sum test, p-value = 0.00338 and Vargha-Delaney test, A-value
= 0.691). Hence, the results shows that the routing overhead generated by the
routing protocols are affected by the failure condition occurring in the networks
and the performance of the routing protocols are context dependent.
In terms of the packet delay, the average time required to deliver a packet is
computed and shown in Figure 3.8. During 0.1s failure duration, the mean packet
delay shown in Figure 3.8(a) for AODV, NST and TinyAODV slowly increases as
the number of failures increases. The packet delay fluctuates between AODV,
NST and TinyAODV as the number of failures increases. However, the differ-
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(b) Routing Overhead for failure duration 10s
Figure 3.7: The routing packets required to successfully delivered a packet are
significantly higher in AODV and TinyAODV due to the lower PDR in AODV
and TinyAODV. The routing overhead is higher for 10s failure durations as RDs
are necessary to recover from the failing nodes.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 2.75E-008 3.29E-018 3.21E-008 4.83E-018 0.7225 4.83E-018
1 0.0001 7.15E-018 7.46E-007 1.06E-017 0.7291 7.16E-018
2 8.91E-007 4.84E-018 0.0001 1.06E-017 0.8314 7.16E-018
3 3.96E-007 4.84E-018 3.32E-005 1.06E-017 0.4639 7.16E-018
4 1.68E-005 4.84E-018 2.02E-005 1.06E-017 0.9482 7.16E-018
5 3.84E-006 4.84E-018 2.59E-005 1.06E-017 0.7618 7.16E-018
6 9.93E-007 4.84E-018 2.67E-005 1.06E-017 0.6313 7.16E-018
7 6.08E-006 4.83E-018 2.93E-005 1.06E-017 0.9425 7.15E-018
8 3.75E-005 4.84E-018 0.0003 1.06E-017 0.7183 7.16E-018
9 4.95E-005 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.8710 7.16E-018
10 2.71E-005 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.7427 7.16E-018
11 4.80E-006 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.6211 7.16E-018
12 4.43E-007 4.83E-018 0.0001 1.06E-017 0.3945 7.15E-018
13 1.37E-006 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.5207 7.16E-018
14 1.63E-006 4.83E-018 0.0005 1.06E-017 0.3709 7.15E-018
15 0.0001 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.5068 7.16E-018
16 1.50E-006 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.60E-017 0.4477 1.06E-017
17 1.82E-006 4.84E-018 0.0002 1.06E-017 0.5492 7.16E-018
18 7.16E-007 4.84E-018 0.0001 1.06E-017 0.4706 7.16E-018
Table 3.14: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different routing over-
head with 0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 3.48E-007 2.62E-015 4.04E-006 4.44E-015 0.21122 4.83E-018
1 8.67E-005 4.44E-015 5.69E-005 7.64E-015 0.84331 1.06E-017
2 0.00065 4.46E-015 1.27E-005 7.66E-015 0.38601 1.06E-017
3 2.07E-005 4.46E-015 0.00037 7.66E-015 0.25435 1.06E-017
4 2.71E-006 7.64E-015 2.53E-005 7.65E-015 0.39118 1.06E-017
5 2.44E-011 1.33E-014 3.46E-005 1.33E-014 0.00338 1.06E-017
6 1.18E-009 7.66E-015 3.07E-008 7.66E-015 0.12199 1.06E-017
7 1.43E-011 1.33E-014 7.49E-009 7.65E-015 0.19350 1.06E-017
8 1.24E-010 1.33E-014 5.40E-012 7.66E-015 0.83322 1.06E-017
9 2.29E-010 7.66E-015 3.60E-013 7.66E-015 0.72558 1.06E-017
10 1.86E-011 1.33E-014 6.37E-014 7.66E-015 0.69766 1.06E-017
11 2.59E-011 4.20E-014 7.66E-013 7.66E-015 0.40165 1.06E-017
12 2.56E-009 4.20E-014 7.67E-009 7.66E-015 0.82592 1.06E-017
13 2.25E-011 4.20E-014 1.68E-010 7.66E-015 0.46211 1.06E-017
14 7.86E-010 4.20E-014 6.58E-009 2.35E-014 0.28843 1.06E-017
15 7.70E-011 4.20E-014 0.00001 7.66E-015 0.86991 1.06E-017
16 3.75E-009 2.35E-014 2.31E-007 1.33E-014 0.95809 1.06E-017
17 1.61E-008 2.35E-014 1.02E-007 1.33E-014 0.87646 1.60E-017
18 8.94E-008 1.33E-014 2.66E-009 1.33E-014 0.47019 1.06E-017
Table 3.15: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different routing over-
head with 10s failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.179 1.000 0.181 1.000 0.521 0.000
1 0.196 1.000 0.210 1.000 0.521 0.000
2 0.212 1.000 0.253 1.000 0.513 0.000
3 0.203 1.000 0.258 1.000 0.543 0.000
4 0.248 1.000 0.251 1.000 0.496 0.000
5 0.229 1.000 0.254 1.000 0.518 0.000
6 0.213 1.000 0.255 1.000 0.528 0.000
7 0.235 1.000 0.256 1.000 0.504 0.000
8 0.258 1.000 0.291 1.000 0.521 0.000
9 0.262 1.000 0.286 1.000 0.510 0.000
10 0.254 1.000 0.284 1.000 0.520 0.000
11 0.232 1.000 0.280 1.000 0.529 0.000
12 0.204 1.000 0.269 1.000 0.550 0.000
13 0.217 1.000 0.280 1.000 0.538 0.000
14 0.219 1.000 0.298 1.000 0.553 0.000
15 0.217 1.000 0.280 1.000 0.539 0.000
16 0.216 1.000 0.281 1.000 0.545 0.000
17 0.220 1.000 0.280 1.000 0.536 0.000
18 0.209 1.000 0.275 1.000 0.543 0.000
Table 3.16: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different routing
overhead with 0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows
medium effect size.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.148 1.000 0.207 1.000 0.580 0.000
1 0.225 1.000 0.240 1.000 0.487 0.000
2 0.266 1.000 0.227 1.000 0.443 0.000
3 0.212 1.000 0.274 1.000 0.575 0.000
4 0.169 1.000 0.225 1.000 0.556 0.000
5 0.072 1.000 0.235 1.000 0.691 0.000
6 0.106 1.000 0.159 1.000 0.601 0.000
7 0.070 1.000 0.144 1.000 0.585 0.000
8 0.086 1.000 0.090 1.000 0.514 0.000
9 0.093 1.000 0.076 1.000 0.523 0.000
10 0.072 1.000 0.064 1.000 0.474 0.000
11 0.069 1.000 0.072 1.000 0.445 0.000
12 0.104 1.000 0.138 1.000 0.485 0.000
13 0.068 1.000 0.108 1.000 0.452 0.000
14 0.090 1.000 0.137 1.000 0.429 0.000
15 0.077 1.000 0.150 1.000 0.511 0.000
16 0.108 1.000 0.174 1.000 0.504 0.000
17 0.121 1.000 0.164 1.000 0.489 0.000
18 0.140 1.000 0.135 1.000 0.452 0.000
Table 3.17: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different routing
overhead with 10s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows
medium effect size.
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(b) Average Packet Delay for failure duration 10s
Figure 3.8: The packet delay in TinyAODV is lower than AODV and NST-AODV
as packet are dropped when a failure is detected in the network. It is more appro-
priate to perform global route discovery when there is no route available locally
to forward to packet in order to allow the next packet to be delivered quickly.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.6911 4.70E-018 0.6761 9.31E-018 0.9890 9.87E-018
1 0.0437 7.17E-018 0.0224 1.44E-017 0.8910 8.59E-018
2 0.3500 8.27E-018 0.3704 1.73E-017 0.8202 1.09E-017
3 0.6985 1.04E-017 0.3741 1.73E-017 0.6624 2.23E-017
4 0.2438 1.04E-017 0.3704 2.34E-017 0.7345 2.36E-017
5 0.5842 1.40E-017 0.7475 2.34E-017 0.7895 7.23E-017
6 0.6880 1.17E-017 0.8998 2.20E-017 0.7923 5.39E-017
7 0.6390 1.17E-017 0.8228 2.34E-017 0.7564 1.36E-016
8 0.8590 1.49E-017 0.8721 4.02E-017 0.9827 3.24E-016
9 0.7817 1.67E-017 0.9164 3.16E-017 0.8202 4.56E-016
10 0.7735 1.49E-017 0.9275 2.98E-017 0.6211 7.66E-017
11 0.2046 1.40E-017 0.5660 2.81E-017 0.4639 1.53E-016
12 0.4620 1.67E-017 0.9609 3.16E-017 0.3826 1.82E-016
13 0.5625 1.58E-017 0.8611 4.81E-017 0.6546 1.45E-016
14 0.8730 1.99E-017 0.8065 2.98E-017 0.6135 5.11E-016
15 0.8063 1.99E-017 0.9331 2.81E-017 0.6915 6.06E-016
16 0.8314 1.99E-017 0.9151 4.53E-017 0.6498 1.86E-015
17 0.7899 1.99E-017 0.9832 3.16E-017 0.6703 1.26E-015
18 0.6724 1.77E-017 0.8228 2.98E-017 0.7895 1.96E-015
Table 3.18: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different average packet
delay with 0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.74743 0.69496 0.50028 0.27959 0.96439 0.12393
1 0.29086 0.05995 0.55199 0.00083 0.64127 0.00303
2 0.09421 0.40863 0.06426 0.11962 0.94404 0.07709
3 0.24361 0.00010 0.00444 0.03621 0.11971 0.14628
4 0.29638 1.01E-007 0.02360 0.00015 0.20339 0.00081
5 0.70230 2.05E-013 4.36E-005 3.54E-011 0.00063 3.55E-005
6 0.86934 1.71E-013 0.00106 2.53E-012 0.00756 0.00001
7 0.60498 4.33E-013 0.00932 1.83E-013 0.00366 4.71E-007
8 0.59630 6.56E-011 0.08625 1.60E-013 0.03327 2.35E-008
9 0.42419 1.61E-012 0.11527 1.22E-011 0.07915 1.32E-007
10 0.76018 1.03E-012 0.16283 8.43E-012 0.15466 2.33E-007
11 0.96359 3.14E-012 0.43875 4.36E-013 0.37075 5.22E-008
12 0.73939 2.23E-012 0.25194 1.16E-012 0.24275 1.37E-007
13 0.72956 2.08E-012 0.35514 9.60E-013 0.42853 9.36E-008
14 0.34879 2.95E-013 0.29135 3.49E-012 0.52859 2.17E-008
15 0.35690 3.40E-013 0.36568 2.39E-013 0.15193 5.07E-007
16 0.42224 2.13E-013 0.46658 1.64E-012 0.23668 5.64E-008
17 0.80949 2.13E-013 0.58146 2.04E-014 0.39188 5.76E-008
18 0.45952 3.32E-010 0.84469 1.00E-010 0.81488 1.17E-008
Table 3.19: p-values computed from Rank-Sum test for different average packet
delay with 10s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows statistical significance.
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Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.535 0.461 0.539 0.399 0.496 0.595
1 0.513 0.402 0.508 0.339 0.490 0.615
2 0.616 0.565 0.581 0.385 0.463 0.527
3 0.608 0.589 0.572 0.434 0.469 0.494
4 0.589 0.584 0.570 0.473 0.482 0.506
5 0.594 0.629 0.584 0.484 0.495 0.505
6 0.590 0.615 0.571 0.475 0.480 0.480
7 0.614 0.614 0.574 0.446 0.462 0.485
8 0.599 0.625 0.579 0.482 0.484 0.490
9 0.611 0.637 0.588 0.474 0.475 0.492
10 0.588 0.619 0.583 0.487 0.493 0.503
11 0.575 0.609 0.557 0.498 0.489 0.483
12 0.572 0.616 0.574 0.503 0.509 0.497
13 0.599 0.641 0.579 0.488 0.486 0.480
14 0.599 0.636 0.583 0.477 0.496 0.498
15 0.602 0.634 0.572 0.464 0.479 0.482
16 0.594 0.625 0.569 0.476 0.484 0.484
17 0.584 0.618 0.564 0.477 0.484 0.486
18 0.594 0.629 0.571 0.464 0.478 0.485
Table 3.20: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different aver-
age delay with 0.1s failure duration where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and
T=TinyAODV. The values in bold shows large effect size and in italic shows
medium effect size.
92
3.2 Performance Analysis of Routing Protocols
Number Routing Protocols
Failures N:A N:M N:T A:M A:T M:T
0 0.523 0.475 0.543 0.431 0.503 0.589
1 0.574 0.380 0.539 0.285 0.469 0.673
2 0.618 0.553 0.620 0.400 0.505 0.603
3 0.582 0.748 0.682 0.635 0.602 0.415
4 0.574 0.843 0.647 0.745 0.583 0.304
5 0.528 0.977 0.761 0.930 0.721 0.259
6 0.512 0.974 0.710 0.950 0.673 0.215
7 0.463 0.970 0.670 0.973 0.688 0.206
8 0.462 0.924 0.613 0.975 0.638 0.174
9 0.443 0.954 0.603 0.936 0.615 0.192
10 0.478 0.963 0.592 0.939 0.593 0.198
11 0.496 0.961 0.552 0.966 0.559 0.182
12 0.525 0.965 0.577 0.957 0.577 0.192
13 0.526 0.965 0.563 0.959 0.552 0.188
14 0.570 0.983 0.571 0.956 0.542 0.173
15 0.433 0.982 0.561 0.971 0.594 0.207
16 0.441 0.981 0.549 0.958 0.578 0.183
17 0.518 0.981 0.537 0.996 0.557 0.181
18 0.554 0.908 0.513 0.920 0.516 0.167
Table 3.21: A-values computed from Vargha-Delaney Test for different aver-
age delay with 10 failure durations where N=NST, A=AODV, M=AOMDV and




ences in packet delay between AODV, NST and TinyAODV are not significant as
indicated by the p- and A-value in Table 3.20 and 3.21.
3.2.2 Discussion
The performance results observed are clearly context dependent. The simula-
tion results suggest that different failure characteristics in terms of duration and
size can affect the routing behaviour, network reliability and efficiency. Response
taken by the routing protocol to overcome failure and its parameter can also affect
the network performance. To improve the performance of the networks, routing
approach taken needs to adapt to the operating condition.
3.3 Summary
The AODV have been enhanced over the last few years to improve its perfor-
mance. The four common routing protocols applied in WSNs were evaluated.
From our studies, the performances of AODV have degraded very quickly as we
increased the number of failures. More packets are dropped in AODV than NST
due to network congestion created by RD packets. The energy consumption and
delay are higher in AODV and NST-AODV than TinyAODV at longer failure du-
ration. Although optimistic retransmission in NST can improve the probability
of packet transmission during transient failure, it utilises the resources unnec-
essary when the failing duration of the next hop neighbour is longer than the
retransmission period assigned. When we increased the failure duration and the
number of failures, the packet latency and energy utilisation in NST begins to in-
crease as each packet is queued while the node attempts to retransmit the failed
packet. The overall performance in NST starts to degrade as it reverts to less
optimistic local repair in AODV. These results have provided a motivation for a






In this chapter, we propose a multi-modal approach switching between different
protocols to improve the robustness and dependability of the WSNs. The motiva-
tion for the work is introduced in Section 4.1. To investigate the robustness and ef-
fectiveness of the multi-modal concept to improve dependability, a Multi-modal
Routing Protocol (MRP) is proposed and presented in Section 4.2. To evaluate
the robustness and scalability of MRP, we have deployed two types of networks
(indoor and outdoor) in simulation to measure the performance of MRP against
AODV and NST-AODV. Using the data collected from the indoor simulations, we
investigate the robustness of the MRP by varying the failure durations and the
number of failures. We present the experimental setup and analyse the results in
Section 4.3 and 4.4. In Section 4.5, we demonstrate further experiments to eval-
uate the scalability of MRP by increasing the number of nodes in the networks
based on an outdoor application. Using the data collected, the performances are
reported for different network sizes. We summarise the results observed from the
experiments in Section 4.6.
4.1 Motivation
In the real world deployment of WSNs, individual nodes are usually arranged in
a pre-defined static topology to ensure the radio connectivity between nodes and
avoiding holes (Wagner, 2010; Togami et al., 2012). Due to the over-utilisation
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of the unlicensed radio channel by other wireless devices, the radio communi-
cation between the nodes can be inflected by radio frequency interference gen-
erated by these devices that can occur anywhere, anytime. Zhou et al. (2004)
have demonstrated that these radio irregularity can degrade the reliability of the
WSNs and disrupt the routing protocol. Huo et al. (2009) show that these inter-
ferences may cause significant packet losses of between 10% to 50%. Although
the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC standard (IEEE, 2006b) attempts to address this prob-
lem by using frame acknowledgement to retransmit the packet immediately after
failure, the retransmission is not always successful due to the temporal character-
istic of the high radio signal noise generated by the interfering device. Srinivasan
et al. (2010) report that a high radio emitting signal from 802.11 device can cre-
ate spatial and temporal correlated packet losses as the noise may also affect its
neighbouring nodes. Hence, a group of local nodes may fail depending on the
characteristics of the noise generated (Lee et al., 2007b). Environmental effects
such as bad weather and blocking objects is unavoidable and can affect the wire-
less channel (Szewczyk et al., 2004). Therefore, it is desirable to have a robust
network protocol that can tolerate these negative effects.
We propose a multimodal approach that toggles between different operating
states using a set of rules according to the changing environment. We formalise
the following hypothesis to answer the first research question in this thesis:
The reliability of WSNs in term of Packet Delivery rate can be improved by
integrating and switching between routing protocols to function according
to its operating environments.
4.2 Multi-modal Protocol
In this section, we introduce the concept of multimodal to support different rout-
ing routing in WSNs.
4.2.1 Multimodal Routing Protocol
In order to tolerate failures with different densities and durations, the operating
protocol should be able to adapt and function according to the state of the net-
works. As highlighted in Chapter 3, operating in one routing protocol may not be
able to overcome different failures. It is necessary combine a number of routing
protocols and activate one of the protocol according to the temporal condition
it will work best. The way to achieve this is to apply a multi-modal concept to
allow multiple routing protocols to be implemented in the node. Different nodes
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are allowed to run different routing protocols in parallel in order to achieve the
dependability level required by the application.
To show that the multimodal approach is more reliable and robust than single
mode approach in dynamic networks, we define the four main objectives in order
to address the research question defined in Chapter 1.1.4 as:
• Objective E4-1: to demonstrate that the multimodal approach can achieve
the desired network reliability (90%) compared to a single mode.
• Objective E4-2: to demonstrate that the multimodal approach does not con-
sume more energy resources than a single mode.
• Objective E4-3: to demonstrate that the multimodal approach has a lower
communication overhead than a single mode.
• Objective E4-4: to demonstrate that the multimodal approach has a lower
packet delay than a single mode.
4.2.2 Design of Multi-modal Routing Protocol
In this section, we investigate the multimodal approach applied on the network
protocol and propose the MRP based a spectrum of routing protocols namely:
AODV, NST, and TinyAODV. The current system is based on a spectrum of re-
active routing protocols. NST deals well with short-term node failures as it at-
tempts a number of re-transmissions before performing local re-routing. In con-
trast, AODV handles long-term failures well as it gives us local re-routing before
trying global re-routing. TinyAODV takes a pessimistic recovery approach to
overcome long-term spatial failure by performing a global re-routing without lo-
cal repair. If we can predict whether we have a short or long-term node failure,
then we can choose the best (in terms of PDR, energy usage and latency) protocol
in the current context.
By incorporating routing protocols with the reactive property, the switching
delay and service disruption reported by Figueredo et al. (2005) can be over-
come. A switching module is used to switch between the AODV, the NST and
the TinyAODV to improve the network reliability and efficiency. Each node can
operate autonomously in either one of the routing modes depending on the prob-
ability (success rate) of the routing protocol to overcome a failure.
The MRP consists of Route Selection Module (RSM), a set of routing proto-
cols, conditional table and thresholds as illustrates in Figure 4.1. The RSM is
implemented in the network layer for the RSM to access and activate the routing
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protocol immediately. To detect failure, MRP relies on the Link Layer to report for
any transmission failure. In the AODV protocol proposed by Perkins et al. (2003),
the routing protocol can either depend on the Hello packet or the LLN for detect
network failure. In MRP, the Hello packet is not used as the results in Chapter 3
have shown that enabling hello packet can severely reduce the network perfor-
mance. Instead, MRP depends on the LLN to detect and alert any packet missing
an acknowledgement. A single-hop packet acknowledgement is proposed as a

























Figure 4.1: The Architecture of Multimodal Routing Protocol
To allow intermediate nodes to make localised decisions to switch between
AODV, NST or TinyAODV, a self-switching route mechanism is proposed. The
switching decision is made autonomously and independently in the RSM based
on the success rate of the previous attempts of the routing protocol to overcome
failures. Each routing protocol can use different approaches to overcome failures:
NST uses the optimistic approach to ReTransmission (RT), AODV uses Local Dis-
covery (LD) and TinyAODV uses the pessimistic approach to initiate Global Dis-
covery (GD). Once a routing decision is activated, the RSM module will wait for
the feedback from the link layer, and evaluate the effectiveness of that decision.
Based on the evaluation, it updates the cost to execute to routing protocol in the
response table.
In order to manage the switching mechanism, each route recovery approach
98
4.2 Multi-modal Protocol
is assigned with a cost to assist in the switching decision namely:
• CostRT ∈ Z corresponds to the cost of RT in NST,
• CostLD ∈ Z corresponds to the cost of LD in AODV,
• CostGD ∈ Z corresponds to the cost of GD in TinyAODV,




NST, if CostRT ≤ RTmax or CostRT ≤ CostLD,
AODV, if CostLD ≤ LDmax and CostLD ≤ CostGD,
TinyAODV, if CostGD ≤ GDmax.
(4.1)
where RTmax is the maximum number of attempts for RT,
LDmax is the maximum number of attempts for LD, and
GDmax is the maximum number of attempts for GD.
During startup, the variables (CostRT , CostLD, and CostGD) that control the
switching between the routing protocols are initialised to zero. Each routing pro-
tocol is assigned with a threshold value (RTmax, LDmax, GDmax). When the ap-
plication wants to send a data packet, the RSM look-ups the routing table for the
available route to forward the packet. If a route is not available, GD is initiated.
If a route is available, the node will transmit the packet. If a packet cannot be
sent successfully, a LLN is issued by the link layer. Based on the LLN receive,
the RSM updates and adjusts the routing cost according to the protocol executed.
For each failure, the cost of the routing function executed is increased by one until
it reaches its threshold value (RTmax, LDmax, GDmax). Alternatively, the routing
costs are reduced by one for each successful transmission until it is zero. Based
on Equation 4.1, a routing protocol is only executed if its cost is below its thresh-
old. A state diagram is shown in Figure 4.2, highlighting different recovery states
based on AODV and NST-AODV routing protocols.
During each unsuccessful packet transmission, the RSM evaluates and selects
the routing protocol with the lowest cost and is below the threshold value (RTmax,
LDmax,GDmax). It is a common practise in network community to set the number
of maximum attempt to 3. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard recommends that the max-
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Figure 4.2: Flow Diagram for MRP during failures.
the network (IEEE, 2006a). Zhao et al. (2013) have observed an increase in packet
delivery probability when the number of packets retransmission were between 3
to 6. Hence, the same maximum thresholds (RTmax ,LDmax, GDmax = 3) are set in
all the routing protocols using the recommended retransmission. Although the
parameters selected may not be the best value, it should be sufficient for us to in-
vestigate and compare the performance of the multimodal against single-modal
approach. As these parameters can be highly dependent on the network utilisa-
tion and condition, we acknowledge that there may a need to adapt and apply
reinforced learning to tune these thresholds dynamically to work according to
the environment. Hence, it has been proposed as a future research work.
Once a routing mode is selected, the forwarding node is set to wait for a
random number of backoff periods Txbackoff ∈ [0, B] where B = (2n − 1) and
n(numberofattempts) ∈ [0, 4] specified by the IEEE (2006a) for IEEE 802.15.4
MAC in order to overcome packet collision due to network congestion. Once the
backoff period expires, the selected routing protocol is activated. The activation
of the routing protocol is repeated until it reaches its threshold level. Once this
threshold level is reached, the failed packet will be stored in the node’s transmis-
sion buffer and the MRP switches the next lowest routing protocol. When a new
packet is received during that time, the node will attempt to forward the packet
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using its current routing mode. The MRP algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Multimodal Routing Protocol Algorithm
Input : Ps:Packet Send
Input : Pack:Packet Acknowledge
Output: Response Action
1 while Packet Buffer is not Empty do
2 Send Packet Ps and wait for acknowledgement Pack
3 if Pack is received then
4 Decrease RTcost




8 else if LDcost < LDmax and LDcost < GDcost then





AODV(LD).11 if Route Discovery is Successful then
12 Decrease LDcost, RTcost
13 else if GDcost < GDmax then
14 Invalidate Route






17 if Timeout then
18 Reinitialised
4.2.3 Discussion
In this section, we have presented a multi-mode routing approach to provide
different routing strategies depending on current network conditions. Three re-
active routing protocols (NST, AODV and TinyAODV) have been integrated to
minimise disruption of network services while trying to increase the reliability of
packet delivery and lower energy consumption. The reactive protocols have been
proposed to reduce the switching overhead and a linear threshold is applied to
control the switching between the routing protocols. Although the current MRP
only supports three reactive routing protocols, additional reactive routing pro-
tocol can be added to the MRP to tolerate new failure pattern. For instance, an
adaptive power transmission routing proposed by Lin et al. (2006) can be applied
to overcome failure that has short duration and strong intensity by increasing the
transmission range of the node above the interference signal. Other reactive rout-
ing such as DSR and AOMDV can be used to handle failure that has long duration
and weak intensity.
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In order to demonstrate the ability of the MRP to tolerate with different oper-
ating environments, the robustness and scalability of MRP based on both indoor
and outdoor scenarios are evaluated using three sets of simulated experiments in
the following sections.
4.3 On Robustness: 1. The effects of failure duration
To compare the robustness of the MRP, NST and AODV routing protocols, we
analyse the performance of MRP against AODV and NST under the influence of
different failure durations using the data obtained from simulation. In order to
investigate the robustness of the routing protocols, we vary the failure durations
by failing a node along the active path with an increasing failure population to
simulate the effect on different types of interference sources affecting the number
of nodes along the route. A number of random nodes in WSNs can fail for a
period of time depending on the duration and strength of the interference source.
We present the application scenario and the simulation setup and analyse the
results using statistical tools in Section 4.3.5.
4.3.1 Application Scenario
The application scenario used in this experiment is based on an indoor patient
monitoring system applied in hospital (Chipara et al., 2010). In order to collect
vital data, sensor nodes are attached on the patient which periodically capture
medical data such as heart rate and blood pressure. For example, the oxygen level
in the patient blood must be collected and delivered to the end user every 5 to 10
seconds for a pulse oximetry application (Chipara et al., 2010). In this application,
we assume a periodic data stream which is send across multiple nodes using a
multi-hop routing protocol as the control station can be far away from the patients
room as shown in Figure 4.3. We believe this periodic transmission is applicable
across most applications as the health of the WSNs need to be checked using
periodic heartbeat packets send across the network even in applications that are
event driven (Xiao et al., 2010).
4.3.2 Network Setup
The nodes in WSNs are usually deployed in a flat-based topology where each
node are usually placed within the transmission range of the neighbouring nodes.
In this experiment, 51 static nodes are deployed across the simulated environ-
ment and positioned at the top of the wall as shown in Figure 4.3. The nodes are
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placed 10m apart with the transmission range set to 14m to avoid interfering with
distant nodes. Packets can only be transmitted to the top, bottom, left or right
node within the transmission range of the forwarding node as shown by nodes 6
and 14, but not diagonally. The network is designed with redundant links along
the corridor where nodes are place in parallel to each other to form two possible
paths between the source and the destination (Chipara et al., 2010). This alter-
native node allows individual sensor node to send the packet via the alternative
path when the next hop node failed. In a traditional network, it is a common to
provide an additional backup link next to the current one to provide redundancy.
With this additional link, a route can be established quickly without traversing























































Figure 4.3: Network topology based on the indoor deployment for critical health
monitoring networks
4.3.3 Simulation Parameters
Table 4.1 provides the simulation parameters adopted for this experiment. Exten-
sive simulations are performed using the ns-2.34 simulator (NS2, 2002). The MAC
layer is configured to operate in CSMA/CA mode as defined in the IEEE 802.15.4
(Kessler and Shepard, 1997) since it is commonly used in real sensor platform like
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TinyOS. The two-ray ground propagation model was applied as it is determin-
istic and will not create additional packet drop (Zamalloa and Krishnamachari,
2007). The node can either receive the packet or not depending on whether it
is within the receiving range of the transmitting node. Hence, this transmission
model will not affect the failure model used in the experiment. A CBR packet
was generated to model the periodic patient data that is required by the applica-
tion. Similar to the application proposed by (Chipara et al., 2010), packet data is
sampled and sent every one second to avoid any loss of vital data. In each exper-
iment, the simulation for each of the routing protocols (MRP, NST and AODV)
is run for 120 simulation seconds. Due to the stochastic nature of the simulator,
each experiment was repeated N = 50 to reduce the uncertainty.
Table 4.1: NS-2 Parameters to evaluate MRP.
Parameters Values
Simulation area: 200x200m
Number of nodes 51 nodes
Initial Energy 30J
Transmission interval: 1 s
Propagation model: Two-Ray Ground
MAC: 802.15.4 (CSMA/CA) with LLN enabled
Routing Protocol: AODV, NST-AODV, MRP-AODV 1
4.3.4 Simulation of failures
To investigate how irregular failures can affect the behaviour of the MRP and the
network performance, different failures are injected to the nodes. Six failure du-
rations of 0.5s, 2s, 5s, 10s, 20s and permanent are arbitrary chosen to represent
different transient failures of short to long temporal behaviours. These errors are
induced after the packet has traversed more than Ht/2 hops to allow the possi-
bility of the LD to be activated where Ht is the maximum number of hops from
the source to the destination. Following the ON/OFF failure model specified in
Section 3.1.2, an active node receiving a packet with hop count equal to Ht/2 is
failed. We also vary the number of failing nodes as more than one sensor nodes
may be affected spatially by the interfering signal in real world.
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4.3.5 Results
To evaluate the difference between the performance of the routing algorithms, we
compute the performance metrics defined in Section 3.1.5, namely PDR, average
end to end delay, average energy consumed by the node, and routing overhead
for different number of failing nodes with different durations. As all the results
from different numbers of the failures have shown similar trends, the data taken
from simulation with 10 failing nodes are selected and presented as box-whiskers
plot for comparison in Figure 4.4 and 4.5. The use of box-whiskers provides a
clear understanding on the distribution of the results collected from the simula-
tion and it shows the maximum and minimum values of each of the performance
metrics. Table 4.3 shows the numerical median and mean values of each routing
protocol for detailed comparison.
From the box-whiskers plot in Figure 4.4(a), all the three routing protocols ex-
hibit statistically different PDRs as computed in Table 4.4. The number of pack-
ets delivered by MRP are higher than the NST and AODV. When no error is in-
jected, Figure 4.4(a) shows that the PDR of AODV (Table 4.3: median=92.04%,
mean=89.77%) is significantly less than NST (Table 4.3: median=97.15%, mean=96.16%,
Table 4.4: ranksum p-value=0.01, Vargha-Delaney A-value=0.75) and MRP (Ta-
ble 4.3: median=98.01%, mean=97.56%, Table: 4.4: ranksum p-value=4.40e-07,
Vargha-Delaney A-value=0.85).
Further analysis on the simulator logs reveals that the data packets dropped
in AODV are related to the Link Quality Issue (in bold).
Table 4.2: NS-2 traces showing the data packet (CBR) dropped (D) at the MAC
layer (MAC) due to collisions (LQI) (In bold).
action time node at why pktid pkt
D 92.5965056 11 MAC LQI 0 AODV 39
D 92.596505613 18 MAC LQI 0 AODV 39
D 92.6020416 11 MAC LQI 780 cbr 107
D 92.605547722 27 MAC LQI 775 cbr 107
D 92.6071616 11 MAC LQI 780 cbr 107
D 92.6132416 11 MAC LQI 780 cbr 107
D 92.633721594 10 MAC LQI 795 cbr 107
D 92.644395627 11 MAC LQI 0 AODV 39
From the log shown below, the transmission in node 11 and 10 have expe-
rienced error in the MAC layer (MAC) where data packets (CBR) have been
dropped (D) due to packet collision (LQI).
Due to the random access of the channel in CSMA, higher numbers of packet
drop in AODV have occurred in the network resulting more requests for route
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(b) Higher energy is consumed in AODV due to the transmission of routing packets.
Figure 4.4: Box-Whiskers plot showing the median, mean (diamond), lower quar-
tile, upper quartile, highest and lowest values for PDR and Energy Consumption
on the performance of MRP against AODV and NST
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(b) More routing packets are generated without the retransmission in MRP and NST.
Figure 4.5: Box-Whiskers plot showing the median, mean (diamond), lower quar-
tile, upper quartile, highest and lowest values for Average Delay and Routing
Overhead on the performance of MRP against AODV and NST
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Table 4.3: The performance results in term of PDR, average energy remaining
in a node, routing packet required to deliver a packet, and the average end to
end delay for the three protocols: MRP, NST and AODV. Shown are the median
and mean over the 50 runs for different failure durations of 0.5s, 2s, 5s, 10s, 20s
exposed to 10 failing nodes.
Failure Median Mean
Duration (s) AODV NST MRP AODV NST MRP
0 92.04 97.15 98.01 89.77 96.16 97.56
0.5 69.60 89.77 98.29 70.66 88.40 97.10
PDR 2 72.44 84.94 90.62 70.34 84.69 89.72
(%) 5 65.62 85.51 88.92 66.98 83.83 88.22
10 72.44 78.69 83.23 70.19 78.36 81.93
20 68.75 67.61 74.43 67.42 66.69 72.95
Permanent 23.29 27.55 29.54 22.11 27.84 28.92
0 3.95 2.94 2.81 5.01 3.14 2.93
0.5 12.50 6.97 2.71 11.81 7.21 2.84
Average 2 11.57 8.02 6.26 11.79 8.42 6.22
Energy 5 12.40 8.29 6.63 12.50 8.25 6.94
Consumption 10 12.00 8.65 7.62 11.99 9.14 7.77
(%) 20 12.23 10.39 8.09 11.88 10.32 8.30
Permanent 11.77 12.65 13.13 11.40 12.68 12.78
0 97 52 49 146 62 53
0.5 445 156 49 420 167 55
Routing 2 335 188 155 438 209 146
Load 5 486 189 171 528 207 165
10 376 267 216 453 272 216
20 396 334 263 461 362 267
Permanent 1618 1692 1459 1802 1802 1481
0 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.11
0.5 0.49 0.24 0.10 0.50 0.35 0.12
DLY 2 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.53 0.43 0.40
(s) 5 0.43 0.36 0.57 0.51 0.52 0.61
10 0.32 0.75 0.63 0.40 0.82 0.76
20 0.44 0.77 1.28 0.56 0.94 1.37
Permanent 0.31 0.24 0.18 0.49 0.36 0.28
discovery and higher routing packet as depicted in Figure 4.5(b). In Table 4.3.
AODV (97 packets (median) and 146 packets (mean)) produces more routing
overhead compared to NST (52 packets (median) and 62 packets (mean)) and (49
packets (median) and 53 packets (mean)). We believe the additional number of
routing packets generated has lowered the number of PDRs in AODV observed
in Figure 4.4(a).
As the failure duration increases from 0.5s to 20s, the PDRs of NST and MRP
decrease while AODV maintains a fluctuating median of 69.60% to 72.44% (mean:
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Table 4.4: p- and A-values indicating the difference between MRP and AODV,
MRP and NST, and NST and AODV for different failure durations. Numbers
highlighted in bold-italic are significant, comprising a large effect
Significance Tests P-Test (p-value) A-test (A-value)
Metrics Failure MRP MRP NST MRP MRP NST
(Nodes) AODV NST AODV AODV NST AODV
0 4.40e-07 0.08 0.01 0.85 0.62 0.75
0.5 6.83e-13 3.93e-11 4.57e-09 1.00 0.96 0.91
2 5.35e-12 3.82e-05 2.50e-07 0.98 0.79 0.86
PDR 5 1.82e-11 0.01 1.39e-09 0.97 0.71 0.92
10 3.95e-10 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.77 0.74
20 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.76 0.74 0.53
∞ 2.46e-08 0.02 3.69e-05 0.89 0.66 0.79
0 9.86e-05 0.52 0.01 0.77 0.55 0.73
0.5 3.56e-20 1.37e-14 4.98e-09 1.00 0.96 0.88
Average 2 4.83e-17 1.60e-06 3.21e-08 0.98 0.82 0.86
Energy 5 2.72e-14 0.01 2.12e-09 0.96 0.71 0.88
Remains 10 1.83e-11 0.01 7.84e-06 0.92 0.71 0.80
20 9.81e-07 9.11e-05 0.02 0.82 0.76 0.66
∞ 0.02 0.89 0.07 0.66 0.51 0.63
0 5.46e-05 0.41 0.01 0.78 0.56 0.74
0.5 3.56e-20 1.37e-14 4.25e-10 1.00 0.96 0.90
Routing 2 2.16e-17 1.13e-06 6.00e-09 0.99 0.82 0.88
Load 5 1.44e-15 0.01 2.25e-10 0.97 0.75 0.90
10 1.85e-13 3.53e-05 1.37e-05 0.95 0.78 0.79
20 2.57e-09 2.25e-06 0.02 0.88 0.81 0.66
∞ 0.06 0.62 0.26 0.63 0.54 0.58
0 0.39 0.28 0.11 0.56 0.58 0.61
0.5 2.10e-12 2.28e-08 0.02 0.93 0.86 0.66
Average 2 0.08 0.23 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.54
Delay 5 0.34 0.16 0.67 0.57 0.60 0.53
10 0.97 0.11 0.17 0.50 0.61 0.60
20 5.11e-07 0.12 2.97e-05 0.83 0.61 0.78
∞ 0.06 0.67 0.20 0.63 0.53 0.59
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66.98 to 70.66%) in Figure 4.4(a). The PDR of MRP degrades slower than NST as
the failure duration is increased. In Table 4.3, the PDR of MRP decreases from
98.29% to 74.43% (mean: 88.40% to 66.69%) while NST decreases from 89.77%
to 67.61% (mean: 88.40 to 66.69). The PDR of MRP is significantly better than
NST and AODV (Table 4.4: ranksum p-value < 0.01 and Vargha-Delaney A-
value > 0.71) when errors are injected into the nodes. When the failure dura-
tion is increased to 20s, there is no significance different between the PDR of NST
(mean=66.69%, median=67.61%) and AODV (mean=67.42%, median=67.61%). The
same PDR is observed in AODV when errors are injected regardless of the dura-
tion of the failure.
When no error is injected, higher energy consumption is also observed in Fig-
ure 4.4(b) for AODV (4.3: median=3.95%, mean=5.01%) compare to NST (4.3: me-
dian=2.94%, mean=3.14%) and MRP (4.3: median=2.81, mean=2.93). As a tran-
sient error of 0.5s is injected to the network, the energy consumption of AODV
increases from 3.95% to 12.5% (median) and 5.01% to 11.81% (mean) compared to
2.94% to 6.97% (median) and 3.14% to 7.21% (median) in NST. MRP has the lowest
energy consumption with 2.71% (median) and 2.84% (mean). As the failure dura-
tion increases from 2s to 20s, the rate of energy consumption of MRP shown in 4.3
is slower than NST while the energy consumption of AODV remains consistent
between 11.57% to 12.50% (median) and 11.79% to 12.50% (mean). The statistical
tests in Table 4.4 also show that the energy consumption of MRP is significantly
lower than NST and AODV. The higher energy consumption observed in AODV
and NST are caused by the additional transmission of the routing overhead. As
longer failure durations are injected, more route discoveries are activated by the
nodes and therefore more energy is consumed.
In terms of the packet end to end delay, MRP has a lowest end to end delay
when the failure duration is less than 0.5s. while the packet latency in AODV
is maintained between 0.32s to 0.43s. The end to end delay in AODV is consis-
tent throughout the failure as packets that cannot be transmitted in AODV were
dropped and was not accounted for during the calculation of the average delay.
Hence, a lower delay is observed in AODV even at high failure duration. In MRP,
the packets are stored the routing queue while it tries to select the routing pro-
tocol to make any attempt to deliver the packet. Although this buffering process
has introduced additional delay in MRP as shown in Figure 4.5(a) that is smaller
than NST and AODV, results from the statistical tests in Table 4.4 have shown
that the differences between the delay are not statistically significant.
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Discussion on the effect of failure duration
In this analysis, we have shown that MRP can achieve better performance than
NST and AODV. From the results, higher PDR has been observed in MRP than
NST and AODV in figure 4.4(a). The built-in switching mechanism and the
localised decision whether to activate local repair, retransmission or drop the
packet have allowed individual nodes to reduce the number of routing packets.
This reduction in number of routing packets can be seen in Figure 4.5(b) where
MRP has the lowest routing overhead required to ensure packet delivery. MRP
has also reduced the amount of packet transmission leading to the reduction of
the energy consumption in the node. The statistical tests have verified that differ-
ences in the PDR, energy consumption and routing overhead are both statistical
and scientifically significant. Hence the MRP can tolerate failures with different
durations and is more reliable and energy efficient than NST and AODV.
4.4 On Robustness: 2. The effects of varying the num-
ber of failing nodes
As the performance of the WSNs can be affected by interference spatially, in this
section we investigate the effects of varying the number of nodes on the perfor-
mance of MRP, NST and AODV.
4.4.1 Results
We use the data obtained from Section 4.3 to compute the PDR, energy consump-
tion, routing overhead and average delay for different numbers of failure up to
the maximum 14 nodes before a total network failure occurs. We discuss each of
the results separately in a tabulate format in the following subsections.
Packet Delivery Rate
Table 4.5 enumerates the median PDR achieved by each of the routing protocol
when the number of failing nodes induced with failures increases. The results
show that the PDR achieved by MRP is significantly higher than AODV and NST
with 0.5s failure duration (p-value < 0.01 and A-value < 0.73). When errors with
0.5s are introduced in the nodes, the PDR of AODV degrades faster than NST and
AODV. When the number of failures with 0.5s duration is increased from 1 to the
maximum (14) nodes, the PDR of AODV decreases from 88.35% to 63.64% (by
24.71%) and NST decreases from 94.89% to 84.38% (by 10.51%). The PDR of MRP
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remains consistent (98.01% < PDR < 98.5%) as the number of failures increases
at 0.5s. The ability of the nodes to avoid local route discovery has reduced the
number of routing packets generated as shown in Table 4.7 and reduces the prob-
ability of packet collisions. Visual inspection on the simulation traces also reveal
that the number of packets drop related to LQI is also less in MRP compared to
AODV. This shows that the MRP is more tolerate to failure with 0.5% duration.
When failures with longer duration (2s, 10s and 20s) is introduced, the PDR
of MRPS begin to decrease slowly (by 10% at 2s, 16% at 10s and 27.56% at 20s)
Table 4.5. However, the rate of the PDR degrades in MRP is smaller than NST
and AODV. The results also show that the PDR of AODV is not affected by the
failure duration as the PDR generated by each number of failures is similar for all
failure duration. Statistical test have shown that the differences in PDR of AODV
between different durations are not significant.
We also evaluate the distribution of the results between the PDR of MRP and
AODV, MRP and NST, and NST and AODV using non-parametric statistical tests
to determine significance of the PDR difference for 5s, 2s, 10s and 20s failure dura-
tions. The minimum p-values and maximum A-value between MRP and AODV,
MRP and NST, and NST and AODV are plotted against the number of failures
in Figure 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. The graph in 4.6 shows that the dif-
ferences between MRP and AODV are statistical significant at 95% confidence
interval when the failure durations is 0.5s. Between MRP and NST (Downward-
pointing triangle), most of the p-values are below the 0.05 significance level as
shown by the dotted line in Figure 4.6 and 4.7. There are less than 4 cases when
the p-values are more than 0.05 for each failure duration. The difference of be-
tween MRP and AODV are also scientifically significance as they exhibit a large
effect size with the A-values are greater than 0.71 in Figure 4.8 and 4.9. We can
conclude that MRP deliver more packets than NST and AODV and the perfor-
mance is significantly better than AODV.
Average Energy
In the previous section, we have evaluated how the number of failures can reduce
the packet delivery of AODV and NST. In this section, we analyse the energy
efficiency of the routing protocols. We depict the median taken from 50 different
seeded runs for each failure in Table 4.6. To better understand the significant
difference between the energy consumptions, the p- and A-values are computed
statistically and presented graphically in Figure 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13
During normal network operation, both MRP and NST only consume mini-
mal energy of 2.81% and 2.94% respectively compare to AODV of 3.95% as shown
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Table 4.5: The median of the PDR calculated from 50 runs for different number of
failures injected with different failure duration for MRP, NST and AODV.
Number of Failures PDR (%) for 0.5s PDR (%) for 2s
AODV NST MRP AODV NST MRP
0 92.05 97.16 98.01 92.05 97.16 98.01
1 88.35 94.89 98.30 88.35 94.60 97.44
2 88.35 93.75 98.30 78.69 94.60 96.59
3 78.69 92.61 98.58 83.52 93.47 97.16
4 81.82 92.05 98.30 77.56 91.76 96.59
5 82.39 91.76 98.30 79.55 90.34 96.88
6 79.55 89.77 98.30 73.86 90.63 96.59
7 76.42 88.64 98.30 75.85 89.77 93.47
8 70.17 90.91 98.30 73.58 87.22 93.47
9 68.47 87.78 98.58 71.31 87.22 92.90
10 69.60 92.05 98.30 72.44 91.76 96.59
11 65.63 84.94 98.30 71.59 86.93 88.64
12 65.63 87.22 98.30 66.48 82.10 91.19
13 64.49 84.38 98.30 66.19 80.68 90.34
14 63.64 84.38 98.30 66.19 84.09 91.19
Number of Failures PDR (%) for 10s PDR (%) for 20s
1 87.22 94.89 97.44 89.49 95.45 97.44
2 83.81 93.47 96.59 83.24 90.34 96.31
3 81.82 90.91 96.31 82.95 91.19 96.31
4 84.66 89.20 96.31 73.58 80.11 90.91
5 77.56 86.65 92.33 73.58 71.88 91.48
6 74.43 86.08 92.33 75.28 75.28 84.66
7 72.16 87.22 87.78 70.74 75.00 84.66
8 76.70 85.23 86.08 71.59 73.86 80.11
9 72.44 81.25 87.22 69.03 68.47 77.84
10 72.44 89.20 96.31 68.75 80.11 90.91
11 61.65 78.69 82.95 61.65 67.61 69.89
12 61.08 77.84 84.66 57.67 66.19 68.75
13 65.34 74.72 80.40 55.68 59.94 71.02
14 61.08 73.30 82.39 59.29 66.19 68.75
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(b) The p-values for 2s
Figure 4.6: The p-values showing the statistical significant of PDR with 0.5s and
2s failure durations. The point below the line (at 0.05) shows that the results are
significant.
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(b) The p-values for 20s
Figure 4.7: The p-values showing the statistical significant of PDR with 10s and
20s failure durations. The point below the line (at 0.05) shows that the results are
significant.
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(b) The A-values for 2s
Figure 4.8: The A-values showing the scientific significant of PDR for with 0.5
and 2s failure durations. The points above the dashed line (at 0.71) show that the
results are scientifically significant with large effect size.
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(b) The A-values for 20s
Figure 4.9: The A-values showing the scientific significant of PDR with 10s and
20s failure durations
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Table 4.6: The median of the average energy remaining in a node for different
number of failures injected with different failure duration for MRP, NST and
AODV. The energy consumption increases as the number of failures introduced
increases except for MRP with 0.5s failure durations.
Number of Failures ENG (%) for 0.5s ENG (%) for 2s
AODV NST MRP AODV NST MRP
0 3.95 2.94 2.81 3.95 2.94 2.81
1 5.26 4.05 2.77 5.27 3.75 2.94
2 5.31 4.05 2.73 7.58 3.75 3.55
3 7.72 4.51 2.71 6.66 4.12 3.37
4 6.58 5.02 2.76 8.28 5.41 3.63
5 6.58 5.35 2.73 8.25 5.62 3.50
6 7.56 5.11 2.83 8.91 5.44 3.95
7 7.72 5.60 2.73 8.21 6.31 5.13
8 9.68 5.25 2.76 9.20 6.43 5.18
9 9.90 5.43 2.73 8.82 6.81 5.18
10 10.89 5.02 2.76 8.85 5.41 3.63
11 11.03 6.34 2.73 10.11 7.13 5.68
12 11.56 6.97 2.73 10.11 7.68 5.72
13 11.46 6.97 2.74 11.14 8.02 5.92
14 12.50 7.00 2.71 11.57 7.91 6.26
Number of Failures ENG (%) for 10s ENG (%) for 20s
0 3.95 2.94 2.81 3.95 2.94 2.81
1 5.42 3.75 3.09 5.26 3.74 3.11
2 6.65 4.34 3.31 7.01 4.44 3.48
3 7.06 5.36 3.56 6.72 4.98 3.48
4 6.87 5.52 3.62 8.95 7.26 4.77
5 8.22 6.20 4.72 9.24 7.72 4.69
6 8.73 6.26 4.79 8.82 7.69 5.28
7 9.35 5.58 5.33 9.81 7.69 5.44
8 8.73 5.88 6.31 8.99 7.88 5.80
9 9.01 7.50 6.76 9.57 9.38 7.11
10 10.28 5.52 3.62 10.11 7.26 4.77
11 12.14 8.14 7.15 12.33 8.96 7.58
12 11.91 8.71 7.06 12.87 9.70 7.86
13 11.32 8.65 7.62 12.87 10.39 8.69
14 12.00 9.30 7.62 12.23 8.94 8.09
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(b) The p-values for 2s
Figure 4.10: The p-values showing the statistical significant of energy difference.
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(b) The p-values for 20s
Figure 4.11: The p-values showing the statistical significant of energy difference.
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(b) The A-values for 2s
Figure 4.12: The A-values showing the scientific significant of energy difference.
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(b) The A-values for 20s
Figure 4.13: The A-values showing the scientific significant of energy difference.
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in Table 4.6. The higher energy consumption observed in AODV is due to the ad-
ditional route discovery packets generated during packet collision. When more
nodes are injected with failure, the energy consumption for the three routing pro-
tocols increases with the number of failure nodes, except for MRP when the fail-
ure duration is 0.5s. At 0.5s in MRP, the energy consumption is consistent at
2.73% with ±0.03 variation as shown in Table 4.6. AODV consumes the high-
est amount of energy consumption (from 3.95% to 12.5%) and MRP utilises the
least amount of energy with a maximum of 8.09% when the number of failures is
increase from 1 to 14. The difference in energy consumption observed between
AODV and MRP is mainly due to the additional route request triggered during
route discovery as the result of additional nodes failing. The broadcast nature of
AODV during RD has injected a large number of control packets (shown by the
higher number of routing overhead in Table 4.7), increasing the energy incurred
during communication.
The energy consumption between MRP and NST also varies between the num-
ber of failures. The energy consumption for NST increases from 2.94% to a maxi-
mum of 9.30% when the maximum number of failures (14 nodes) are introduced
as tabulated in Table 4.6. By managing between retransmission and route discov-
ery, MRP has achieved a lower energy consumption than NST as the number of
route discovery performed by MRP is less than NST. The p-values between NST
and MRP from the statistical tests in Figure 4.10 and 4.11 show that their energy
differences are statistically significant with the A-value above the medium effect
size (> 0.64) in Figure 4.12 and 4.13. As for MRP and AODV, their differences
have displayed a large effect size as all the A-values > 0.71. Hence, MRP is more
energy efficient than AODV and NST.
Routing Overhead
Table 4.7 tabulates the median of the normalised routing overhead for different
number of failures injected with difference failure durations. When no error is
injected, AODV generates more routing packets than NST and MRP to recover
route failure caused by collision. Further analysis on the simulation logs have
revealed that the minimum routing packet required to send one packet to achieve
the median PDR stipulated in Table 4.5 is 98 routing packets for 92.05% PDR in
AODV, 52 routing packets for 97.16% PDR in NST, and 49 routing packets for
98.01% PDR in MRP. The number of routing packets on the network observed
in AODV is doubled the amount of MRP. These routing packets have prevented
the data packet to be transmitted successful resulting in a reduction in PDR. The
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simulation logs have shown that the numbers of packet dropped due to collision
(LQIs) are high in AODV.
When we introduced an error with 0.5s failure duration in to the nodes, the
routing overhead of MRP is constant at 48 requests per data packet over the dif-
ferent number of failures as observed in Table 4.7 (RTR Load for 0.5s column). Al-
though both MRP and NST rely on the retransmission mechanism to reduce the
number of routing packets, the routing overhead for NST is significantly higher
than MRP at 0.5s (p-value < 0.01 and A-value < 0.71). As more nodes are failed,
the rate of routing packets generated by AODV (98 to 575) increase faster than
NST (52 to 213). The routing overhead generated by MRP only increases (from 49
to 158 with 2s failure duration) when a failure longer than 2s is introduced.
To compare the significance between the different routing overheads, the p-
and A- values are computed and presented in Figure 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17. In
Figure 4.14 and 4.15, the lower number of routing overhead generated by MRP
are significantly difference to AODV and NST, with majority of the p-values are
below the 0.05 significant line. Further statistical analysis reveals that the differ-
ences are also scientifically significant between MRP and AODV as the A-values
in Figure 4.16 and 4.17 are above the large effect size (0.71) for all failure scenar-
ios. Despite the small p-values between NST and AODV of less than 0.05 at 20s,
some of the A-values are below 0.71 showing that not all of the difference are
significant. On contrary, the differences between MRP and AODV are all signif-
icant. The A-values between MRP and NST also show a high level of effect size
during high number of failures. Hence, we can conclude that the MRP requires
less routing packets to deliver a data packet.
Average Network Delay
In Table 4.8, we tabulate the median of the average end to end packet delay for
each of the routing protocols. The results show that the time required to deliver
the packet increases with the number of failures. During error free condition,
the delay between AODV, NST and AODV are not significant different with the
p-values are greater than 0.05 in Figure 4.18 and 4.18.
When 0.5s failure duration is injected to a node, the average delay for MRP
remain unchanged. As more nodes are injected with 0.5s failure duration, the av-
erage delays for AODV and NST increase to 0.634s (from 0.106s) and 0.404s (from
0.083s) respectively. As the occurrence of failure becomes more frequent, the aver-
age time required to deliver a packet increases significantly for NST-AODV com-
pared to AODV while the delay of MRP fluctuates between 0.087s and 0.127s. The
delay in NST is double in AODV when more than seven nodes fail as tabulated
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Table 4.7: The median of the routing packets required to deliver a packet calcu-
lated from 50 runs for different number of failures injected with different failure
duration for MRP, NST and AODV.
Number of Failures RTR Load for 0.5s RTR Load for 2s
AODV NST MRP AODV NST MRP
0 98 52 49 98 52 49
1 138 92 49 146 82 50
2 149 92 48 248 81 73
3 284 106 48 224 94 64
4 206 126 48 290 138 79
5 186 143 48 283 142 73
6 246 129 49 328 144 82
7 262 150 49 276 171 128
8 365 132 48 341 171 130
9 425 136 48 366 185 138
10 446 126 48 336 138 79
11 456 186 48 358 199 154
12 495 206 48 472 244 143
13 507 195 48 465 248 154
14 575 213 48 474 245 158
Number of Failures RTR Load for 10s RTR Load for 20s
1 155 81 58 138 80 59
2 202 104 64 220 109 73
3 219 138 73 226 124 73
4 211 141 76 326 230 117
5 292 177 113 338 275 115
6 341 185 113 306 268 139
7 348 143 143 366 274 151
8 353 174 180 349 283 171
9 355 226 193 375 385 230
10 376 141 76 397 230 117
11 537 262 213 527 359 269
12 555 313 209 584 379 300
13 483 346 232 636 507 301
14 551 324 233 598 383 293
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(b) The p-values for 2s
Figure 4.14: The p-values showing the statistical significant of routing overhead.
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(b) The p-values for 20s
Figure 4.15: The p-values showing the statistical significant of routing overhead.
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(b) The A-values for 2s
Figure 4.16: The A-values showing the scientific significant.
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(b) The A-values for 20s
Figure 4.17: The A-values showing the scientific significant.
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Table 4.8: The median of the average end to end delay for each packet calculated
from 50 runs for different number of failures injected with different failure dura-
tion for MRP, NST and AODV.
Number of Failures DLY (s)for 0.5s DLY (s) for 2s
AODV NST MRP AODV NST MRP
0 0.106 0.083 0.087 0.106 0.083 0.087
1 0.116 0.118 0.087 0.138 0.097 0.105
2 0.128 0.130 0.105 0.280 0.102 0.140
3 0.204 0.128 0.087 0.256 0.119 0.149
4 0.257 0.165 0.112 0.332 0.206 0.154
5 0.255 0.230 0.105 0.374 0.234 0.143
6 0.346 0.220 0.112 0.333 0.213 0.149
7 0.446 0.214 0.087 0.324 0.213 0.233
8 0.459 0.154 0.112 0.333 0.256 0.328
9 0.484 0.331 0.127 0.323 0.404 0.342
10 0.500 0.165 0.112 0.452 0.206 0.154
11 0.632 0.309 0.107 0.397 0.420 0.389
12 0.619 0.307 0.087 0.468 0.429 0.449
13 0.551 0.281 0.087 0.467 0.563 0.401
14 0.634 0.404 0.079 0.572 0.387 0.403
Number of Failures DLY (s)for 10s DLY (s) for 20s
0 0.106 0.083 0.087 0.106 0.083 0.087
1 0.105 0.110 0.107 0.138 0.109 0.118
2 0.278 0.266 0.201 0.165 0.240 0.149
3 0.218 0.343 0.229 0.184 0.241 0.149
4 0.171 0.396 0.149 0.329 0.532 0.420
5 0.263 0.534 0.374 0.388 0.634 0.324
6 0.336 0.432 0.422 0.373 0.574 0.755
7 0.277 0.432 0.605 0.485 0.655 0.704
8 0.286 0.465 0.653 0.286 0.539 0.761
9 0.294 0.616 0.514 0.488 0.874 1.084
10 0.330 0.396 0.149 0.442 0.532 0.420
11 0.569 0.702 0.635 0.564 0.962 1.316
12 0.593 0.838 0.604 0.557 0.972 1.228
13 0.552 0.850 0.662 0.598 1.008 1.121
14 0.753 0.906 0.637 0.583 0.834 1.232
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in Table 4.8. Statistical tests shown in Figure 4.18(a) reveal that the differences
between NST and AODV are statistically significant when there are more than
five nodes infested with failures. The A-values in Table 4.20(a) also show that
the differences between NST and AODV have a medium effect size. The delay in
MRP is also significantly lower than AODV and NST.
As the failure duration is increased to 2s and 10s, the time taken to deliver
a packet increases with the number of failures for both NST and MRP in Table
4.8. Both MRP and NST require to buffer the packet while trying to retransmit
the packet during failure. Hence, MRP and NST should have a higher delay
compare to AODV. However, the A-values in Figure 4.20(b) for 2s and 4.21(a) for
10s show that the delay is similar for all the three routing protocols. Although
the delay increases with the number of failures, the p-value > 0.05 and A-value <
0.71 show that the delays observed are not statistically different.
When the failure duration is further increased to 20s, the delay in MRP (0.087s
to 1.232s) increases steeply compared to AODV (0.106s to 0.583s). However, the
delay begins to saturate when more than nine nodes are injected. Both MRP
and NST have to discover a new route each time retransmission fails when more
errors occur. The delay in AODV is not always significantly lower than NST or
MRP (p-value > 0.05, A-value < 0.71 when the number of failure is less than 4)
although the data packet is sent immediately once a new route is established.
Hence, MRP does not significantly increase the packet delay when compared to
AODV and NST.
4.4.2 Discussion on the effect of failure size
From the performance results shown, we conclude that the performance of MRP
is not affected by the number of node failures during short transient failures.
When the failure duration increases, the PDR for the routing protocol decreases.
However the use of multi-mode switching has significantly improved the perfor-
mance of MRP compared to when applying AODV and NST alone. The combina-
tion of AODV and NST allows MRP to switch between retransmission when short
transient error occurs and local route discovery during longer retransmission, or
global discovery without compromising the network performance. In addition,
AODV is less likely to be affected by the failure durations as any failure will lead
to route discovery. Nevertheless, the performance of AODV degrades with the
number of failures. The statistical tests have verified that differences in the PDR,
energy consumption and routing overhead are both statistical and scientifically
significant in all failure scenarios evaluated. Hence the MRP is more robust to
different failure durations and failure numbers compare to the AODV and NST
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(b) The p-values for 2s
Figure 4.18: The p-values showing the statistical significant of average delay.
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(b) The p-values for 20s
Figure 4.19: The p-values showing the statistical significant of average delay.
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(b) The A-values for 2s
Figure 4.20: The A-values showing the scientific significant of average delay.
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(b) The A-values for 20s
Figure 4.21: The A-values showing the scientific significant of average delay.
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and is more efficient than NST and AODV. As the size of WSNs can scale up to a
thousand nodes, we evaluate the scalability of the MRP in the next section.
4.5 On Scalability: The effects of network size
In this second set of experiments, the scalability of MRP is evaluated based on its
ability to maintain its performance against AODV and NST. To evaluate the ef-
fects of different network sizes on the routing protocols, a predefined grid topol-
ogy measuring X by X, where X = 5, 7, 10, 15, 400, 900, is used based on an out-
door application as shown in Figure 4.22. A grid topology is usually deployed
outdoor in plantation as it is scalable up to 1000 nodes (Togami et al., 2012). This
large network requires a multi-hop network protocol to route the packet from one
end of the plantation to a base station. Hence it is appropriate to test MRP on this
topology. The ON World survey on industrial WSNs reported by Hatler (2012)
states that out of 74 applications, more than 50% of deployments have used less
than 100 nodes while fifteen percent are between 100 to 1000 nodes. Based on
that survey, we simulate 25 nodes as the minimum network size to ensure that
the packet has traversed at least 3 hops across the network. For each experiment,
the network size is doubled until it reaches the maximum of 900 nodes. Although
some WSNs deployment may reach up to 1000 nodes, we did not test the MRP on
more than 1000 nodes as NS-2.34 does not support network size that is larger than
1000 nodes (Schoch et al., 2008). A custom-built simulator is usually proposed to
test a network with more than 1000 nodes. However, it can be difficult to vali-
date the accuracy of the simulator (Bergamini et al., 2010). Hence, this approach
is not taken. Furthermore, the industrial survey has reported that less than 5%
industrial WSNs have deployed more than 1000 nodes (Hatler, 2012). Hence, the
network size of more than 1000 nodes is not evaluated.
4.5.1 Packet Generation
Using the same simulation parameters specified in Section 4.3.3, different num-
bers of CBR are generated from different sources. The packet generated from
different sources will traverse to one common sink as shown in Figure 4.22. The
number of sources is configured according to the network size as a larger network
is usually used to sense multiple areas. Based on a preliminary baseline exper-
iment to determine the number of sources and the best position to place these
sources without causing excessive packet collisions and congesting the network,
a summary of the source and destination pair and the minimum number of hops
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Figure 4.22: Network topology showing a square grid of 7 by 7 based on the
outdoor plantation scenario
for each grid size is given in Table 4.9. This configuration may vary according to
the network topology.
Table 4.9: The summary of the traffic flow patterns applied for different network
sizes. The network topology for each of the grid sizes is given in Appendix A
.
Grid Size Source Dest MinHop f(N)
5 by 5 1,3,5,15 25 8 hops 3
7 by 7 0,2,4,14,28 48 12 hops 5
10 by 10 2,4,6,20,40,60 99 18 hops 8
15 by 15 0,2,4,6,8,30,60,90,120 224 28 hops 13
20 by 20 2,4,6,8,10,12,40,80,120,160,200,240 399 38 hops 18
30 by 30 2,4,6,8,10,12,60,120,180,240,300,360 899 58 hops 28
4.5.2 Fault injection
To simulate the failure, a node is failed when it received a packet that has tra-
versed more than Ht/2 hops to allow for local re-routing. Ht is the maximum
number of hops from the source to the destination. The number of failures (N)
injected is set to be proportional to the size of the network as shown in Table
4.9 in order to have some effects on the routing protocol. From the initial test
simulations, f(N) can be set according to (MinHop)/2− 1.
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4.5.3 Results
The result in Table 4.10 shows that the networks with different number of nodes
(25-, 49-, 100-, 225-, 400-, and 800-nodes) yield different performance values for
each of the evaluation metrics. To show more clearly how the performance of
MRP responds to failure as the network size increases, the box-whiskers plots for
each of the evaluations metrics are provided in Figure 4.23 and 4.23. Table 4.11
shows the outputs generated from the statistical test from three different sets of
results to show its significance.
Figure 4.23(a) shows the percentage of the number of packets delivered suc-
cessfully over the number of packets sent. If we analyse the PDR in Figure 4.23(a),
we can see that the PDR of MRP is always higher than NST and AODV. For a
small network, MRP delivers 85.45% packets compared to 78.60% in NST and
77.62% in AODV. As the network size doubles, the PDR rate decreases for all the
routing protocols. When 225 nodes were deployed, the difference in the PDR for
MRP to AODV is large where the difference in their median is 25% and their mean
is 25.96%. According the Table 4.11, the difference in PDR for MRP and AODV in
the network size more than 220 nodes are both statistical and scientifically signif-
icant (p-value=8.28e-11 and the A-value=0.88). The A-value always gives a large
effect size (A-value > 0.72) when the network size is larger 225 nodes.
In term of the number of routing overhead, AODV generates more routing
packets than MRP and NST-AODV. The number of route requests generated in-
creases exponentially as the network size increases as shown in Figure 4.24(b).
AODV generates more routing packets than in NST and MRP when the network
size is greater than 225 nodes due to the propagation and regeneration of route
requests by individual nodes. This high number of routing overheads depicted
in Figure 4.24(b) reduces the PDR observed in Figure 4.23(a) as the nodes spend
more time in transmitting the routing packets than the data packets. To send
one packet, AODV uses three route request packets for a 25 nodes network. This
route requests double (8) as the networks become twice in size. At 225 nodes, the
route requests increase by a factor of four (from 16 requests to 69 requests) for
AODV. This halves the PDR (from 63.11% to 37.81%).
Figure 4.24(a) also shows a higher average end to end delay between AODV
(0.93s) and MRP (0.51s). This difference is significant for a network of 225 nodes
(p-value=0.01 with a medium effect size of A-value=0.33). This end to end delay
is the implication of the additional route discovery initiated during node fail-
ure, where the packet is buffered. Due of this additional routing packet, normal
packet transmission cannot be performed and the packet is dropped. Hence, less
packet is being delivered as observed in Figure 4.23(a).
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Table 4.10: The performance results in term of PDR, average energy remaining
in a node, routing packet required to deliver a packet, and the average end to
end delay for the three protocols: MRP, NST and AODV. Shown are the median
and mean results for the network size of 25-, 49-, 100-, 225, 400, and 900-nodes
exposed to f(N) failure nodes with 1 second failure duration.
Network Size(Nodes) 25 49 100 225 400 900
MRP 85.45 80.44 69.21 62.81 42.43 36.86
Median PDR (%) NST 78.60 79.99 66.54 60.18 41.09 35.48
AODV 77.62 78.18 63.11 37.81 28.00 27.23
MRP 84.57 80.00 68.87 64.56 43.17 37.20
Mean PDR (%) NST 80.33 79.66 68.64 57.76 38.37 34.95
AODV 78.24 74.55 61.15 38.60 29.25 26.68
Average MRP 18.43 18.22 18.49 18.47 18.59 19.09
Median Energy NST 18.57 18.26 18.51 18.56 18.55 19.08
Remain (J) AODV 18.61 18.37 18.59 18.61 18.62 19.05
Average MRP 18.44 18.32 18.52 18.54 18.60 19.11
Mean Energy NST 18.57 18.31 18.51 18.55 18.57 19.10
Remain (J) AODV 18.65 18.41 18.62 18.61 18.64 19.04
Normalised MRP 2 3 8 17 41 195
Median Routing NST 3 4 10 20 49 216
Load AODV 3 7 16 69 135 422
Normalised MRP 2 3 8 19 46 197
Mean Routing NST 3 4 10 23 58 1442
Load AODV 3 8 21 104 146 4434
Average MRP 0.04 0.29 0.57 0.51 0.85 0.39
Median Delay NST 0.04 0.38 0.76 0.63 0.92 0.55
(s) AODV 0.04 0.27 0.51 0.93 1.14 0.42
Average MRP 0.14 0.49 0.78 0.64 0.95 0.59
Mean Delay NST 0.14 0.45 0.73 0.75 1.12 0.64
(s) AODV 0.09 0.43 0.75 1.01 1.28 0.64
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(b) Similar energy consumption is observed between MRP, AODV and NST.
Figure 4.23: Box-Whiskers plot showing the median, mean (diamond), lower
quartile, upper quartile, highest and lowest values for different network sizes
with 17 failing nodes, with failure duration = 1s, failure interval = 5s.
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(b) The routing packet generated increases exponentially as the network size increases.
Figure 4.24: Box-Whiskers plot showing the median, mean (diamond), lower
quartile, upper quartile, highest and lowest values for different network sizes
with 17 failing nodes, with failure duration = 1s, failure interval = 5s.
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Table 4.11: p- and A-values indicating the difference between MRP and AODV,
MRP and NST, and NST and AODV for different networks sizes. Numbers high-
lighted in bold-italic are significant, comprising a large effect
Significance Tests P-Test (p-value) A-test (A-Value)
Metrics No of MRP MRP NST MRP MRP NST
(Nodes) AODV NST AODV AODV NST AODV
25 0.02 0.21 0.27 0.64 0.57 0.56
49 0.14 0.87 0.21 0.59 0.51 0.57
PDR 100 0.04 0.63 0.04 0.62 0.53 0.62
225 8.28e-11 0.05 1.43e-08 0.88 0.61 0.83
400 0.01 0.27 1.66e-08 0.72 0.41 0.79
900 1.12e-07 0.63 0.01 0.77 0.53 0.71
25 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.29 0.37 0.42
Average 49 0.04 0.70 0.05 0.38 0.48 0.39
Energy 100 0.08 0.89 0.03 0.40 0.51 0.37
Remains 225 0.06 0.29 0.23 0.39 0.44 0.43
400 0.14 0.73 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.43
900 0.05 0.80 0.13 0.60 0.51 0.58
25 0.04 0.43 0.12 0.38 0.45 0.41
49 7.29e-07 0.20 1.21e-05 0.21 0.43 0.25
Routing 100 1.55e-09 0.32 8.84e-08 0.16 0.44 0.20
Load 225 8.03e-16 0.06 4.42e-14 0.03 0.39 0.06
400 4.44e-06 0.21 7.20e-18 0.11 0.60 0.06
900 1.27e-16 0.02 4.70e-09 0.09 0.37 0.18
25 0.14 0.38 0.69 0.59 0.55 0.52
49 0.60 0.97 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.55
Average 100 0.51 0.93 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.53
Delay 225 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.33 0.41 0.39
400 0.50 0.61 0.03 0.44 0.54 0.39
900 0.61 0.69 0.40 0.53 0.48 0.55
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4.5.4 Discussion on the scalability of MRP
In this section, we have reported that by increasing the number of the nodes in
a network can reduce the packet delivery of the applications. However, the per-
formance of MRP is significantly better than AODV in a large network. From
Figure 4.23, the PDR of AODV decreases significantly compared to MRP when
more than 255 nodes are deployed (p-value < 0.05 and A-value > 0.83 as shown
in Table 4.11). The PDR of MRP is always higher than AODV and NST with
a lower routing overhead. This significant packet drop in AODV is caused by
RREQ packets generated by the node during failures. These packets multiply
and propagate through the network, creating a sudden burst of traffic and caus-
ing other nodes have to wait for data packet transmission or drop the packet
when the output buffer is full. The higher PDR and lower routing overhead in
MRP have shown that the routing switching mechanism in MRP can increase the
probability of the packet delivery by 5-10% avoiding the needs of unnecessary
route discovery during failures. The result in Table 4.10 also shows that the delay
and energy consumption between MRP, NST and AODV is the similar. The p-
and A-values in Table 4.11 verify the means of the energy consumption and delay
is not differences for MRP, NST, and AODV. Hence, MRP improves the reliability
of packet delivery without incurring additional overhead for an outdoor WSNs
application based on a grid topology.
4.6 Summary
In this section, we have performed an extensive set of simulations to test the
performance and robustness of our proposed solution. Our experiments have
demonstrated, through analysis and simulations, that a significant improvement
in the number of successful packets delivered in the network can be achieved
(Objective E4-1). The number of RDs are significantly lower than AODV and
NST-AODV (Objective E4-3), making the networks less congested and more en-
ergy efficient (Objective E4-2). The results also show that switching delay intro-
duced in the node are not statistically significant (Objective E4-4). Hence, the pro-
posed multi-modal approach can achieve a better packet reliability and is more
energy efficient than single mode approach. However, the MRP can only detect
and recover from failure. It does not identify the failure that may be required
to rectify the failure effectively and quickly. In the next chapter, we will inves-
tigate the ability of a bio-inspired algorithm to identify the faults and assist the




Assisted Recovery with An
Immune-Inspired Classifier
This chapter investigates the application of Artificial Immune System (AIS) to
assist in detecting and recovering from failures in WSNs. Most fault tolerance
approaches applied in WSNs in Chapter 2 demand high resources, require of-
fline training and centralised detection. Some researchers attempt to improve the
network availability and reliability through redundancy (Zou and Chakrabarty,
2007), or by detecting the fault with limited automated recovery (Chandola et al.,
2009). It is sometimes necessary to determine the cause of the fault online in order
to rectify the problem quickly and effectively to reduce network downtime (Can-
dea et al., 2004). As a result, researchers have applied the bio-inspired approaches
such as the immune-inspired algorithms to solve complex engineering problems
using one or two features of the immune system derived from an analogy of the
application process and the biological principles (Hart and Timmis, 2008). The
immune system has many attractive properties that are similar to WSNs such
as self-adaptive, self-healing, robust, scalable, autonomous, and self-stabilisation
that can be applied to resolve complex problem such as fault detection (Wallenta
et al., 2010). The ability of the immune cells to self-detection, self-identification
and self-recovery has provided an inspiration for the application of the immune-
inspired algorithm to provide self-healing in WSN.
The objectives of this chapter are to
• Investigate and exploit how the self-healing property of the immune system
can assist in identifying and recovering from radio anomalies.
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• Apply an immune-inspired algorithm to provide automated diagnosis and
recovery in WSNs to improve the reliability and efficiency of the routing
protocol.
• Evaluate the performance of the automated detection and recovery system
in both hardware (TelosB) and software (NS2).
We propose an immune-inspired Interference Detection and Recovery System
(IDRS) that allows individual nodes to detect, diagnose and recover from net-
work failure due to radio interferences. Radio interference can affect the commu-
nication in any wireless network that needs to be identified. Section 5.1 discusses
why existing approaches are not suitable to distinguish interferences in WSNs
and the self-adaptive and learning properties of an immune system are required.
Based on the review of the different AIS algorithms in Section 2.7.3, the RDA has
been selected to perform the interference classification due to its ability to detect
anomalies in a dynamic changing environment (Hilder et al., 2012). The RDA
is described in Section 5.2. The architecture and design of IDRS is presented in
Section 5.3. The accuracy, efficiency and reliability of IDRS are evaluated and
discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 ends the chapter with the summary.
5.1 Motivation
Network failures such as having an unreliable link and packet dropped are com-
mon in WSNs as the node shares the same radio frequency with other radio emit-
ting devices such as laptop, tablet and game console. The radio on a node is
sensitive to the interference generated by these devices. It is necessary to scan
the radio channel for any abnormal radio signal strength that is higher than its
current radio signal and avoid transmission during interference. This function is
usually provided by the link layer (Gutierrez et al., 2001). Before a node trans-
mits a packet, CSMA/CA requires the node’s radio to listen and detect for an
idle channel. If the channel is clear, then the radio switches into the transmission
mode and sends out a packet. This function only detects the presence of inter-
ference but does not determine the characteristics of the interference required for
an effective recovery. The level of interference is dependent on both the strength
and duration of Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) (Liu et al., 2010). It is easy
to determine the strength of the interference (strong or weak) by measuring the
radio signal strength indicator (RSSI) from the radio interface. As these inter-
ferences depend on the device usage pattern, it can be a challenge to determine
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the interference’s duration that can be short, long, transient or permanent and de-
rive a pattern that can be used by the routing protocol to identify the interference
characteristics and applied appropriate recovery or avoidance actions. It is nec-
essary to collect interference patterns and classify the interference according to
the strength and duration. From the classification, the appropriate response to
rectify the fault generated by each interference type can be mapped onto each
interference class and the detection system can use this classification information
to identify and rectify the failure.
5.1.1 Problem Formulation
Lin et al. (2009) classify these interferences into three distinct patterns namely:
small fluctuation created by multi-path fading of wireless signals; large distur-
bance due to shadowing effect of the presence of obstacles; continuous large fluc-
tuations caused by WLAN devices. Each of these interference patterns can have
different detrimental effects on the Packet Sending Ratio (PSR). Recent work by
Wang and Akyildiz (2011) has shown that the interference from a WLAN network
can produce up to 30% packet losses in WSNs. To guarantee the availability of the
network, the node may need to detect and provide a fast and accurate response to
overcome the interference. According to Candea et al. (2004), the availability can






If the MTTR in Equation 5.1 minimises to zero, near 100% availability can be
achieved. Hence, it is necessary to reduce the MTTR by improving the responses
through a diagnostic process. Poor diagnosis may yield false positive and pro-
duces incorrect treatment that may consume unnecessary resources and increase
recovery time.
Different recovery approaches can be taken by the routing protocol such as to
retransmit, or varying of transmission power in order to communicate with the
neighbour. In severe cases, the node may need to establish a new route in order to
send the packet. Some of these recovery approaches such as flooding are more ex-
pensive to execute and time consuming than others. To illustrate, six static homo-
geneous nodes are deployed in the topology shown in Figure 5.1. Each node can
forward packets and produce network statistics. The communication between a
node (5) and its neighbouring nodes (4 and 7) are disrupted when a laptop placed
close to the node (5) decides to transmit a packet randomly. Although the laptop
employs the CSMA/CA to detect for an idle channel, it is unable to sense the
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low power transmission of the WSN’s node. This radio activity causes packet
collision in the WSNs. As a result, the affected node will attempt to rectify the
failure by executing protocol-specific recovery functions such as retransmission,
flooding and collision avoidance (Perkins and Royer, 1999). Incorrect response
can aggravate a congested network. For example, retransmission is best applied
when the interference is temporary and transient. Retransmission can improve
the probability of successful transmission and improve the reliability of the net-
work (Balakrishnan et al., 1997). Local discovery should be avoided in a noisy
network as it may lead to broadcast storm (Hsu et al., 2007). Hence, it is not only
important to detect the presence of an anomaly, but also the cause of an anomaly
needs to be established in order to make accurate and automated recovery deci-










Figure 5.1: Interference source is introduced near node 5 to disrupt the radio
communication between node 2 and 3.
5.1.2 Existing approaches
To perform the error processing techniques (error detection, diagnosis and re-
covery) described in Section 2.6 in a node can be difficult and expensive. Due
to limited constraints in the node, the diagnostic and recovery mechanism taken
should be performed online. It should also be low cost and low overhead with a
high probability of rectifying the problem. Zacharias et al. (2012) propose the use
of signal processing approaches such as the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to dis-
tinguish the radio interference with a known fixed frequency such as Microwave
from Bluetooth and WLAN. However, the FFT is only performed in a computer
using the RSSI collected from the sensor nodes via the base station as FFT is a
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computationally expensive operation to be performed in the motes. For an n el-
ements series, the FFT algorithm computational complexity is O(n2) (Trinidad
and Valle, 2009). Ong et al. (2010) show that the execution time can take from
20.39ms to 166.68ms in a MSP430 microcontroller depending on the number of
operations performed and the input representation (an integer or floating point).
With the stringent energy budget in sensor mote, a simple and quick algorithm
over complex algorithms is more favourable to reduce execution time and energy
consumption. Existing work mainly focus on anomalies generated by malicious
attacks that usually have a static distinctive feature that can easily be classified
(Ngai et al., 2006). Little work has investigated anomalies due to the presence of
interferences in the operating environment such as WLAN communication. One
of the challenges in detecting anomalies due to these interferences is that the du-
ration and occurrence for these types of anomalies are unpredictable and varies
with time (Liu et al., 2010). The duration and occurrence of these interferences are
usually dependent on the type of radio devices or applications, and their usage
pattern. Thus, it can be very difficult to be detected and classified using existing
conventional statistical approaches (Boers et al., 2010).
5.1.3 Contributions
To diagnose a fault, the state of the faulty system must be collected and analysed
when the fault occurs for immediate recovery. As only limited historical data can
be stored in the memory for error processing, diagnostic information is usually
sent to the sink for analysis. Due to unreliable communication, this information
may be lost during delivery. There is a need to perform online fault diagnosis
on the node. The importance of integrating the detection, diagnosis and recov-
ery into one system has been widely ignored in literature as each fault tolerance
approach is usually performed and analysed in isolation.
The contributions of this chapter are:
1. We propose an immune-inspired solution that allows individual nodes to
self-detect, diagnose and recover from network failure. Cohen (2004) pos-
tulates that the immune system does not only protect the body. It also per-
forms body maintenance through the process of recognition, cognition and
response with respect to its current environment (Cohen, 2004).
2. We apply a multi layer approach where MRP provides the first line of de-
fence to detect the fault and integrate the Receptor Density Algorithm (RDA)
as a secondary defence to determine the interference in order to assist in re-
covery. The RDA is an AIS algorithm based on a T-Cell signalling model
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with statistical kernel density function to detect anomalies (Owens et al.,
2012).
3. We implement the RDA in real TelosB mote to recognise different types of
interferences according to the duration and strength, affecting the PDR of
the networks and perform as systematic evaluation to measure its accuracy.
5.2 The RDA: Receptor Density Algorithm
Based on the review in Section 2.7.3, we apply the RDA to perform the fault de-
tection and identification in order to assist in recovery. RDA is a suitable for our
problem as it has the ability to learn and discriminate between the normal and
abnormal autonomously in a dynamic environment. It has also been shown to
yield a high accuracy rate when apply to detect anomalies (Owens et al., 2012).
It operates independently and can adapt to changes. This section provides an
overview on the biological inspiration and the development of the algorithm.
5.2.1 Biological principle
In adaptive immunity, the T-Cell must perform a discrimination process to dis-
tinguish between the self and non-self antigens. The discrimination process is
performed based on the population of the TCRs ability to bind to a population of
antigens presented by the APCs. The discrimination does not depend solely on
molecular recognition between the TCRs and antigens, but also on the stimula-
tion received from all the antigens and the internal signalling of the T-Cell (Owens
et al., 2012). The internal component of the TCR undergoes a process known as
kinetic proofreading with a negative feedback. The binding between the TCR and
antigen consists of energy consumption process that increases when a sufficiently
strong and lasting bonding occurs. The antigens may continually associate and
dissociate from the TCRs and the binding strength can be weak, medium and
strong. Weak binding has little effect on the T-Cell, the medium binding inhibits
the T-Cells and the strong binding will activate the T-Cells. These binding pro-
cesses also involve negative energy consumption steps that are reversed as the
binding dissociate. As the kinetic proofreading steps progress, a negative sig-
nal is released when the proofreading steps are greater than the base negative
feedback. The antigen may also bind to the nearby receptors on the T-cell that
inhibits and reverses the progress if a TCR dissociates from the antigen. The neg-
ative feedback generated by a TCR can also spread and dampen nearby TCRs
(Owens et al., 2012). The spreading of the negative signal is a key concept in
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RDA in determining the activation of the T-Cells. If no TCR can generate an acti-
vation signal, the negative feedback will pull the kinetic proofreading below the
base negative state. If a small set of strong antigens associated to the TCR is able
to complete the kinetic proofreading before the majority weaker antigens reach
the negative feedback base state and reverse the kinetic proofreading, the T-Cell
is activated, triggering immune response.
5.2.2 The Algorithm
Using the concepts introduced in the last section, Owens et al. (2012) extracts
the computational abstraction of the TCRs and develop an algorithm with an
abstracted molecular recognition system for detecting anomalies. The algorithm
begins by defining the term receptor taken from Owens et al. (2012).
Definition. A receptor r is a tuple (p, n, β, `, c), where:
p ∈ [0, `], the receptor position;
n ≥ 0, the generated negative feedback
β > 0, the base negative feedback barrier;
` ∈ (0,∞), ` > β, the length of the receptor;
c = {0,1}, the receptor output. c = 1 if p ≥ `;
This definition of a receptor is an abstraction of the internal component of the TCR
in which p represents the kinetic proofreading state of the internal component
of the TCR and ` is the maximum kinetic proofreading state that is capable to
generate an activation signal. c is the output that determines whether the T-cell is
activated. n represents the generation of negative feedback in the neighbourhood
of the receptor and the threshold β is the base negative feedback barrier (Owens
et al., 2012).
The behaviour of a receptor presented in Figure 5.2 is described as follows:
• A receptor receives a sequence of input {ut} with ut ∈ R at discrete time
t = 0, 1, 2, ... and ut ≥ 0.
• The input ut pushes pt towards `.
• The receptor generates a negative feedback nt if the receptor position pt ≥ β
the negative barrier.
• The negative feedback nt reverses the progress of the receptor position pt
• The receptor position pt and negative feedback nt are updated according to
a decay function
ft : (pt, nt, ut, β)→ (pt+1, nt+1) (5.2)
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where pt+1 and nt+1 are given in Eq. 5.3 and Eq. 5.4.
pt+1 = bpt + ut − ant (5.3)
nt+1 =
dnt if pt < βdnt + g if pt ≥ β (5.4)
The parameters b and d are the receptor position decay rate and negative
feedback decay rate with 0 < b < d < 1. a > 0 controls the influence of
negative feedback. g > 0 is the negative feedback growth rate.
• If the receptor position is on and above the receptor length `, then a classifi-
cation occurs and the receptor is activated and considered anomalous (c = 1




















Figure 5.2: The Receptor from Owens et al. (2012): An input ut will move the
receptor position to pt as well the generate a negative feedback if pt > β. This
negative signal reverses the receptor position to p(t + 1). If the subsequent input
signal is strong, the pt progresses further toward `where the output c is produced
when pt = `.
5.3 IDRS: Interference Detection and Recovery Sys-
tems
In this section, we propose the application of RDA to diagnose and determine the
cause of the failure using the current radio RSSI values collected within a time
window. RDA is designed to detect any continuous time-series anomalous event
and has the ability to adapt to dynamic changing environment by reshaping the
normal pattern in the system when required. The RSSI has been recognised as a
good predictor of link quality and has been used in routing protocol to assist in
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detecting link failure (Srinivasan et al., 2010; Gnawali et al., 2009). Specifically, it
has been shown that if the RSSI is higher than a sensitivity threshold [RSSIth(x)]
(about -87dBm), the RSSI correlates very well with the packet reception rate. This
will allow us relate the distribution of the RSSI observed to the PDR generated by
the MRP for detection and classification. However, the raw RSSI values consist of
a mixture of different signal including noise. Any value less than -87dBm is un-
usable as it includes the background noise (Srinivasan et al., 2010). It is necessary
to remove the noise in order to process and extract the interference pattern from
the raw RSSI. Hence, we integrate the RDA into the MRP to provide an immune-
inspired self-healing system that allow individual node to detect, determine and
recover from failure online.
The objectives of the IDRS are:
1. To accurately identify the interference that is affecting the communication
between a node and its neighbour in a distributed manner,
2. To make autonomous decisions on the recovery action to mitigate the effect

















Packet Tx / Packet Ack RSSI (Environment)
Sensor
Node
Figure 5.3: The architecture of the Interference Detection and Recovery System.
The IDRS in Figure 5.3 consists of three modules, representing each stage in
the CIS: MRP Detection Module (MDM), RDA Diagnostic Module (RDM), and
Radio Interference Response Module (RIRM). Inputs to the IDRS are the PSR and
the RSSI. These inputs can easily be obtained and calculated from the node. The
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MDM acts as the first line of defence to provide initial detection and response to
the interference. If the condition does not improve, the MDM will activate the
RDM to identify the type of interference based on the RSSI. Based on the results
from both the MDM and the RDM, the RIRM will activate one or a combination
of responses. By using the close feedback loop provided by the link layer, the
effectiveness of the responses can be evaluated by the MRP. The cost of each re-
sponse can be adjusted accordingly. Hence, IDRS should be able to recognise and
respond to the failure based on the strength and duration of the interference.
In the following subsections, a detailed description of the proposed IDRS Al-
gorithm is presented.
5.3.1 MDM: The MRP Detection Module
In WSNs, the packet reception ratio (PRR) is commonly used as a metric to detect
network anomalies. The PRR is shared between neighbouring nodes (Lin et al.,
2006). This data is usually piggybacked on an existing packet. However, in the
presence of interference this data may be lost or corrupted. Hence, we advocate
that the detection module should be implemented at the transmitting node. In the
IDRS, we propose the use of the MRP to detect the presence of interference based
on the PSR to provide an initial response. The PSR is the total number of packets
successfully sent over the total number of attempts made in a given time window.
The MRP detects deviation in the PSR and utilises the packet acknowledgement
(Pack) to provide initial network recovery response and activate the RDM. Each
route recovery response incurs a specific cost (RTcost for retransmission, LDcost for
local recovery). Associated with each recovery response is a maximum cost thresh-
old: RTmax for retransmission and LDmax for recovery. The recovery response
will only be selected if the cost of carrying out the response is lower than the
maximum threshold. All these responses utilise the existing acknowledgement
mechanisms on the link layer. As such, no additional communication overhead
is incurred in the network.
5.3.2 RDM: The RDA Diagnostic Module
To identify the cause of a transmission failure, the RSSI is used. Monitoring the
RSSI in WSNs has been widely used to decide the required transmission power
to transmit a packet (Boers et al., 2010). However, as illustrated in Figure 5.4,
the RSSI values are sensitive to changes in environment and to classify the RSSI
using traditional statistical techniques to differentiate fluctuating RSSI pattern is
challenging (Boers et al., 2010). The RSSI values consist of a mixture of gaussian
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(background) noise, packet signal and radio interfering signal. Small changes in
the operating environment can trigger large variations in the RSSI due to the pres-
ence of noise, making it difficult to determine the type of interferences (Ko and
Terzis, 2010). We propose the use of the RDA (Lau et al., 2011; Owens et al., 2009)
to remove the background noise and classify different types of interference. The
RDA has ability to achieve high positive detection rate and low false detection
rate. Its ability to recognise anomalies in a dynamic environment has motivated
its application to our solution.














(a) Normal RSSI Radio Data Pattern












(b) Abnormal RSSI Radio Interference Pattern
Figure 5.4: The raw RSSI data collected from the radio interface of a TelosB for
both normal (Figure 5.4(a)) and abnormal (Figure5.4(a))
In order to generate the normal receptor signature on a node, the white back-
ground noise needs to be removed from the signature to reduce the number of
false positives. These noises are determined by capturing the RSSI values from
the radio transceiver without data communication. Based on RSSI values cap-
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tured, the RSSI values range from -100 to -88 dB are known to be noise (Srini-
vasan et al., 2010). Based on these values, any RSSI values less than -87 dB can be
discarded as its receptor’s position will always exceed the threshold (`) as shown
in Figure 5.5(a). Once the receptors representing the background noise have been
identified and removed, the actual data signature can be generated using the RSSI
values captured during normal data transmission without the interference.
To apply the RDA, the RSSI input data is divided into s discretised locations
and a receptor xs is placed at each of these locations. A receptor has a maximum
length ` = Smax(x), a position rp ∈ [0, `], and a negative feedback rn ∈ (0, `). The
maximum receptor length ` (activation threshold) is set based on the spread of
the RSSI value obtained during training. At each time step t, each receptor takes
input xi and performs a binary classification ct ∈ 0,1 to determine whether that
location is considered anomalous. The classification decision is determined by
the dynamics of rp and negative feedback rn ∈ (0, `).
The processes for initialisation and classification of the RSSI values are de-
scribed as follows:
Phase 1: Initialisation
1. Present the normal RSSI values X (Figure 5.4(a)) to the RDA to generate
its normal signature (Figure 5.5(a)). For each receptor x , calculate the












where h is the kernel width and n is the total number of normal RSSI
values.
It is necessary to use appropriate kernel width to accurately detect the
interference. To set the h, three sets of training data (normal, www
and video streaming) are used to analyse the effect of h on the detec-
tion rate. From figure 1, a small h = 1 pushes the receptor position
far away from the threshold that may increase false positive detection
(mis-classification). A large h = 10 may decrease the true negative rate
(missed detection) as the reception position is below the threshold. By
manually adjusting the value of h using the training data, the RDA can
yield a high true positive rate when h = 5.
2. Calculating the negative feedback rn(x) for each receptor x. rn(x) slows
down the progression of the receptor position to reduce the false posi-
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(b) The signature of activated receptor for the abnormal RSSI interference Pattern
Figure 5.5: The raw RSSI data shown in Figure 5.4 are fed into RDA to produce
normal 5.5(a) and abnormal 5.5(b) signatures of activated receptors.
tive rate and is computed based on the base negative barrier β. Hence,
it is necessary to determine the value of β by adjusting the β using a set
of training data. From Figure 5.3.2, the position of the receptors moves
toward threshold ` faster if β is high (β =1). The progression of the
receptor position decreases when β is small (β =0.01). By manually
inspect the receptor position with different value of β, β is set a low
value (β =0.01) to yield low false positive rate.
rn(x) =
S(x)− β, if S(x) ≥ β0, otherwise (5.6)
Phase 2: Classification
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Figure 5.6: The signature generated by RDA with different values h. The receptor
































Figure 5.7: The signature patterns generated by RDA with the different values β.
A low of value β slow down the progress of the receptor position and hence may
reduce the false positive rate.
1. Initialise the receptor position rt(x)=0 for all receptors.
2. Based on the MAX(rp(x)) of normal signature, set the threshold value
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of the receptor length ` = Smax(x). Smax(x) is the maximum peak of the
normal signature generated over 100 runs during Phase 1.










, rp(x) = Ks − rn(x) (5.7)
where each RSSI value vi ∈ V.
4. Classify V:
A receptor is activated when
V =
Normal, if rp(x) < lInterference, otherwise. (5.8)
The classification of v to different classes of interference is based on
two variables (Figure 5.8c):
• The difference between distance of the highest receptor position
and ` (max(`− rp(x))), referred to as Intensity;






















Classification (d & fq)
Figure 5.8: Using the outputs generated by RDA, the interference can be classi-
fied into either Class I, II, or III based on the euclidean distance of the furthest
activated receptor and the number of activated receptors above the threshold l,
represented by the global maximum and vertical lines in (c) respectively.
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5.3.3 RIRM: Radio Interference Response Module
According to the duration and strength of the interference introduced, we classify
the interferences into three patterns namely: short and weak, medium, long and
strong. Three different responses to overcome the interferences under investiga-
tion have been associated to each of the patterns classified namely:
1. Weak and short: Retransmission (RT) is the optimistic approach to over-
come transient failure. It is activated when the MDM detects that the ac-
knowledgement packet Pack has timeout and the cost of retransmission (RTcost)
has not exceed the threshold (RTmax). This response is particularly effec-
tive when the network is suffering from frequent intermittent packet colli-
sions created by other radio emitting devices with a stronger signal (Gutier-
rez et al., 2001). Increasing the transmission stronger than the interference
source may also help to handle unavailable route caused by an obstacle or
a weak interference source. It is a common to increase the transmission
power to penetrate through the obstacle in order to communicate with the
next hop neighbouring node (Boers et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2006). However,
the use of higher transmission power can only be applied if the interfer-
ence source is known to be weaker than the node’s transmission signal as
a higher radio transmission consumes more battery and may also interfere
with other nodes.
2. Medium: Local discovery (LD) is activated when the node failed to send
the packet after several RTs (as indicated by PSR) or when the RDM iden-
tified an interference that has medium strength and duration. As a medium
interference may only affect one of two nodes, other local nodes within the
affected area can still forward the packet to the next two hop neighbour.
This response is also best executed when the next node is permanently un-
available.
3. Strong and long: Global Discovery (GD) is usually the last option to take
when the local nodes are spatially interfered and the existing route is known
to be unreliable. This action is usually taken when all the previous re-
sponses have failed, and there is no local node available to re-route the traf-
fic. This type of failure is usually created by the interference source that is
long and strong affecting all the nodes.
Beside the three interference patterns presented above, there are other inter-
ference patterns that are not identified by our classification algorithm. To identify
159
5.4 Experiments and Results
other interference patterns such as strong intensity and short duration, each inter-
ference needs to be generated and captured on the node before it is processed and
classified by the RDA. Once the new class has been determined, an appropriate
routing protocol can be mapped onto the new class.
A decision tree, based on expert knowledge, is presented in Figure 5.9 to show
the response strategy to be selected based on the current network environment.
The algorithm for IDRS with MRP, RDM and RIRM is given in Algorithm 2.
Is RTcost > RTMax
Is RSSI High? Retransmit
Retransmit
Is Local Discovery 
success?

























Figure 5.9: Decision tree based to respond to different interference.
5.4 Experiments and Results
We conducted two experiments to evaluate the proposed IDRS. The first exper-
iment examines the effectiveness of the RDA classifier in the RDM. The second
experiment evaluates the efficacy of the proposed IDRS when compared to other
methods.
5.4.1 Evaluation of the RDM
In the RDM, we use over 850,000 RSSI readings to classify the interference intro-
duced into three classes: CLASS I, CLASS II, and CLASS III. The RSSI values are
obtained from the TelosB radio module, exposed to different interference sources
with weak, medium and strong intensity. The spectrum of the RSSI values used
is the range of -100dBm to -10dBm. Due to the limited processing power and
storage in a sensor node, this spectrum is uniformly divided into 30 slots to en-
sure that each RSSI values are evaluated. The RDA requires O(n2) processing
overhead, hence will only activate if PDR < N (where N is the minimum PDR the
application can afford to tolerate). A receptor is used to represent each slot.
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Algorithm 2: IDRS Algorithm with the combination of MRP and RDA
Input : Packet Send Ps
Output: Response Action
1 while Packet Buffer is not Empty do
2 Send Packet Ps and wait for acknowledgement Pack






Calculate Packet Sending Ratio, PSR
5 else
6 Decrease Retransmission Cost, RTcost






Determine interference CLASS from RDM
9 if not CLASS III and [PSR > 90% or RTcost < RTmax] and
Route is valid then
10 Retransmit
 TriggerRT Response.
11 Increase Retransmission Cost, RTcost
12 else if CLASS II and LDcost < LDmax then
13 Perform Route Discovery




15 if Route Discovery is Successful then
16 Decrease Retransmission Cost RTcost
17 else if CLASS I and TxPower < TxMAX then




Power Response.19 Decrease Retransmission Cost, RTcost
20 else
21 Invalidate Route and Send Error
22 Global Discovery
 TriggerGD Response.
23 if Timeout then
24 Reinitialised
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In order to classify the interference into different classes, the pre-processed
training data from the RDA have to be grouped according the number of acti-
vations (duration) and the maximum distance between ` and maximum receptor
position. A scatter plot is used to investigate whether a general pattern can be
observed from the preprocessed data. From Figure 5.10, the output generated by
the RDA can be grouped into 3 different classes based on different Intensity (C1)
and Duration (C2) representing:
• Class I:- Weak intensity, short duration (C1 < i1 and C2 < d1)
• Class II:- Medium intensity, medium duration (i1 < C1 < i2 and d1 < C2 <
d2)
• Class III:- Strong intensity, long duration (C1 > i2 and C2 > d2)




































Figure 5.10: The distribution of the interference characteristics after processed
by the RDA. The distribution can be grouped as the three different interference
classes (Class I, II and II) as separated by the dotted lines
Hence, an unsupervised K-mean clustering algorithm is applied to data group
the data into 3 groups. K-means clustering is a method used in data mining to
partition v samples into c clusters in which each sample v belongs to the cluster
with the nearest mean. It is performed offline as it is computationally expensive.
The classes do not usually change throughout the node’s lifetime unless it is de-
ployed in a different physical location or moved. The derived classes based on
C1 and C2 is shown in Table 5.1.
Evaluation Metrics:
We evaluate the performance of the RDM in TelosB mote based on sensitivity
(Equation 5.9) and precision (Equation 5.10).
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Table 5.1: Interference Class based on the intensity and duration of the interfer-
ence experienced by a node
Intensity, C1 Duration, C2 Class Remarks
0 < C1 ≤ 2.8 0 < C2 ≤ 5 I weak intensity, short duration
2.8 < C1 ≤ 11.0 5 < C2 ≤ 16 II weak intensity, long duration








Sensitivity measures how well the RDM can correctly classify the interference
source whilst precision measures the probability of a detected event that is rep-
resenting a true positive result rather than a false positive. Precision ensures the
appropriate response is taken for the corresponding interference.
Experimental Setup:
Two static nodes are deployed so that they are within each other transmission
range. One node is configured to transmit packets at the rate of 8 packets per
second to simulate heavy load traffic while sampling its radio channel at the rate
of 1 KHz to collect the RSSI values and perform online detection.
Seven different network conditions, each representing different interferences
commonly occur an office and home environment, are used to test the system
namely: object blocking, jamming, web browsing, slow streaming, fast streaming,
slow downloading, and fast downloading (torrent). The descriptions of each of
the traffics are provided in Table 5.2. In each run, the interference is injected into
the network at periodic interval to capture the PSR affected by the interference.
This is done by placing a laptop next to the receiving node. Due to the limited
memory size in the nodes to store the log, each experiment is run for 5 minutes
to generate 2400 packets and is repeated 15 times.
Experimental Results:
The results for the experiment are shown in Figure 5.11. From the figure, the RDM
has achieved a precision of above 80% when the interferences have caused a dras-
tic drop in the PSR < 70%. The occurrence of these two interferences requires an
alternative route to deliver the packet successfully. Hence, it is important these
two interferences are correctly identified to avoid unnecessary responses to be
executed. With RDM, a precision rate from 80% to 90% has been achieved for
both blocking and fast download. Although the RDM can only classify 50-60%
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Table 5.2: Descriptions of different type of traffics generated using the laptop.
Traffic Descriptions
Object blocking People continuously walking across the communication path be-
tween the two nodes.
Jamming A local node continously transmitting packets placed near the
sending node.
Web browsing Casual surfing of websites (searching in google.com, bbc.co.uk and
soccernet.com).
Slow streaming Watching video streaming from the news channel in Brunei
(http://www.rtbnews.rtb.gov.bn/).
Fast streaming Watching multiple HD video streamed within uk like BBC iplayer.
Slow download-
ing
Downloading file from file-sharing website with an average speed
of speed of 518Kbps.
Fast download-
ing
Downloading file using file sharing software (torrent) with aver-
age speed to 2Mbps.
of the class II interference, its impact on the network PSR is less extreme with
more than 80% of the packet is still being delivered compare to blocking and fast
download with the PSR below 70%. Beside, high accuracy in Class II interfer-
ence is usually not required for accurate response as the sequential recovery step
(Retransmission followed by local discovery) provided by the MRP can usually
overcome weak interference and rectify the problem.
5.4.2 Evaluation of the IDRS
In this second experiment to compare the efficacy of the IDRS to NST, MRP, and
MRP with adaptive transmission power, two sets of experiments are executed:
one in hardware and the other in simulation. The objective of the hardware ex-
periment it to show that the IDRS can increase the PDR and reduce the commu-
nication overhead in the network. The simulation evaluate the scalability of the
IDRS as it is much easier to test a large scale network in simulation than real
hardware deployment.
To evaluate the performance of the IDRS against the NST, MRP, and MRP
with adaptive TPC (MTPC), the routing protocols are installed and tested in both
hardware and simulation. The MTPC protocol is used to evaluate the benefit of
boosting the transmission power when the receiver is being blocked. The perfor-
mance of the routing protocols is evaluated based on the following metrics:
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): PDR represent the percentage of the number
of packets received by the receiver, to the total number of packets trans-
mitted by the sender. This metric measures the reliability of the routing
protocol.
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Figure 5.11: Results showing the detection accuracy and the effect of different in-
terference classes on PSR. The RDM can detect and identify interference that have
a severe impact on the PSR (PSR<70%) as above 80% precision can be achieved
• Transmission Overhead (TO): TO is defined as the average number of trans-
missions made by a node to deliver the packets to the receiver. This metric
represents the efficiency of the routing. It can be calculated by dividing
the sum of the transmissions made, including RT, LD and GD, to the total
number of packets received.
Hardware Experimental Setup:
Six static TelosB motes are placed 3 metres apart using the topology shown in
Figure 5.1 to ensure that the neighbouring nodes are within each other transmis-
sion range. The experiment is conducted at the centre of a room relatively free
from uncontrolled radio sources to ensure its correctness and validity. The node
transmission is set to minimum power using the same channel as the WLAN in
the room. A notebook with different applications will be used as an interfer-
ence source. The LLN is enabled to allow packet acknowledgement in each node.
During initialisation, node 2 is configured to collect temperature reading from the
sensor and transmit the packet to node 3, at regular intervals (250ms) via the in-
termediate nodes. Once the network route has been established, and the normal
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signature has been collected by the RDM (after 30 seconds), different interference
sources are introduced into the network (close to node 5 and 6) at every i seconds
intervals. Each interference lasts for approximately d seconds. In our experiment,
the values of i and d are set accordingly (i = 30 and d = 15) to ensure that the net-
works can recover before the next interference source is injected. The PDR and
the response executed are computed and logged by node 7 during each interfer-
ence cycle. Due to the limited memory size to store the logs, each experiment
is run for 10 minutes to capture 20 interference sources. Each experiment is re-
peated 15 times as it takes a longer time to configure and run the experiment in
hardware.
Experimental Results:
The results for this experiment are shown in Figure 5.12 and 5.13 with their re-
spective statistical test values in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. During normal condi-
tion, NST has the lowest PDR (median at 92.5%) and requires more transmissions
than MRP, TPC and IDRS. The transmission overhead for IDRS is slightly lower
than MRP and TPC despite having the same PDR (Rank-Sum p-value < 0.005451,
Vargha-delaney A-value >0.79778).
When errors are introduced into the network, the performance improvement
made by the RDA with MRP is significantly better than MRP as the PDRs for
IDRS are always higher than MRP. (For Class I is 2% higher, Class II is 4% higher
and Class III is 9% higher with p-value << 0.005 and A-value < 0.27). MTPC
has the highest PDR in Class I and Class III. Further analysis on the responses
executed by the routing protocol in Table 5.3 has shown the number of TPCs in
MTPC is higher than IDRS at class III interference. We believe by increasing the
transmission power during interference may have improved the PDR in MTPC.
From Figure 5.12, by increasing the transmission power during Class I interfer-
ence has improved the PDR by 5% on average for MTPC compared to MRP and
2.5% compared to IDRS.
Although the boxplot in Figure 5.12 has shown a significantly higher PDR in
MTPC than IDRS , IDRS has a lower number of packet transmissions compare to
MTPC as shown in Figure 5.13. When Class I and III errors are introduced, the
transmission overhead for IDRS is less than MTPC and the PDR of MTPC is 2%
higher. From Table 5.3, we can observe that IDRS generates fewer packets than
MTPC as an appropriate response can be executed by RIRM based on the diagno-
sis made by the RDM. For example, the IDRS performed less RT and TPC in Class
II interference as the node was able to recognise the interference and performed
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Figure 5.12: PDR achieves by different routing protocols for different classes of
interference.
Table 5.3: The execution of different responses in all the nodes for IDRS and
MTPC. Results show that IDRS can execute the appropriate response compared
to MTPC. Class III interference has been correctly classified resulting in higher
number of Global discovery and lower number of high power transmission.
Numbers of Each Response Executed Interference
RT LD TPC GD Detected
Class IDRS MTPC IDRS MTPC IDRS MTPC IDRS MTPC I II III
Normal 41 44 24 35 5 7 50 48 7 0 0
I 113 174 52 92 33 12 342 404 59 4 1
II 42 66 15 14 6 14 88 60 35 15 1
III 164 193 108 145 25 44 121 219 88 74 82
LD immediately (higher LD). The RDM in the IDRS managed to effectively clas-
sify the interference as shown in class I, II, and III in Table 5.3. As a result, the total
number of responses performed by IDRS is significantly less than the MTPC. As a
result, IDRS consumes less energy as a lower number of transmissions is required
to deliver a packet successfully compare to NST, MRP and MTPC.
Table 5.4 and 5.5 also shows that the performance (PDR and TO) of IDRS is
both statistically and scientifically significant different (in bold) from the other
three protocols. Hence, the use of RDA to classify the radio signal noise pattern
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Figure 5.13: Transmission Overhead generated by different routing protocols for
different interference classes of interferences.
has not only allowed the system to response accurately with minimal transmis-
sion overhead, but has also maintained a higher PDR.
Table 5.4: p-values (Rank sum test) to determine statistical significance of the
performance between the routing protocols for the PDR and TO (Bold highlights
significance value p < 0.05)
Protocols NST:MRP MRP:MTPC MRP:IDRS MPTC:IDRS
Packet Delivery Rate (%)
Normal 3.2011e-06 0.69072 1.00000 0.95004
Class I 8.3800e-05 0.00029 0.02595 0.00071
Class II 3.2994e-06 8.5659e-05 0.00102 0.80234
Class III 3.5431e-05 3.2581e-06 3.2994e-06 0.02223
Transmission Overhead
Normal 0.001941 0.129261 0.005451 4.8774e-06
Class I 2.9279e-06 2.8064e-05 2.9279e-06 5.7810e-06
Class II 3.3495e-06 8.5503e-05 3.1688e-06 9.1032e-05
Class III 2.9430e-06 3.1688e-06 3.0973e-06 3.2173e-06
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Table 5.5: Vargha-delaney test to determine scientific significance of the perfor-
mance between the routing protocols for PDR and TO. The A-values are com-
puted (Bold highlights significance value)
Protocols NST:MRP MRP:MTPC MRP:IDRS MPTC:IDRS
Packet Delivery Rate (%)
Normal 0.00000 0.54444 0.50000 0.49111
Class I 0.07778 0.11111 0.26000 0.86444
Class II 0.00000 0.07778 0.14667 0.47111
Class III 0.05778 0.00000 0.00000 0.74667
Transmission Overhead
Normal 0.83333 0.66222 0.79778 0.98222
Class I 1.00000 0.94889 1.00000 0.98667
Class II 1.00000 0.92222 1.00000 0.92000
Class III 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
Computation and Memory Footprint
To measure the computation and memory footprint of IDRS, MRP, NST and AODV,
we capture the number of CPU clock cycles required to send 50 packets using the
Contiki’s Cooja Simulator. Using the same Tiny-OS binary for the hardware, the
number of CPU clock cycles processed by node 7 of Figure 5.1 is measured from
the simulator. The statistics of the number of CPU clock cycles from 20 runs are
given in Table 5.6 together with the memory footprint obtained during compila-
tion.
Table 5.6: The memory footprint (in Byte) required for MRP and IDRS in a TelosB
mote and the processor computational (Number of cycles) collected from a Con-
tiki’s Cooja Simulations
Overhead IDRS MRP NST AODV
RAM (KBytes) 5.12 4.01 4.00 3.99
ROM (KBytes) 34.33 32.20 32.04 31.66
Number of CPU Clock Cycle 61.7 0 58.08 59.17 54.69
(MCycles)
From Table 5.6, the IDRS has the highest number of CPU clock cycles than
the other routing protocols. The number of CPU clock cycles required to exe-
cute IDRS is 4.28% higher than MRP. However, the differences between them
are not significant (p-value=0.056 a=0.3). The statistical test also shows no dif-
ference in the number of CPU clock cycles to send 50 packets between single
mode (NST) and multi-mode (MRP) (p=value=0.21, a-value=0.385). The number
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of CPU clock cycles utilises by MRP is 5.5% higher than AODV (p-value=0.0296
and a-value=0.30). However, Raghunathan et al. (2002) highlighted that the en-
ergy consumption required for processing is 70% less than communication. As
a result, the increase in the processor footprint in the multimode routing is ac-
ceptable as the number of communications required for routing is reduced sig-
nificantly, indirectly reducing the energy consumption in the nodes. The code
and storage size required for the implementation of MRP and IDRS can fit in the
existing mote.
Simulation Setup:
In order to test the scalability of the IDRS, the IDRS1 is implemented and tested in
NS-2 simulation and compare it against AODV, NST and MRP. MTPC is not eval-
uated in simulation because NS-2.34 does not support dynamic power control.
To simulate the IDRS, the interferences experienced in the real networks need to
be implemented in NS-2. Using the RSSI traces captured in the hardware exper-
iment, these traces are preprocessed and transformed into a series of on and off
patterns according to the values of RSSI (above -87dB is off, otherwise on). These
on and off patterns will be used by the node to generate the failure. 50 different
failures patterns for each class, each stored in a file are generated. Each of these
files will be randomly selected by NS-2 to generate the failures observed by each
node. In order for RDA to perform the diagnosis during failure, it is necessary to
generate 100 sets of raw RSSI pattern for each interference class and store them
separately in a file. These RSSI traces will also be randomly selected by the simu-
lator during each failure detected by the MRP.
Two sets of networks are deployed. The first one is a small scale network
based on the controlled hardware deployment of 6 nodes that mirrors the hard-
ware experiment and its configurations defined in Section 5.4.2. In the second
experiment, we employ the 51 nodes indoor deployment of Figure 4.3 of Section
4.3.2 to evaluate the IDRS in a larger network. To generate the failure for the sec-
ond experiment, each node 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 will turn itself on and off
according to the on-off pattern observed from the randomly selected failure file
and node 0, 1 ,2 and 3 will transmit periodically every 0.2s. As it is faster and
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Simulation Result:
The four performance metrics defined in Section 3.1.5 are used to evaluate the
results generated by NS-2.34 simulator. Figures 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 show the
performance of the routing protocol induced with different interferences. The
overall results have shown that the performance of the IDRS is not affected by
the size of the network as shown by the PDR (Figure 5.14) of the small controlled
network and large indoor network. However, the communication overhead gen-
erated by IDRS is significantly less than MRP, NST and AODV in both small and
large networks (Figure 5.15) when induced with a Class III interference compared
to Class I and II interferences (Medium A-value > 0.67). The effect on Class I in-
terference on the routing protocols produced in simulation is not significant as
shown by both the p (> 0.05) and A-value (< 0.73 or > 0.27 ) in Table 5.7. The
boxplot also shows different trends between the hardware and simulations.
In the small controlled environment, the PDR of both MRP and IDRS is sig-
nificantly higher than NST and AODV (above 90%) in Figure 5.14(a). Although
there are no differences between the PDR for IDRS and MRP, significantly lower
routing overhead is observed for IDRS in Figure 5.15(a) for Class III interference
with the p-value ≤ 0.01 in Table 5.7 with scientifically significance A-value. Each
time the RDA detects the class III interference, the MRP is alerted. As a result,
local repair is avoided; the amount of routing overhead and energy consumption
are lowered. Although there is no significant difference in the energy consump-
tion in ENG column of Table 5.7 between the MRP and IDRS, the highest energy
consumed by IDRS during Class III interference is 10% less as shown in Figure
5.16. The time to deliver the packet in IDRS is also significantly small compared
to NST and AODV. This reduces the MTTR in Equation 5.1 and increases the
availability.
In the large indoor environment, more packets have been delivered by IDRS
than AODV in class II and III interference with p-value < 0.001 and A-value <
0.3. The variability of PDR observed in IDRS is significantly larger than the other
three protocols as shown in Figure 5.14(b). This is due to the time varying be-
haviour, and the flexibility and different options available in IDRS to switch be-
tween different routing protocols and respond to the failure over a periods of
time. Some responses produce high PDR and less routing overhead as shown in
Figure 5.15(b). While in other case, the response gives the same minimum PDR as
the other routing protocol. Similar to the control environment, the routing over-
head generated during class III interference is also significantly lower in IDRS
with p-value < 0.006 and A-value < 0.67. Hence, the results from the simulations
have shown that by using the RDA to identify the type of interferences in the
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(b) Simulated PDR for large indoor deployment
Figure 5.14: The Box Whisker plot showing the packet delivery ratio achieved by
the AODV, NST, MRP and IDRS for both small controlled 5.14(a) and large indoor
5.14(b) environments induced with the 3 different interference classes.
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(b) Simulated routing overhead for large indoor deployment
Figure 5.15: The Box Whisker plot showing the routing overhead produced by
the AODV, NST, MRP and IDRS for both small controlled 5.15(a) and large indoor
5.15(b) environments induced with 3 different interference classes.
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(b) Simulated energy utilisation for large indoor deployment
Figure 5.16: The Box Whisker plot showing the percentage of energy consumed
by the AODV, NST, MRP and IDRS for both small controlled 5.16(a) and large
indoor 5.16(b) environments induced with 3 different interference classes.
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(b) Simulated DLY for large indoor deployment
Figure 5.17: The Box Whisker plot showing the average delay for the AODV,
NST, MRP and IDRS during interference in both small controlled 5.17(a) and large
indoor 5.17(b) environments.
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Table 5.7: Significance test for AODV, NST and MRP against IDRS for the perfor-
mance metrics PDR, ENG, RT and DLY in both small controlled and large indoor
deployments. (Bold indicates 95% significance with p-value < 0.05 test and A-
value > 0.73 or < 0.27 indicate large effect size.)
Interference Protocols PDR ENG RT DLY
Class Controlled p-value
AODV/IDRS 1.16E-014 2.27E-010 1.60E-010 4.73E-007
3 NST/IDRS 0.00011 2.52E-011 6.93E-009 0.00005
MRP/IDRS 0.44260 0.38965 0.01303 0.52409
AODV/IDRS 1.03E-010 2.85E-008 0.00022 0.33348
2 NST/IDRS 0.00046 0.00085 0.01533 0.56283
MRP/IDRS 0.03661 0.35647 0.09556 0.18960
AODV/IDRS 2.25E-012 5.60E-009 6.14E-010 0.00229
1 NST/IDRS 0.02333 0.00080 0.00046 6.10E-005
MRP/IDRS 0.80845 0.48434 0.41850 0.91627
Class Controlled A-value
AODV/IDRS 0.01677 0.10254 0.90070 0.81575
3 NST/IDRS 0.26647 0.09763 0.84926 0.74397
MRP/IDRS 0.45036 0.44438 0.66000 0.54127
AODV/IDRS 0.08424 0.14100 0.73913 0.56280
2 NST/IDRS 0.30568 0.31433 0.65262 0.54437
MRP/IDRS 0.39933 0.46843 0.62371 0.60248
AODV/IDRS 0.01435 0.09649 0.92823 0.71132
1 NST/IDRS 0.35610 0.28723 0.72228 0.75420
MRP/IDRS 0.48421 0.45497 0.55205 0.50702
Class Indoor p-Value
AODV/IDRS 0.00020 0.00289 5.08E-0111 1.12E-005
3 NST/IDRS 0.69946 0.01819 0.00795 0.07263
MRP/IDRS 0.78175 0.27509 0.00641 0.00013
AODV/IDRS 0.00110 0.00298 0.02827 0.85274
2 NST/IDRS 0.06638 0.30164 0.28315 0.29045
MRP/IDRS 0.10740 0.24193 0.51853 0.82123
AODV/IDRS 0.12441 0.08768 0.03204 0.27316
1 NST/IDRS 0.93739 0.64211 0.90832 0.25942
MRP/IDRS 0.97907 0.74046 0.91700 0.01045
Class Indoor A-value
AODV/IDRS 0.25466 0.30129 0.90387 0.78623
3 NST/IDRS 0.47339 0.33999 0.67923 0.62232
MRP/IDRS 0.51774 0.43071 0.67073 0.73614
AODV/IDRS 0.30121 0.32077 0.63333 0.48841
2 NST/IDRS 0.38741 0.43654 0.56593 0.43506
MRP/IDRS 0.40123 0.42815 0.53975 0.48593
AODV/IDRS 0.40903 0.39861 0.62723 0.56513
1 NST/IDRS 0.49504 0.47163 0.51820 0.57849
MRP/IDRS 0.49823 0.48005 0.50643 0.65270
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environment, the reliability and availability of the MRP can be improved signif-
icantly even when the network size is increased from 6 to 51 nodes. From our
results, the IDRS is scalable.
5.4.3 Discussion
Although the results from both the simulation and hardware experiments are not
the same, the results from hardware experiments have shown that the proposed
IDRS has improved the PDR and reduced the number of transmission. With the
ability to determine the type of interference using the RDA, the appropriate re-
sponse can be taken to rectify the failure. To evaluate the scalability of the IDRS,
a large network of 51 nodes has been simulated using NS-2.34. The p-value and
A-value computed from the simulated results have shown that the performance
observed in IDRS is not always significantly better than AODV, NST and MRP
when the network scales. However, the maximum energy utilisation and routing
overhead generated by IDRS are lower as shown in the boxplot. As a future work,
further investigation is required to analyse and tune the RDA to improve the de-
tection and identification of the failures. The validity of the NS-2.34 simulator
used to model the interference and evaluate the IDRS needs to be verified.
The plots in Figure 5.12 (PDR for Hardware) and 5.14(a) (PDR for Simulation)
also demonstrated that the shape of the graphs are not the same. Although the
simulation has been designed based on the hardware scenario and the failures are
generated using the RSSI patterns collected from the motes, the results between
hardware and software observed are not the same. We believe the dissimilarity
may be caused by the error introduced the experiment. A systematic evaluation
may be required to improve to improve the confidence between the hardware
and software results.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an immune-inspired detection and recovery
system called the IDRS. In the RDM, we have extended the RDA to diagnose dif-
ferent types of interferences. Our hardware experimental results have demon-
strated that RDA can effectively classify the interference based on the RSSI val-
ues. Working together with the MRP, an effective response to network anomalies
due to interference can be executed. The results in hardware sensor motes show
that the IDRS can improve the PDR with Class I and III interference without gen-
erating excessive communication overhead. It can detect anomalies that affecting
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the motes radio. As the signature of normal RSSI can be easily regenerated as
required, the IDRS can be made to adapt to its changing environment. How-
ever, the hardware results are collected using a small network topology that may
not model the real world and the IDRS results obtained from trace-based sim-
ulation have shown insignificant improvement on the performance. Additional
works are required to validate the trace-based features implemented in NS-2.34
as a future work. Both the hardware and software also did not exhibit the same
distribution. In order to reduce the gap between the hardware and software re-





Using Statistical Approach to
Demonstrate Dependability
In this chapter we are concerned with results that are generated via both simula-
tor and experimental measurements. The results generated from multiple mea-
surements can be subject to error. It is necessary to reduce the error by apply-
ing statistical analysis to summarise those observations and quantifies the un-
certainty in the measured variable. We present the Systematic Protocol Evalua-
tion Techniques (SPET), a comprehensive statistical approach for performing and
evaluating the performance of a routing protocol to a level of confidence required.
It utilises a combination of hardware and simulator, where the hardware acts a
protocol conformation tool to ensure that the results are close to the real world
deployments and the simulator allows us to perform extensive testing on the pro-
tocol.
The motivation for the work is introduced in Section 6.1. To improve the con-
fidence of the results observed, the SPET is proposed in Section 6.2. A case study
is presented in Section 6.3 to evaluate the benefit of SPET against the current state
of the art approach followed by a discussion on the results from the case study.
This chapter ends with a summary in Section 6.4.
6.1 Motivation
In Chapter 3, we have formulated a systematic evaluation methodology to eval-
uate the routing protocols proposed in this thesis. Existing state of the art tech-
niques including the simulation and real hardware deployments have been ap-
plied to assess the dependability of the protocol. However, results from Chapter 5
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have shown dissimilarity between the results obtained from simulator and hard-
ware. These experimental techniques applied are susceptible to uncertainty that
may make the outcome invalid and undependable. As a result, there is a need to
reduce the uncertainties. There are two types of uncertainty namely: aleatory un-
certainty and epistemic uncertainty (Helton, 1997). Epistemic uncertainty arises
from the incompleteness and lack of knowledge of the system components of
the sensor network where aleatory uncertainty occurs due to the random be-
haviour of the networks which changes with respect to time and its environment.
Aleatory uncertainty may not produce the same result even with the same ex-
periments calling for a more systematic approach to reduce this uncertainty. The
issue of establishing confidence and minimising uncertainty in the results pro-
duced by these experiments has been widely ignored and the use of scientific
empirical approach to reduce epistemic uncertainty is limited in WSNs. This ob-
jective of the chapter is to investigate the application of statistical techniques to
reduce these uncertainties and provide the confidence of the results to address
the research question:
Can the dependability of network protocols be demonstrated by reducing the
experimental uncertainty using state of the art statistical techniques?
6.2 Scientific Protocol Evaluation Technique
It can be very difficult to validate the reliability of the WSN’s routing protocol
even with repeated simulation because of the stochastic nature of the simulator.
With simulation, more testing can be performed but the evidence from simula-
tion is not always sufficiently realistic to be classed as valid (Zhao, 2005; Wu et al.,
2010b). Even with the availability of real hardware to verify the simulator, it can
be difficult to perform sufficient tests on real hardware to collect sufficient data in
order to minimise the uncertainty and achieve the confidence required to show
that a routing protocol can achieve the desired level of reliability. In order to over-
come these problems, we develop a scientific approach, using statistical tools, to
evaluate the routing protocol reliability in WSNs and cross validate the results
acquired from the simulation against hardware experiments. The approach is
known as SPET. Figure 6.1 shows the stage of the evaluation process, where each
stage will be elaborated in the following subsection.
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(A) Defining the Scope
- Establish the dependability claims
- Formalise the hypothesis
- State any assumption
(B) Design of Experiment
- Real Scenario
- Large Test Cases





- Compilation of Results
- Graphical representation
(E) Statistical Analysis























Figure 6.1: SPET consists of three parts: (I) define a set of dependability claims
based on a specific problem domain. (II) specifies the design space of the exper-
iment and the sample size required. (III) provides the evidence to support the
dependability claims.
6.2.1 Defining the Scope
Before any experiment is carried out, we need to determine what we are trying to
show by conducting this experiment. The reliability threshold for dependability
needs to be defined according to the application requirements and the experimen-
tal boundary needs to be set to allow us to focus on the problem we are trying to
solve. This can be done by stating the dependability claims that form the objec-
tive of the experiment. This will allow us to formulate the hypotheses focusing
on the specific question to be answer. A hypothesis test can then be applied to de-
termine if new data confirms or rejects the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis
usually assumes no performance differences between the two samples. The alter-
nate hypothesis assumes there is a change in the value between the two samples.
By applying the correct statistical test, the outcome of the hypothesis test will al-
low us to either confirm or reject the null hypothesis. Any assumption made with
regard to the experiment need to be highlighted. This step will demonstrate the
empirical validity of dependency and the correctness of our approach.
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6.2.2 Design of Experiment
This is an important phase to ensure the experiment is credible and empirically
valid. There is a need to obtain realistic data that represent the true operational
envelop of the system, to be used in the statistical test, to ensure the validity of
the test. The accuracy of the data collected highly depends on the experimental
approach used, and details of the experimental design taken and setup have to
be documented and made available for download. Only with this information
can we show that the experiments have been carried out properly with minimal
error and unbiased (Kurkowski et al., 2005). Such information also allows other
researchers to repeat the experiments and generate the similar set of data for com-
parison.
6.2.3 Uncertainty Analysis
In order to minimise the aleatory uncertainty in an experiment, it is necessary to
acquire sufficient number of results by repeating the experiments n times. This is
usually not shown or performed in existing WSNs experiments as it can be a diffi-
cult and time consuming task to perform. n can only be determined by repeating
the experiment until a desired level of confidence is achieved. In SPET, this level
of confidence is achieved statistically by comparing the effect size between first
n result samples against the next n results samples acquired from the experiment
using the same set of parameters. This process in SPET is known as sufficiency
test. To perform the comparison, we apply the approach proposed by Read et al.
(2011) and use the Vargha-Delaney A-test (Vargha and Delaney, 2000) to measure
the effect size (differences) between the two samples. A-test gives an A-value in
the range [0, 1] to measure the differences. The A-test result will exhibit a no effect
size (A=0.5) when a sufficient number of result samples n is obtained.
6.2.4 Graphical Analysis
At this phase of the experiment, the simulation results are interpreted and pre-
sented. To ensure that the protocols are performing as expected, rigorous per-
formance analysis using statistical methods and interpretation of the results are
required. It is common in many works to report the mean of a number of runs,
and in some cases with 95% CI error bar. The benefit of using the CI error bar
is that we can determine whether the difference between the mean values is sig-
nificant when the CI error bar do not overlap. However, when the CI overlap,
the means may or may not be statistical significance. In order to assess statistical
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significance, the sample size as well as variability has to be taken into account.
Therefore, by analysing the error bars does not always allow us to determine
whether the difference is statistically significant. The use of such statistics also
relies on an underlying assumption that the results follow a normal distribution.
Therefore, a safer alternative is to assume results do not have a normal distribu-
tion and employ non-parametric statistics (Helton, 2008).
Non-parametric techniques are suitable for use on data that is normal and
non-normally distributed, and therefore in many cases more appropriate. Graph-
ical representations such as scatter plots and box plots can identify unusual ob-
servations in the data that may be considered as outliers. These outliers need to
be identified and analysed to minimise the likelihood of statistical error. In SPET,
the box-whisker plot is used to analyse the results. The boxplot is suitable to anal-
yse the uncertainties instead of error bar as critical information may be omitted
during the calculation of means and deviation (Helton, 2008).
6.2.5 Statistical Analysis
In this section, a statistical approach is used to analyse the significance and con-
fidence of the experimental results that will help to determine the validity of the
dependability claims (hypotheses) formulated earlier and answer the following
questions:
• What is the probability that the results are different?
• If it is different, is it significant?
Using the two statistical tools introduced in Section 3.1.6 of Chapter 3 namely
statistical significance test and scientifically significance test, a Conceptual Statis-
tical Test Framework (CSTF) in Figure 6.2 is proposed to analyse and verify the
improvement observed are significant and have scientific values using the results
generated from hardware and simulator.
The processes of CSTF are described as follows where Step 1, 2, 3 correspond
to the labels (1, 2, 3) in the Figure 6.2.
Step 1: Statistical Significance Tests: To determine whether there is any differences
in the results produced from hardware and software.
1. Presents the results from two sets of experiment from the hardware
and simulation to a non-parametric statistical test (Wilcoxon test) to
compute the p-value.
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Figure 6.2: Conceptual Statistical Test Framework applies non-parametric tests
to compare the distributions of the results obtained from the experiments and
simulations
2. Apply the null hypothesis H0(1) to perform the hypothesis test. The
H0(1) states that there is no difference between the two results.
3. Using a pre-determined confidence level of X%,H0(1) can be rejected if
the computed p-value <= α, indicating that our results are statistically
significant. An α value of 0.05 is typically used, corresponding to a
95% confidence levels (Wilcoxon, 1945).
Step 2: Scientific Significance Tests: To determine the degree of differences in the
results generated from hardware as well as from simulation.
1. Repeat Step 1 by using the same set of results to a non-parametric sci-
entific significance test (Vargha-Delaney test) to determine the A-value.
2. Using the test statistic calculated from previous Wilcoxon test in Step 1,
compute the A-value to measure the effect size between the two sam-
ples. The effect size is a measure of the strength of a phenomenon or
the degree of differences (Vargha and Delaney, 2000).
3. If the A-value is < 0.27 or > 0.73, the difference between the two sam-
ples has a large effect size (large different) and is scientifically signifi-
cant.
Step 3: Goodness of Fitness Tests: To determine whether the simulated results is a
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good representation of the real hardware.
1. Take two sets of results, one each from hardware and software, and
apply a goodness of fitness test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test) to
measure their discrepancy and to deduce the similarity between the
results. The KS test is a non-parametric test used to determine whether
two samples are drawn from the same distribution, by quantifying the
distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples.
2. Compute the p-value.
3. Apply the null hypothesis H0(3) for the KS test to accept or reject the
hypothesis. TheH0(3) states that the samples are drawn from the same
distribution and we can reject H0(3) if the p-value <= 0.05 at 95% con-
fidence levels.
6.2.6 Measuring the Effectiveness of the WSN’s Evaluation
In order to demonstrate a dependability routing, we propose the use of the 3Cs
approach commonly applied in requirement engineering to check the Correct-
ness, Consistency, and Completeness (3Cs) of the evaluation approach proposed
by Zowghi and Gervasi (2003). They have defined correctness as the ability to
achieve completeness and consistency as well the ability to achieve the desired
goal. In addition, we also consider the fourth C, Cost-effectiveness. For this sec-
tion, we will define and discuss how these terms are used in this chapter:
• Correctness: The ability to achieve consistency and completeness in our test re-
sults
The main challenge in designing experiments is to determine the total num-
ber of runs and consequently decrease the required time and cost while
achieving its correctness. Zowghi and Gervasi (2003) define correctness as
the satisfaction of achieving the specification of the test requirements. Sta-
tistical analysis allows us to inspect the data and extracts all the important
details, taking into consideration the variability and measurement error that
occurs during the experiment. It allows us to establish the confidence level
of the test results and the correctness of the resultsin achieving the goals.
It can help to prevent any unjustified claims about the effect of an algo-
rithm. It is possible for an effect to be statistically significant, but of little
or no scientific value (Vargha and Delaney, 2000). Hence, extensive statisti-
cal tests should be applied to the outputs in order to show the experiments
are performed correctly and the magnitude of any significant effects must
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be reported to indicate its precision with respect to its respective statistical
values.
• Consistency: The outcome of the tests does not contradicts each other under simi-
lar test conditions
Sensor networks can exhibit different behaviours across space, time and
scale affecting the results acquired. The results obtained from an experi-
ment may differ from another as it is exposed to the aleatory uncertainty.
Aleatory uncertainty arises due to the stochastic nature of the system and
can occur not only simulation (Mal-Sarkar et al., 2009), but also in real
WSNs. This is mainly due to the pseudo-random number generator in the
simulator or the non-deterministic behaviour of the sensor hardware, that
can affect the output even if the same set of input parameters and exper-
iment configurations are applied (Pawlikowski et al., 2002). Hence, it is
necessary to perform uncertainty analysis by repeating the experiment suf-
ficiently in both hardware and simulation to reduce the impact of aleatory
uncertainty and to achieve consistency and sufficient level of confidence
that is a representative of the prognostic results. By repeating the experi-
ment allows us to determine and show consistency in the result.
• Completeness: The test entails of everything that is required for a test condition
to be true and result provides every aspect of the possible outcomes
A good experiment needs to be performed rigorously and in an unbiased
manner to ensure its validity especially when performed in simulation. The
experimental constraints and controls, such as the network parameters and
scenario, used in the simulation should be consistent and must be set ac-
cording to the aspect of real WSNs being studied to reduce epistemic uncer-
tainty (Di Martino et al., 2012). Information such as realistic environmen-
tal model and application characteristics must be collected from real hard-
ware and applied to the simulation to exercise the protocol under investiga-
tion and reduce the impact of epistemic uncertainty. Any initialisation bias
needs to be addressed, and the experimental input must be randomised and
tested on different scenarios rigorously.
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6.3 Case Study: Evaluating the dependability of MRP
using SPET
In order to explore the benefits of SPET, a case study to investigate the depend-
ability of MRP against AODV and NST is conducted in this section. In order to
demonstrate that the MRP can achieve the required dependability and its perfor-
mance is significantly better than AODV and NST, we apply the SPET to perform
the comparison and analyse the results collected from the simulation and hard-
ware experiment.
6.3.1 Defining the Objectives
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of MRP against AODV and NST.
In order to evaluate the dependability of MRP, we define the three main objectives
(Dependability claims) of the experiments as:
• Objective E-1: to demonstrate that MRP can achieve the desired network
reliability (90%) for different test cases compare to NST and AODV.
• Objective E-2: to demonstrate that MRP does not consume more resources
than AODV and NST and is more efficient to reach the reliability target.
• Objective E-3: to demonstrate that the simulation results obtained are a
valid representation of the real WSN.
In order to perform the test to achieve these objectives, we formalise a set of
hypotheses as:
Null Hypothesis 1 (H0(1)): There is no difference in the number of packets
delivered by MRP, AODV and NST.
Null Hypothesis 2 (H0(2)): There is no difference in the number of routing
packets generated by MRP, AODV and NST to deliver a packet.
Null Hypothesis 3 (H0(3)): There is no difference in the PDR and routing
overhead (RO) between the simulation and the real hardware implementa-
tion.
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6.3.2 Experimental Setup
TelosB Experimental Setup
In the hardware experiment, we have set up a network as shown in Figure 6.3
using six TelosB motes. We have developed a test application (included in the
MRP source code1 to collect traffic measurements require for the comparison of
those routing protocols. Each node is placed in a position of 0.5 metres from the
other node so that it can only communicate with its immediate neighbours. The
transmission power in each node is also set to a range of about 0.75 metres to
avoid any interference from other non-neighbouring nodes. Channel 26 is used
to avoid any interference with other WLAN operating in the same band. An
acknowledgement for each packet is enabled for link layer notification operation.
Figure 6.3: TelosB network setup using a small network for a better control of the
experiment environment
In the experiment, Node 1 is configured to generate packet streams periodi-
cally and transmit the packet to base station (node 6) every 250ms via the inter-
mediate nodes using the multihop routing protocol. Each experiment is run for
15 minutes (3600 packets generated) due to the storage limitation of the node to
collect the statistics. Each packet includes the node id and a sequence number,
which is incremented every transmission cycle and each packet is time-stamped.
The network statistics, including number of packet sent, received, and the num-
ber of routing packet sent and received, are collected by individual node and
stored in its on-board flash memory. These statistics are later retrieved from the
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NS-2.34 Simulation Setup
In order to validate the hardware against simulation, extensive simulations are
performed on NS2. In Chapter 4, we have evaluated MRP and have achieved
better performance on a larger network. For this simulation, we have designed a
controlled experiment based on 6 static nodes that mirror the real world deploy-
ment in Figure 6.3. CBR traffic is used, in which node 1 is configured to transmit
to node 6 at every 250ms (similar to the hardware experimental setup).
Number of Runs
Due to the stochastic nature of the experiment, we perform the sufficiency test
described in Section 6.2.3. Based on the technique proposed in Read et al. (2011),
we have repeated the experiments N times and compute the A-value until the
A-value is >0.45 and < 0.56. This should ensure that we have collected enough
samples for our experiments. From the results of the test shown in Figure 6.4,
we have found out that the number of runs required for simulation is 35 while in
hardware it is 15. Compare these numbers with the number of runs used by the
experiments in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, all the repeated runs are above the minimum
number of runs required. We have performed 50 runs in simulation and 15 runs
in hardware.
Test Scenario
To investigate how irregular failure can affect the behaviour of the routing pro-
tocol and the overall network performance, transient failures are injected to the
network based on arbitrary failure patterns with varying duration and frequency
to mimic the real environments. We apply the ON/OFF approach presented in
Chapter 3 by configuring an active node along the route not to respond during
the MAC layer two-ways handshaking. These failures are only injected into the
network after the initialisation period (10 seconds) required for the network to
stabilise and to establish the initial route.
Evaluation Metrics
Choosing the right metrics is crucial to assess the performance accurately. The
two metrics proposed in Section 3.1.5 are selected as the input for the statistical
tests to evaluate the statistical validity of the experiment. These metrics can be
used to represent the reliability and efficiency of the protocol.
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(a) Simulation: The A-value shows that a sample of at least 35 runs is required to bring the level


























(b) Hardware: The A-value shows that a sample of at least 15 runs is required to bring the level of
aleatory uncertainty within the small effect region
Figure 6.4: The A-values for different sample sizes (Number of repeated runs)
from two set of experimental results: Simulation (a) and Hardware (b). In this
test, the three effect size boundaries for the A test is indicated. We are interested
within the small effect region where its represent there is no significant different
between the samples.
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• Reliability: PDR is used to measure the network reliability and is repre-
sented as the percentage of the number successful packet received Pr to the







• Efficiency: The efficiency of the network, in term of the energy consump-
tion, is usually represented by the number of routing packet required to
transmit a data packet. It is calculated by normalising the sum of the total
number of routing packets send to the total data packet received. A low





Total Data Packet Received
6.3.3 Results Analysis
The results obtained from both simulation and hardware are presented and anal-
ysed in this section.
Reliability
One important performance metric used to measure reliability of a routing pro-
tocol is the success rate of packet delivery. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 represent the
median and the mean of the measured PDRs computed from the hardware and
simulation results at five different failure durations: no failure, 0.25s, 1s, 2s, and
5s. In order to analyse the effect of the sample sizes on the computed results, 5,
10, 15 samples from hardware, and 5, 15, 35 from simulation are plotted.
• Hardware Result: By examining the boxplot, the performance variability be-
tween the three protocols can be easily understood compared to using the
mean and error bar. We also observe the MRP has a higher reliability in
delivering the packets than NST and AODV by looking at the median and
IQR which is higher and narrow for MRP. MRP has achieved the 90% reli-
ability target of the experiments. During normal network condition, about
3% data packets were dropped in AODV and 1% in NST due to random
errors between the motes through collisions caused by initial RD. When the
radios of node 4 and 5 were turned off at regular intervals (0.25s, 1s and
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(b) PDR taken from 5, 15, 35 NS2 simulation runs
Figure 6.5: The Box Whisker plot showing Median (Black bar) , Inter-quartile
range (Region inside the box), Max and Min values within the 1.5 IQR (Whisker)
and Outliers (Dotted point) of the PDR for different sample sizes collected from
TelosB hardware experiment (a) and from NS2 simulation. (b), with different
failure durations.
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(b) PDR taken from 5, 15, 35 NS2 simulation runs
Figure 6.6: The Mean-Error plot showing the Mean (Circle), and 95% CI (Error
Bar) of the PDR for different sample sizes collected from TelosB hardware exper-
iment (a) and from NS2 simulation (b), with different failure durations.
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2s), MRP has achieved above 90% PDR compared to AODV and NST. The
congestion caused by the routing packet in AODV and NST has prevented
other nodes to transmit their data packets successfully. At 5s, the PDRs for
MRP spread around the median of 90% and peaks at 92%. MRP has man-
aged to achieve less than 10% packet loss compared to 20% in AODV, and
11% in NST as shown in Figure 6.5(a). Although we can see that the mean
of MRP is higher than NST in most cases, we may not be able to determine
whether there is a significant difference in performance between MRP and
NST at 5s and 0.25s as they have overlapping CI. It is necessary to perform
statistical additional tests to computer the p and A-values . From the results
of these tests, we can then deduce that the performance between the three
routing protocol is significant with the p-value < 0.05 test and A-value >
0.73.
Table 6.1: p and A values for Hardware Experiment (Bold highlights significance
value)
Failure Routing PDR
Duration Protocols p-value A-value
MRP/AODV 2.643347e-05 0.9
Normal MRP/NST 8.337457e-06 0.9333333
NST/AODV 0.8347418 0.5244444
MRP/AODV 0.0002479539 0.8933333
0.25 sec MRP/NST 0.03145654 0.7311111
NST/AODV 0.1294403 0.6644444
MRP/AODV 2.432901e-06 1
1 MRP/NST 2.432901e-06 1
NST/AODV1 0.4476234 0.5822222
MRP/AODV 2.52458e-06 1
2 sec MRP/NST 3.39453e-05 0.9422222
NST/AODV 0.005221419 0.8
MRP/AODV 2.996304e-06 1
5 sec MRP/NST 0.03036426 0.7333333
NST/AODV 4.204401e-05 0.9377778
• Simulation Result: Figure 6.5(b) shows the box-whisker plot of PDR ob-
tained NS-2 simulations. During normal operation, when no fault was in-
jected to the networks, all the three protocols have achieved 100% PDR.
When faults were injected into the network, by turning off an active node
along the two possible paths, 5% packet loss were observed in AODV due
to the unavailability of the next hop neighbour. These numbers kept on
increasing as we gradually increased the duration of failure in all the three
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routing protocols. With the RSM in MRP, it have achieved above 90% packet
received compare to 80% in AODV and 87% in NST. In terms of perfor-
mance improvement, this is over 10% in AODV and 5% in NST at 5s. The
same improvement can be observed from Figure 6.6(a). The non-overlapping
error bar shows that they are significantly different at 95% CI. This is ver-
ified by the small p-values (<<0.05) in Table 6.2. A large effect size (> 0.9
and <0.2) is also observed for all failures. Hence, the reliability achieved by
MRP is both statistically and scientifically significant.
Table 6.2: p and A values for Simulation (Bold highlights significance value)
Failure Routing PDR
Duration Protocols p-value A-value
MRP/AODV 0.3313349 0.5142857
Normal MRP/NST 0.3313349 0.5
NST/AODV 0.3313349 0.4857143
MRP/AODV 2.459434e-13 1
0.25 sec MRP/NST 1.302901e-10 0.9379592
NST/AODV 4.358851e-12 0.02285714
MRP/AODV 3.717241e-13 1
1 MRP/NST 3.916657e-13 1
NST/AODV1 0.9475107 0.495102
MRP/AODV 5.319198e-13 1
2 sec MRP/NST 1.878333e-12 0.9877551
NST/AODV 1.831988e-06 0.1681633
MRP/AODV 5.90433e-13 1
5 sec MRP/NST 4.303105e-10 0.9334694
NST/AODV 0.0496135 0.3632653
• Comparing hardware against simulation: We have also tried to validate the
simulator against the hardware using KS goodness of fit test, on the sam-
ples collected from hardware and simulation. As highlighted in Table 6.3,
only some test cases have shown similarity in PDR with p-value > 0.05. We
believe this low number of similarity is caused by random radio noise in
hardware that was not modelled in NS-2. During error-free condition, 1.2%
of the total packets have failed to reach the destination in our hardware
experiments in AODV and NST that was not observed in NS-2. The real
sensor motes are sensitive to communication failures that can be tolerated
by MRP.
• Discussion: From Figure 6.5 and 6.6, it is necessary to repeat the exper-
iment and obtain sufficient samples to achieve an appropriate amount of
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Table 6.3: KS Test p-values (Bold indicates two samples having the same distribu-
tion) for PDR between NS2 and TinyOS using Matlab
Frate Protocols
seconds MRP NST AODV
0 1 0.0001354575 0.0001354575
0.25 0.9250857 6.118046e-07 0.002545268
1 6.118046e-07 0.375211 0.07626242
2 0.0001354575 0.1813004 0.0006276553
5 4.229108e-06 0.009033161 2.558461e-05
variability in the result. This process is usually ignored in most papers that
were reviewed. Using graphical approaches within our method (SPET), we
have shown that MRP can achieve above 90% reliability at 95% confidence
level with minimal number of test and unit time. The statistical analysis be-
tween MRP and NST, and MRP and AODV has shown that the difference in
performance improvement is both scientifically and statistically significant.
Hence, the null hypothesisH0(1) can be rejected. Although similar trends in
reliability improvement are observed in both the hardware and simulation,
results from the KS test have shown that the PDR between the hardware
and simulation is statistically different.
Efficiency
In WSNs, additional routing packets are required to establish a route to a desti-
nation when a link is unavailable. These additional packets are known to create
additional overhead in the network and reduce the available of the network. It
can cause the network to be unavailable for data packet transmission, and in-
crease the energy consumption in the node due to additional transmission. In
order to compare the energy efficiency of the routing protocol, we have analysed
the RO between the three routing algorithms using box-whisker plot as shown in
Figure 6.7 for different sample sizes with different failure duration. To compare
the benefit of SPET, the mean and error plot for the RO is also provided in Figure
6.8.
• Hardware Result: When we increased the radio failure duration in the active
node from 0.25 to 5 seconds, the RO also increased in AODV and NST. This
overhead is significantly less in MRP between 0 to 2 second failure intervals
as shown in Figure 6.7(a). The switching mechanism in MRP can abort RD
and switch immediately to RT when the next hop neighbour is available for
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(b) Routing Overhead from NS2 Simulation
Figure 6.7: The Box Whisker plot showing the Median (Black bar) , Inter-quartile
range (Region inside the box), Max and Min values within the 1.5 IQR (Whisker)
and Outliers (Dotted point) of RO taken from different sample sizes collected
from TelosB hardware experiment (a) and from NS2 simulation. (b), with differ-
ent failure durations.
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(b) Routing overhead from NS2 Simulation
Figure 6.8: The Mean-Error plot showing the Mean (Circle), and 95% CI (Error
Bar) of the RO for different sample sizes collected from TelosB hardware experi-
ment (a) and from NS2 simulation (b), with different failure durations.
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communication making it capable to operate more efficiently during tran-
sient random error. The RO for MRP gradually increases with failure du-
ration until it reaches above 220 at 5 seconds, where this value is close to
the RO of AODV. However, the difference between AODV and MRP cannot
be observed with only 5 samples. Additional n runs (where n=15) are re-
quired, that was determined statistically in SPET. From the mean error plot,
the significant difference between AODV and MRP cannot be determined
as the error bar in Figure 6.8 overlap at 5s for 15 samples. This can only be
determined using statistical tests. Table 6.4 shows that the differences are
scientifically significant as represented by the A-value in bold.
Table 6.4: p and A values for Hardware Experiment (Bold highlights signicance
value)
Failure Routing Routing Overhead
Duration Protocols p-value A-value
MRP/AODV 6.264758e-07 0
Normal MRP/NST 76.326979e-07 0
NST/AODV 0.01946062 0.2488889
MRP/AODV 7.840888e-05 0.07555556
0.25 sec MRP/NST 9.558141e-05 0.08
NST/AODV 0.318427 0.3911111
MRP/AODV 2.853591e-06 0
1 MRP/NST 2.667462e-06 0
NST/AODV1 0.4668257 0.4222222
MRP/AODV 3.073756e-06 0
2 sec MRP/NST 3.105197e-06 0
NST/AODV 0.03296333 0.7288889
MRP/AODV 0.03417722 0.2711111
5 sec MRP/NST 0.001204504 0.1511111
NST/AODV 0.5067258 0.5733333
• Simulation Result: The simulated RO is shown in Figure 6.7(b). During nor-
mal condition, each successful packet received requires only 7 routing pack-
ets to be sent on average for all the routing protocols. This number increased
linearly for NST and AODV with failure duration where they peaked at 2
seconds. However, the overhead in MRP is less than AODV and NST as
shown by the mean and median in Figure 6.8(b) and is also statistically sig-
nificant indicated, by a very small p-value (<<0.05) in Table 6.5. Hence,
H0(2) can be rejected.
• Comparing hardware against simulation: By analysing the mean and median
values in Figure 6.7 and 6.8, each failure scenario has shown differences in
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Table 6.5: p and A values for Simulation (Bold highlights significance value)
Failure Routing Routing Overhead
Duration Protocols p-value A-value
MRP/AODV 0.8938737 0.5085714
Normal MRP/NST 0.8518442 0.5118367
NST/AODV 0.9789139 0.5020408
MRP/AODV 2.850978e-13 0
0.25 sec MRP/NST 2.841219e-13 0
NST/AODV 1.056553e-12 0.995102
MRP/AODV 5.712717e-13 0
1 sec MRP/NST 5.565661e-13 0
NST/AODV 0.03690669 0.644898
MRP/AODV 1.221272e-06 0.162449
2 sec MRP/NST 2.722869e-08 0.1134694
NST/AODV 0.312294 0.4293878
MRP/AODV 3.422429e-07 0.1453061
5 sec MRP/NST 1.309193e-05 0.1967347
NST/AODV 0.008807238 0.317551
RO between the hardware and simulator. This is verified using the result
computed by KS Test in Table 6.6 where all the failure scenarios have shown
a small p-values (<<0.05). Hence, we cannot verify that the result produced
by simulator is a valid representation of real hardware.
Table 6.6: KS Test p-values (Bold indicates two samples have the same distribu-
tion) for Routing Overhead between NS2 and TinyOS using Matlab
Frate Protocols
seconds MRP NST AODV
0 6.118046e-07 6.118046e-07 6.118046e-07
0.25 6.118046e-07 4.229108e-06 0.002545268
1 0.002545268 0.002545268 6.118046e-07
2 2.558461e-05 6.118046e-07 6.118046e-07
5 6.118046e-07 1.289345e-08 6.118046e-07
• Discussion: From Figure 6.7 and 6.8, the median and mean of RO in MRP
is smaller than AODV and NST. This difference is both statistically and sci-
entifically significant as shown by the low p-value and high effect value of
A-value. Hence, the results reject H0(2). However, there is no evidence
from the KS-Test to show that the overheads between the simulation and
hardware are similar.
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6.3.4 Discussion: Benefit of SPET
From our results, we have shown that SPET has improved the confidence of the
results observed in a WSN’s experiment by incorporating a comprehensive em-
pirical approach and statistical techniques in the experiments. In order to show
the proposed SPET meets the requirement to demonstrate dependability which
is not covered by existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches, we evaluate the
properties of SPET based on the 4Cs requirement engineering approaches.
• Better assessment of the significance: To show the correctness and confi-
dence level of the results, SPET has evaluated the results and validated the
reliability achieved by one protocol (MRP) is both scientifically and statis-
tically significant using extensive statistical tests as shown in Table 6.1, 6.2,
6.4 and 6.5. As for current SOTA approach applied in WSNs, there are two
limitations: Firstly, the results are reported based on a 95% CI to support
the hypothesis. CI is highly dependent on parameters used in the statistics
such as the sample size. Hence, getting the right sample size is important.
Secondly, hypothesis testing was never performed as the statistical signifi-
cance of the results is always determined by looking at the overlapping of
the CI error bar. However, employing hypothesis testing and appropriate
analysis, we can deduce in Table 6.1 that all the PDR for MRP is statistically
significant as the p-value <0.031 and it has large effect size (with A-value
>0.73). Hence, H0(1), can be rejected. Hence, SPET allows us to demon-
strate the correctness and provide the completeness of the results at 95%
confidence level.
• Better assessment of variability: From our experiments, both the box-whisker
and mean-error plots have shown that MRP has managed to achieve more
the 90% PDR (Objective E-1) at a lower overhead (Objective E-2), which sat-
isfies the dependability requirement defined in 6.3.1. However, the use of
Box-whisker plot to visually analyse our results in Figure 6.5 allows us to
understand the spread and variability of performance in more details such
as the skewness and outlier, than mean-error plot. For example, Figure 6.6
allows us to deduce that the mean PDR for NST from hardware experiment
(5s failure duration) only achieves 87.5%. However, the boxplot from Figure
6.5(a) allows us to further deduce that most of the PDRs observed below the
average value and the difference between the maximum and minimum PDR
is 10%. This information will allow one to determine the best and worst per-
formance of the routing protocol which is not visible from mean-error plot.
Hence, a complete characteristic of the result is obtained.
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• Better approach of dealing with sample size: It is necessary to repeat the
experiments to reduce the aleatory uncertainty in our experiments as in-
sufficient sample size can affect the consistency of the result’s statistics as
shown in Table 6.7. A small sample size (< 15) may give incorrect median
and means (in bold) while an excessive sample size does not provide addi-
tional information. The effect size between the two samples (in italic) is also
affected by the sample size. However, determining the sample size can be
time consuming and challenging. Existing evaluation uses the mean with
95% CI to analyse the result where it is necessary to repeat each experiment
until a small CI is observed and there is no mention of how these number
of runs is determined. Following our method, the sample size can be com-
puted statistically using the results obtained from two similar experiments.
With the use of the required sample size, we can ensure the consistency and
correctness of the statistics computed while minimising the time required
to perform the experiments
Table 6.7: This table presents the frequency (in %) where one protocol is better
than the other (bold indicate < 95% out of 50 runs) as the sample size increases.
For a small sample, the probability for one protocol is better than the other is less
compare to a larger sample. Too large sample may not provide useful information
NST>AODV MRP>NST MRP>AODV
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• Wider selection of test cases: It is necessary to test the routing protocol with
different test cases as incomplete tests may cause the routing protocol to fail
during real deployment as well as affecting the quality of the results. This
is usually defined with respect to the type of environment the networks are
deployed in. However, it is not possible to implement and test all the real
world phenomena that can affect the routing functionality in simulation.
Hence, only test cases based on real WLAN environment has been applied.
Although limited test cases were applied in our experiments, more com-
plete test scenarios (if known) can still be applied in SPET to further reduce
the epistemic uncertainty. SPET helps us to ensure the completeness of the
test conducted.
• Cost-benefit approach: SPET provides a cost-effective and time-efficient
approach for evaluating protocols. SPET applies a hybrid approach and
the KS test to validate the performance of the routing protocol. Using this
approach, it is not necessary to perform a large scale WSNs testing in both
hardware and software in order to obtain sufficient confidence. We only
need to deploy a small network and perform N number of runs in hard-
ware to obtain enough results that will be verified against extensive simu-
lations, that is scalable in size, in order to achieve the required confidence
level. By doing so, the amount of time to perform the experiment will also
be reduced.
For instance, if
Tr = the time taken to run an experiment,
R = Number of random runs,
TC = Number of test cases,
P = Number of protocols to compare,
then the total time requires to run the whole experiment:
Te = N × Tr ×R× TC (6.1)
Therefore, in simulation, the total time taken Tsim=5250s where, P = 3, TC =
5, Tr = 10s, and R = 35. In hardware, the actual time taken Tactual=202,500
seconds, where P = 3, TC = 5, Tr = 900 seconds, R = 15. This implies that our
experiments only took approximately 11 days to complete based on 5 hours
work per day to carry out all the hardware experiments required. More ex-
periments can be performed in simulation as it is faster to run. However,
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if the same number of runs performed in simulation (R=35) is conducted
in hardware, the estimated time will take Tpredict=472500 seconds which
is equivalent to 26.25 days, in which we have reduced the time taken to
approximately half. Hence, with SPET, the experiments can be performed
faster, cheaper and with confidence.
6.4 Summary
In this Chapter, we have presented a systematic approach to evaluate the re-
sults generated from the simulation and experiments called SPET. It uses non-
parametric statistical tests to conduct and analysed the data collected in order to
improve the confidence and reduce both the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties
in an experiment. Our results have shown that SPET can reduce the experiment
time and demonstrate the observation made is correct and consistent. Further-
more, as an alternative to the existing evaluation approaches, it is shown that not
only the SPET does not show any unexpected effects on the results but it helps
to improve and provide more confidence in the results to demonstrate the de-
pendability of the routing protocol. As future work, the SPET can be extended to
include a systematic experimental design technique to validate the model used




Conclusions and Future Works
The hypothesis posed in this thesis is to investigate whether the multi-modal re-
covery and immune-inspired approaches can be applied to improve the network
dependability of the WSNs, with a focus on the source of uncertainty arising from
the failures that causes unpredictable degradation of the packets delivered. This
is of interest and importance because current routing approaches are unable to
cope with different failure conditions that occur in the dynamic wireless envi-
ronments. Single routing approaches are usually designed and tested on specific
network under controlled environments. This specific routing may yield incor-
rect responses that may worsen the degradation of the networks.
7.1 Significant Contributions of the studies
This section summarises the contributions in this thesis.
A multi-modal approach toward network dependability
In Chapter 4, a multi-modal concept is applied to the network layer of WSNs
to improve the network dependability and ability to tolerate failure. From the
dependability assessment, it was identified that the communication between two
nodes are unreliable and prone to failure. The survey on the existing literatures
conducted has revealed that unreliable communication can deteriorate the packet
delivery reliability and the irregular failure occurring in the network can signifi-
cantly impact the operation and performance of the network protocol. Simulated
results presented in Chapter 3 have demonstrated that a network operating in a
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single routing mode does not always improve the delivery rate and might not be
able to tolerate nodes failures with different durations and density.
To address the problem, the MRP is proposed. The MRP integrates a number
of routing protocols in the node. Each node is allowed to select and operate in a
routing protocol that has a high success rate of forwarding the packet. Three reac-
tive routing protocols are selected and implemented in the MRP to investigate the
benefit of applying the multi-modal approach. The robustness and scalability of
the MRP are evaluated in simulator. The simulated results have shown that the
MRP can deliver more packets and utilise less resources than AODV and NST.
The results also demonstrate that the MRP can tolerate the simulated faults bet-
ter than AODV and NST. Hence, a multi-modal approach improves the network
dependability of the WSNs
Providing self-healing and assisted recovery in WSNs using AIS
In addition to using the multi-modal approach to tolerate different failures,
this thesis also investigates the application of the immune-inspired algorithms
to provide fault tolerance and improve dependability. Based on a review on ex-
isting immune-inspired algorithms, it was found that the RDA has the ability to
detect changes in a dynamic environment and can yield high positive rate to de-
tect anomalies. It does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality or single point
of failure. As a result, the RDA is extended to assist in identifying the character-
istics of the interference detected.
To allow self-healing in WSNs, the IDRS is proposed in Chapter 5. IDRS mim-
ics the immune systems multi-layer defence approaches where the MRP will pro-
vide the first line of defence to detect and perform recovery. If the fault is not
rectified by the MRP, the MRP will activate the RDA to diagnose the failure and
identify the fault. The interactions between the MRP and RDA will allow an ap-
propriate response to be taken in order to rectify the failures.
Using the real TelosB hardware and NS-2 simulator, the performance of IDRS
is compared against the MRP, AODV and NST. Interferences from a WLAN source
are used to generate the failures between two communicating nodes. Results
from both the experiments have showed that the IDRS have improved the packet
reliability and the efficiency of the network. The dependability achieved by IDRS
is significantly higher than MRP. The hardware results also show that the RDA
can correctly identify interferences that can significantly degrade the PDR.
Improving the confidence and reducing the reality gap using statistical ap-
proaches
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Different evaluation techniques such as simulation, testbeds and real hard-
ware deployments have been discussed in Section 2.9 to assess the dependability
of the protocol. Simulations can provide valuable information about a system’s
behaviour, but cannot replace the experiments of the system on real hardware.
However, the use of statistical analysis in the results is limited in many of the
published works. This may lead to false conclusions and affect the credibility of
the works. These experimental techniques are usually susceptible to uncertainty
that could make the outcome invalid. The issue of establishing confidence and
minimising uncertainty in the results produced by these experiments has been
widely ignored and the application of the scientific empirical approach to reduce
uncertainties is limited in WSNs.
In Chapter 6, Systematic Protocol Evaluation Technique (SPET) is proposed to
evaluate and validate the performance of a network protocol. Within the SPET,
a Conceptual Statistical Test Framework (CSTF) is constructed using statistical
tests to reduce statistical variation errors in the experiments. SPET uses extensive
testing in simulation to confirm that the simulation is correctly conducted and
the obtained results are a valid representation of the real hardware. The real
hardware testing allows us to confirm the trends of simulation and understand
the degree of similarity between the two.
Although the results have shown that the reality gap between the hardware
and simulation exists, there was a degree of similarity observed in the results.
SPET has provided us more confidence in the results observed in a WSN’s ex-
periment by incorporating a comprehensive empirical approach with more test
cases and statistical techniques to evaluate a WSNs protocol. The results have
shown that the MRP can achieve a significantly better performance than AODV
and NST.
7.2 Revisiting the research questions
The main goal of this thesis is to show the dependability of the WSNs can be
achieved through the development and evaluation of a dependable routing pro-
tocol. To achieve the goal, we hypothesise in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 that a multi-
modal approach with an immune-inspired classifier can achieve a better dependability in
term of packet delivery rate with a lower energy consumption than a single-mode routing
protocol. We also motivated the need to identify the network characteristics in order for an
appropriate routing mode to be applied to achieve dependability. It is known that the im-
mune systems exhibit several similar characteristics and properties to WSNs that can the
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fault tolerance to achieve dependability. Hence, the AIS is applied to our work to identify
the failure characteristics and assist the MRP in recovery to improve the dependability.
In order to show that the goal has been achieved, we revisit and answer the research
questions formulated in Chapter 1.
• Can we improve the dependability of WSNs by integrating and switching
between different routing protocols using a multi-modal approach to func-
tion according to its operating environments?
To answer the first research question, it is necessary to select appropriate protocols
to operate in the multi-modal mode. Chapter 3 presented the research methodology
to evaluate the performance of different routing protocols. The routing protocol is
chosen as the subject as it plays an important role in achieving dependability and
is susceptible to failures triggered by the radio irregularity. To establish the im-
pact of link stability on the routing protocol and identify the routing protocols to
operate in multi-modal mode, Chapter 3 investigated the performance of different
WSNs protocols and three routing protocols namely AODV, NST, and TinyAODV
were identified. Using the three routing protocols identified, the MRP is proposed.
The robustness and scalability of MRP are evaluated against single mode routing
(AODV and NST) in Chapter 4. The results have shown that the MRP has a higher
PDR and lower energy consumption, routing overhead and delay than AODV and
NST. The statistical tests have shown that the differences are significant.
• Research Question 2: Can immune-inspired algorithm be applied to as-
sist the routing protocol to classify the different characteristics of the non-
intentional interference in order to improve the response?
From many different AIS algorithm proposed in the literature, we have identified in
Chapter 5 that the RDA can detect changes in a dynamic environment. Our appli-
cation of RDA was to determine the characteristics of the interference and classify
them according to the strength and duration. The RDA is extended in order to per-
form classification and interact with the MRP to provide response that can rectify
the failures effectively. IDRS is proposed and evaluated in both real hardware and
software. The results have shown that the RDA can assist the MRP to provide a
good response that has effective increased the packet delivery reliable and reduce
communication overhead.
• Research Question 3: Can the dependability of network protocol be demon-
strated by reducing the experimental uncertainty using state of the art sta-
tistical techniques? The statistical techniques are usually used to show the confi-
dence and reduce the error observed in measurement. As the results observed from
the WSNs simulation is always different from the hardware, there are two ways
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where the statistical approaches can be used to demonstrate the dependability of the
protocols under evaluation. First, a systematic approach with a statistical approach
to the design of the experiments allows us to show the correctness of the experiment
and reduce the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. Second, the application of the
statistical tests on the data allows us to measure the significant of the measure-
ments. To address the final research question, the SPET developed on the statistical
techniques is proposed and evaluated in Chapter 6. From the presented results,
SPET has provided the evidences to show that MRP are significantly better than
AODV and NST and the experiment has been performed correctly and not biased
toward particular protocol under evaluation.
Based on the results and the findings from the works investigated and discussed in this
thesis, it can be concluded that the multi-modal recovery approach with the AIS improve
the dependability of the WSNs.
7.3 Recommendations for further research
During the evaluation and analysis of this thesis, several opportunities have emerged for
derivative and future research.
Implementation in a real operating environment in large scale
Although the proposed scheme and strategies have been extensively analysed and eval-
uated, the number of nodes deployed may not be large enough to represent the real world
deployment. An attempt has been made to produce a test environment as close to the
real where a small number of the real hardware nodes has been deployed to test the IDRS
using interference from a laptop. The scalability of the IDRS is also evaluated on simula-
tion using interference pattern captured on the real hardware motes. Although the results
from both hardware and simulation have shown significant improvement in dependabil-
ity, there is still a need to evaluate the IDRS in a real operating environment where a
higher number of nodes can be deployed. However, a lot of time and effort is needed to
prepare and select an appropriate testing environment and procure the sensor motes. The
experiment may need to be run for a long period of time (months) before any useful and
significant results can be observed. As a result, one of the immediate future works is to
test the IDRS using a large number of nodes in a building with many other radio emitting
devices that can disrupt the communication between nodes.
Ability to classify more faults
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The work in this thesis has been tested on irregular interferences generated by wire-
less Internet devices. It is known that there are also other radio emitting devices that can
interrupt the low power communication of the WSNs node. Hence, it would be interest-
ing to investigate whether the proposed IDRS can still tolerate failures that are generated
by a combination of the different radio interference devices where the interference pattern
generated can be permanent or transients. In principle, the proposed scheme should still
work as the interference generated by IEEE-802.11 devices is more complex and unpre-
dictable. Even if there is an interference pattern that is different from IEEE-802.11, the
RDA should be able to learn and detect it. However, it will be interesting to see is there
any interference that can fail IDRS or at what point will the RDA fail to distinguish the
interference.
Optimisation of the algorithm through parameter analysis
There are a few parameters in the RDA that can affect the detection rate of the IDRS.
Using an iterative approach, a small set of training data is used to determine the parame-
ters that can yield a high true positive detection and recovery rate. Although this approach
may not give the best parameter with an optimum result, it is still able to detect and recov-
ery from the interference with a high accuracy. With the availability of the complex search
algorithms, it would not be difficult to establish the optimum parameters offline. How-
ever, it is more challenging to explore whether it is possible apply reinforcement learning
to tune the parameters online in order to achieve optimum solution. With the ability of
the MRP to interact and work in parallel with RDA and provide feedback to each other,
it will be an interesting research area to investigate whether these parameters tuning can




Screenshoot for Grid Topology
The gird topology used to evaluate the routing protocols presented in Chapter 4.
(a) Network Topology 5 by 5 (b) Network Topology 7 by 7
Figure A.1: Network Topology 5 by 5 (Figure A.1(a)) and 7 by 7 (Figure A.1(b)
)
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Figure A.2: Network Topology 10 by 10
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Figure A.3: Network Topology 15 by 15
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Figure A.4: Network Topology 20 by 20
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Figure A.5: Network Topology 30 by 30
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Glossary
This glossary provides definitions related to the WSNs and biological terminology. These defini-
tions are taken from the following references: Goldsby et al. (2003) and De Castro and Timmis
(2002).
Adaptive immune system/Adaptive immunity: A system is composed of highly specialized,
systemic cells and processes that eliminate or prevent pathogenic attack.
Affinity: The strength of binding interaction between antigen and antibody molecules.
Antibody: Protein molecule produced and secreted by B-Cell in response to antigen.
Antigen: Substance that can induce an immune response when introduced into the body.
Antigen-presenting cell: A cell that can ”present” antigen in a form that T cells can recognize
it.
Autoimmune response: A response that occurs when the body tissues are attacked by its own
immune system.
B-cells: A type of lymphocyte (white blood cell) that can mature into a plasma cells and memory
B cells.
Bone marrow: The soft blood-forming tissue that fills the cavities of bones and contains fat and
immature and mature blood cells, including white blood cells, red blood cells, and platelets.
Co-stimulation: An event in the immune system involving the delivery of a second signal by an
antigen-presenting cell.
Cytokine: A small protein released by cells that has a specific effect on the interactions between
cells, on communications between cells or on the behavior of cells.
Danger signal: Signals produced as a result of premature or unplanned cell death.
Dendritic cell: A special type of cell that is a key regulator of the immune system, acting as a
professional antigen-presenting cell (APC) capable of activating nave T cells and stimulating the
growth and differentiation of B cells.
Differentiation (in cells): A process where a less specialized (premature) cell becomes a more
specialized cell type.
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ECG: ElectroCardioGram (EKG) is a noninvasive test that is used to reflect underlying heart
conditions by measuring the electrical activity of the heart.
Effector: An cell capable of responding to a stimulus.
Effector function: A function that transmits an impulse to immune system.
EMG: ElectroMyoGram (EMG) is a test that is used to record and detect abnormal electrical ac-
tivity of muscle occur in many diseases and conditions.
Enzymes: are molecules that can cause and accelerate chemical reactions.
Homeostasis: A property of cells, tissues, and organisms that allows the maintenance and regu-
lation of the stability and constancy needed to function properly.
Innate immune system/Innate immunity: The innate immune system comprises the cells and
mechanisms that defend the host from infection by other organisms, in a non-specific manner.
Lymph nodes: Small rounded or bean-shaped masses of lymphatic tissue surrounded by a cap-
sule of connective tissue, that are located in many places. in the lymphatic system throughout the
body. Lymph nodes filter the lymphatic fluid and store special cells that can remove bacteria and
proteins that are traveling through the body in the lymph fluid.
Lymphocytes: A small white blood cell that plays a large role in defending the body against dis-
ease and are responsible for immune responses.
Macrophage: A type of white blood that ingests (takes in) foreign material.
Major histocompatibility complex: A cluster of genes encoding polymorphic cell-surface molecules
concerned with antigen production and critical to the success of transplantation.
Memory cells: Mature B cells that have an affinity for a particular antigen, where a second ex-
posure with that antigen leads to an enhanced and faster response.
Micro-organism: A very tiny living object.
Pathogen: A microorganism that can cause illness such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi.
Pathogen associated molecular pattern: Pathogen associated molecular pattern (PAMP) are
proteins expressed exclusively by pathogen, which can be detected by DCs and result in immune
activation.
Plasma cells: Mature B Cells that produce antibodies (proteins) necessary to fight off infections.
Proteins: Organic compounds made up of amoni acid found in animal cells.
Receptor: A molecule on the surface of a cell that selectively receives and binds a specific sub-
stance.
Somatic mutation: A process that occurs during clonal expansion that permits refinement of
the antibody specificity with relation to the selective antigen.
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Stem cells: Primitive, ”unspecialized” cells that are able to divide and become specialized cells of
the immune systems.
T-cells: A type of lymphocytes, that attack body cells when they have been taken over by viruses
or have become cancerous.
T-helper cell: A type of T cell that provides help to other cells in the immune response by recog-
nizing foreign antigens and secreting substances called cytokines that activate T and B cells.
Thymus: A lymphoid organ situated in the center of the upper chest just behind the sternum
(breastbone) where lymphocytes mature, multiply, and become T cells.
White blood cells: Cells in the immune system that help the body fight infection.
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